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Frequently Asked Questions Concerning the Downing of KAL
Flight 007 and Attendant Matters
These questions explore issues that have come up in
discussions. They deal with material that is in the book Rescue 007: The Untold Story of KAL
007 and its Survivors as well as newer
information or information that was not included. This
section is intended to be a living and growing part of the
web site. Send us
your questions and we will post answers.
- Why did the Russians initially
deny that they had shot down the civilian flight,
KAL 007? Why have the Russians continued to hold the
passengers to this day?
- What sort of interference has
there been in conducting and publicizing this
research?
- What can be said about the
deviation of KAL flight 007 from its intended
course?
- Are the "Black Box" tapes and
their transcripts reliable? How are they
used? Have they been "doctored"?
- What happened to KAL 007 when the
missile exploded? How do the tapes help us to
understand?
- What can be said about how
airworthy or navigable KAL 007 was after the Black
Box tapes end?
- What do we know about the final
minutes of KAL 007's flight and how do we know it?
- What is the "CIA Report", where
did it come from and what is its value?
- Did KAL 007 land on Sakhalin or
on the water off Moneron?
- What happened to the surviving
passengers and crew after they were captured by the
Soviets?
- Why would the Soviets keep the
KAL 007 passengers and crew alive instead of
"killing off" the evidence against them?
- Do any of the items belonging to
the passengers which were returned by the Soviets
bear on the question of passenger rescue? What
about the shoes?
- What happened to the baggage?
- Are there records of people
surviving other ditching attempts?
- If the KAL 007 children were
indeed settled in Soviet orphanages after the
shootdown, as this site contends in FAQ 10, why have
we not heard from them? Wouldn't they have memories
of their original parents and life and wouldn't they
want the world to know?
The answers to these questions lie in the accepted
appraisal of the Cold War
situation of 1983:
- President Reagan had already publicly castigated the
USSR as the "Evil Empire."

- On December 12, 1979, Joseph Luns, Secretary General
of NATO, announced that the United States would deploy
both Pershing II intermediate range ballistic missiles
and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe -- only
six minutes from Moscow! -- to counter the Soviet
advantage in ICBMs.
- Yuri Andropov was trying to make the Soviet Union
appear as a good, peace-loving nation to forestall
NATO's missile deployment.
- If the Soviets had released the passengers right away,
they would have been admitting to their culpability,
which would have destroyed their "peace-loving"
image. As it turned out, their efforts did not
work. The US played the tape of the Su-15 pilot,
Gennadie Osipovich, saying "the target is destroyed" at
the United Nations. NATO then deployed the
Pershing II missiles in November of 1983. They
remained in Europe until Gorbachev agreed to the breakup
of the Warsaw Pact. (In December 1987, Reagan and
Gorbachev signed a treaty that for the first time
eliminated the entire class of intermediate-range
missiles).
- In the failed coup against Gorbachev in August, 1991,
fifteen plotters committed suicide, including General
Pugo and Marshal Akhromeyev. On the other hand,
plotters Marshal Varrenikov and KGB head, Vladimir
Kryuchkov, were imprisoned by Gorbachev but released
soon thereafter. Varrenikov was commander in chief
of the army. Kryuchkov had been head of the First
Chief Directorate of the KGB at the time of the
shoot-down. These two represented elements within
the Soviet military that were strongly xenophobic,
anti-US and oriented towards nuclear
confrontation. These were the same ones who lead
the cover-up of KAL 007 from the start.
(Varrenikov arrived on Sakhalin on September 1st to head
up the first military inquest and to contain the
damage. Kryuchkov was a senior officer in the KGB
and personally interrogated congressman Larry McDonald
at the Lubyanka prison in Moscow shortly after the plane
came down.) Their release reflects their
continuing strength. Kryuchkov is still active, a
personal friend of Russian President Putin and on the
lecture circuit(!), and Varrenikov is now chairman of
the Committee for Veteran's Affairs of the Russian State
Duma. To this day, they have a strong interest in
maintaining the cover-up. A recent book, War
Scare: Russia and America on the Nuclear Brink by
Peter Vincent Pry, Praeger Publishers, 1999, shows how
these elements were active during the coup attempt
against Boris Yeltsin in October, 1993, and how they
continue to exist. These elements are even more
dangerous now as they are acutely aware of how weak
Russia's conventional forces are today, which leaves
them only the option of nuclear solutions.
- Russia may fear that the release of the KAL 007
passengers and crew might create a negative reaction in
the US and bring an end to the American aid that Russia
currently receives.
- Finally, IF (a big "if") the Soviets shot down KAL 007
in order to get Larry McDonald (as some believe), or if
they discovered the prize they had unintentionally
received was too precious to return, they could not
release any of the passengers as this would
force them to admit to their holding him.
Avraham Shifrin, an émigré from the Soviet
Union who established the
Research Centre for Soviet Prisons, Psych-prisons and
Forced-Labor Concentration
Camps in Israel conducted research into the downing of KAL
007. He
encountered opposition to the public disclosure of the
results of his
investigation. In 1991, he scheduled a press
conference to lay out the
evidence for the survival of KAL 007 and those aboard and
their subsequent
incarceration by the Soviets. The day before the
conference took place,
persons claiming to be from the Research Centre office
contacted the various
media representatives invited and stated that the press
conference had been
cancelled. To Shifrin's total surprise, none of the
correspondents
contacted came to the conference.
The time of greatest observable opposition to my work was
in the middle
1990's.
Attempts to prevent South Korean media from reviewing and
publicizing Centre
findings were either partially or completely
successful. Three interviews
with Shifrin and myself were carried out in Israel for
publication in the Korean
media -- the press, magazines and prime time TV. The
Korean C.I.A. yanked
the TV series off the air after two shows and prevented
all newspaper notice of
their findings. They failed to prevent the
publication of our findings in
the January 1996 issue of the Korean language magazine, Win.
The
21-page summary to the C.I.A.
Report appeared in the February 1996
edition. However, the magazine was prohibited from
printing the rest of
the seven part series.
Shortly before the publications, a representative of the
South Korean embassy
in Tel Aviv, considered by members of the local Korean
expatriate community to
be an agent of the Korean C.I.A., contacted me. He
requested an interview
with me to which I agreed. Our conversation lasted
for close to two
hours. During the first half of the interview he
tried to dissuade me of
my convictions about the passenger rescue. He spent
the rest of the time
trying to find out about my past and planned contacts with
the Korean
media. I tried not to reveal anything while at the
same time seeking to
learn as much as I could about the Korean government's
interest in KAL 007 this
nine years after the event. A short while later the
last of our contacts
with the Korean media -- a TV team -- was prevented from
boarding their
scheduled flight from Seoul to Tel Aviv.
There have been other indications of interference such as
apparent false
leads, veiled threats, etc., but I have not detailed these
as they are more
difficult to pin down and/or verify.
All of this opposition has only strengthened my
conviction that there are
governments that wish to cover up the incident.

KAL 007's actual and planned flightpaths. Source:
www.cia.gov
Flights of this nature use a number of navigational aids,
the primary one at
the time being the Inertial Navigation System (INS).
The INS employs navigational
"landmarks" called "way points." The first two of
these (after Anchorage) on KAL 007's flight from Anchorage
to Seoul were Cairn
Mountain (28 minutes into the flight) and Bethel (50
minutes into the
flight). Along the route is a range of permissible
deviation from the
planned route termed the "Desired Track Capture
Envelope." As
long as the flight stays within this envelope, the
autopilot can be captured and
controlled by the INS and the plane can be brought back on
track if it strays.
Shortly after takeoff, the plane was put on autopilot and
the "NAV
Mode" set to "Magnetic Heading" (determined by the
magnetic North
Pole in northeast Canada, some 1,300 miles from true
north). The plane
began to deviate from its planned course about ten minutes
into the
flight. No reason is given in the ICAO report for
this.
There are two possible reasons why the INS had not
captured the autopilot.
- The pilots never set the autopilot mode to INS.
- The pilots set the autopilot mode to INS but only
after the flight had passed outside of the 7.5 nautical
mile (NM) envelope. This occurred after the Cairn
Mountain way point. At Cairn Mountain, the flight
was already 6.5 miles off course but still within the
envelope. If Air Traffic Control had notified KAL
007 that they had deviated from the course, they could
have still corrected the situation by switching the NAV
mode from Magnetic Heading to INS. Of all the
flights that day, Anchorage Air Traffic Control failed
to mark the positions of only KAL 007 and KAL 015.
Congressman McDonald was aboard KAL 007; Senators Helms
and Symms and Congressman Hubbard were aboard KAL
015. This failure of Air Traffic Control to mark
down the position of KAL 007 and KAL 015 (and only those
two flights) is both unfortunate and curious.
Note: The pilots would have been assured by means
of an indicator light
that they had selected the autopilot for INS but they
would have had no means of
knowing that since they were already outside the 7.5-mile
envelope, the
autopilot had, in fact, not come under the control of
INS. "The lack
of an indication on the flight director mode deprived the
crew of a cue which
might have drawn their attention to the fact that the
autopilot was not being
controlled by the INS." (ICAO 1993, Pg. 43.)
The pilots would also have been able to correct "actual
track" to
desired track without using the INS by using Bethel's
VORTAC (Very High
Frequency Omni-Directional Range Tactical Air Navigation
system) as a
"course provider" instead of as a "reporting station"
which
it could not do anyway as the flight was too far off
course (12.6 NM) at that
point for reporting.
Anchorage's VOR was out of order from 10:17 pm, August
23, to 12:39 am,
September 2. (The crew of the flight had been warned
of this fact via a
Notice to Airmen or NOTAM.) If it had not been out
of order and if flight
007 had been notified, it could have used the Anchorage
"radial" to
correct course -- the VOR display on the plane would have
read "from"
instead of "to."
By the time flight 007 reached way point Bethel, it was
12.6 NM off course. Continuing on its magnetic north
heading, rather than the desired tracked set by its
Inertial Navigation System (INS), KAL 007 would continue
its deviation -- 60 nautical miles (NM) off course at
waypoint NABIE, 100 NM at waypoint NUKKS, and 160 NM at
waypoin NEEVA -- until it would enter Soviet territory
just north of Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula and
then into harm's way over Sakhalin Island.
Normally, aircraft departing Anchorage for the Far East
would be "tracking out", that is, using the Anchorage VOR
radial for navigation along the desired track.
Knowing that the Anchorage VOR was out should have
increased the pilots' sense of the importance of verifying
their position by using the radial from the VOR(TAC) at
the next (and last) continental navigation station--the
"gateway" station at the small fishing village of Bethel,
Alaska.
At 49 minutes after take-off, the pilot was reporting to
be on course and at Bethel, "007, Bethel at forty-niner."
But, in reality, they were far off course. For at 50
minutes after take-off, U.S. Air Force radar at King
Salmon, Alaska had tracked KAL 007 at a full 12.6 nautical
miles north of where it should have been
(Bethel)--exceeding by more than six times, its
permissible "leeway" drift from the course set by the INS.
In order for the INS (calibrated to true north) to
capture the autopilot and
keep it on the desired track, the autopilot had to be set
to
"INS." The Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) shows
that the
INS never captured the autopilot. KAL 007 flew at a
"constant
magnetic heading" of 245 or 246 degrees for the entire
flight. If the
INS had captured the autopilot, the magnetic heading would
not have been constant but would have changed with
each leg of the desired track since the waypoints were not
in a straight line.
ICAO subcontracted BEA (Bureau Enquetes-Accidents) of
France to examine and
analyze the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR), the Digital
Flight Data Recorder (DFDR)
and their tapes.
The Soviets had these tapes in their possession for nine
years, during which
time they denied having them. When strong evidence
to the contrary came to
light, President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Republic
admitted having the tapes
and turned them over to the United Nations.
Concerning the possibility of
Soviet tampering with the tapes during this period,
Timothy Maier of Insight
Magazine has this to say:
Even though portions of the tapes were unintelligible,
they were never technically analyzed to determine if
there were erasure gaps because the technology to do so
didn't exist at the time they were provided to ICAO in
1993. Experts tell Insight that
Intelligent Devices, a Washington sound-extraction
company currently seeking to review the 18-and-one-half
minute gap on the Nixon tapes, might be able to extract
voices from the KAL 007 tapes if Congress were to
request it. (Insight Magazine, April 2001)
There are evidences of possible manipulation --
evidences that need to
be further examined. (BEA may still retain the
original tapes or copies of
them.)
- As Gary Lesser, spokesman for Boeing Co., explains,
"As long as there is one engine running, both recorders
would still operate until the plane hits the
water." The engines were operating normally, as
twice reported by the co-pilot on the portions of the
CVR tape transcribed and released. Since the
recording "stopped" while the plane was still in flight,
104 seconds after missile detonation, we may ask if
there is any evidence of erasure, deletion, splicing or
additions to the tapes.
- The Sundstrand DFDR's 800 ft. tape recorded 27 hours
of KAL flights from Seoul to Anchorage, Anchorage to JFK
airport in New York City, JFK to Anchorage and KAL
flight 007 from Anchorage on its way to Seoul.
There were splice joints that ICAO could explain only on
the basis of breaks due to a high speed impact.
"Spliced joints were found at approximately 108, 440,
442, and 463 ft. from the beginning of the tape.
The middle two were spaced at a distance corresponding
to the length of the tape between the two reels and the
last data was recorded between these two joints.
It was not unusual for the tape to break as a result of
high speed impacts, near where it left the reels."
(ICAO Report, 1993, pg. 30, paragraph 1.14.3.5.4)
However, if the recorder had not met with a high speed
impact, as we contend, then these splices require
another explanation. In addition, we need to point
out - it can no longer be maintained that the black
boxes stopped simultaneously due to a "high speed
impact" as the time of stoppage was 104 seconds after
missile detonation (18:26:02) while the Russian
military transcripts appended to the 1993 ICAO report
now show us that KAL 007 continued its journey after
missile detonation at least until 1835
GMT, and the Russian radar trackings have KAL 007
continuing its flight in wide descending spirals over
Moneron Island at least until 1838 GMT.
- The Collins Cockpit Voice Recorder loop tape requires
further present-day state-of-the-art examination.
The loop contains its full one-half-hour of
recording. If the Soviets had deleted most of the
post-detonation flight from the end of the tape, they
must have added the amount deleted to the "beginning" of
the loop -- that portion prior to the detonation.
ICAO concluded that during the first nine minutes of
casual conversation between Captain Chun and his First
Officer, unusual background noise was also
recorded. "Intermittently through the first seven
minutes forty-five seconds of recordings some unusual
sounds occurred which were identified as keyed
continuous wave semi-automatic Morse code tone.
Due to the poor quality of the recorded signal and the
limited activity no read-out or user identification was
possible." (ICAO Report, 1993, pg. 25, paragraph
1.14.2.4.3.) Though apparently Morse code, what is
unusual and unidentifiable at such a critical juncture
ought to be further examined for clarification.
The Soviets falsified and re-recorded their own
audiotape of their interceptor pilot and ground
controller communications during the shoot down using an
electric shaver in the background to simulate radio
static! (This information comes from the
Izvestia 1991 series on KAL 007 as reported in the
Republican Staff
Study/"CIA Report", pg. 69)
In short, for the following reasons, the doctoring of the
tapes by the
Soviets is highly likely:
- Both components of the black box (CVR and DFDR) were
operating after the missile detonation.
- There is no evidence of impairment of the electrical
system (High Frequency broadcast by KAL 007 to Japanese
ground control after detonation of missile and
all four engines reported to be operating normally.)
- Both recorders "stopped" minutes prior to any
conjectured aerial mishap (substantiated by both radar
trackings and military real-time communications.)
- Both recorders, with electric lines on opposite sites
of the fuselage and with separate points of attachments
to their respective instruments, "stopped working" at
precisely the same second.
Since present-day technology may decipher what 1993
technology could not and
since ICAO's final report is both politicized and
minimalist (the wording of the
final report is the product of voting by the various
national representatives to
the ICAO -- Russia, the U.S., etc. -- in contrast to the
non-politically
oriented wording of the technical committee reports) we
ought to have another go
at these tapes. That the recorder with its tape had
not met with a high-speed impact at the time the tape
stopped - 1 minute and 44 seconds after missile detonation
- is abundantly evidenced by both Soviet ground-to-ground
communications and radar trackings showing KAL 007's
flight, both of which show that, far from terminating at a
high-speed impact at this time (or any time), KAL 007
continued for at least over another 10 minutes (1838
GMT). And this at a decelerating rate.
In a symphony, each instrument has its own individual
"story line",
yet there is one overriding theme that includes them
all. So it is with
the Symphony in DFDR. Each line of the Digital
Flight Data Recorder (DFDR)
graph tells us a coherent story and with all together, a
saga whose theme is
Escape From Destruction!
Each instrument playing its own line takes us more deeply
into the understanding
of just how KAL 007 escaped destruction. The
instruments:
- Every word spoken by Pilot-in-Command, Chun Byung-In,
Co-Pilot and First Officer, Son Dong-Hui, and Flight
Engineer, Kim Eui-Dong, recorded for us by the Cockpit
Voice Recorder.
- The condition of sixteen parameters picked up by
sensors reporting the different functions of the
aircraft recorded for us by the Digital Flight Data
Recorder.
For this discussion, refer to the two graphs, Plot
1 and Plot 2
(prepared by Laboratoire BEA). The times appear in
four-second
intervals at the bottom of each chart.
At 18:26:02 (06:26:02 Sakhalin time), Maj. Osipovich's
ANAB radar-guided
air-to-air missile explodes 50 meters behind and slightly
to the right of KAL
007's tail.
The nose begins to pitch up immediately (Plot 1, line 2)
to be followed by a
more gradual increase in altitude (Plot 1, line 1).
These changes appear on
the crew's instruments. They may also have sensed
them. Immediately
upon missile detonation, the jumbo jet begins to
experience buffeting (yawing)
as the dual channel yaw damper is damaged (Plot 2, line
6). Yawing would
not have occurred if either No. 1 or No. 2 hydraulic
systems were fully
operational. What does not happen that should have
happened is that the
control column (Plot 1, line 3) does not thrust forward
upon impact (it should
have done so, as the plane was on autopilot -- plot 2,
line 8 -- to bring down
the plane to its former altitude of 35,000 feet).
This failure of the
autopilot to correct the rise in altitude indicates that
hydraulic system No. 3,
which operates the autopilot actuator, a system
controlling the plane's
elevators, was damaged or out. KAL 007's airspeed
(Plot 1, line 4) and
acceleration rate (Plot 1, line 5) both begin to decrease
as the plane begins to
climb.
At 18:26:06, Capt. Chun yells out, "What happened?"
First
Officer Son responds, "What?" Two seconds later,
Chun yells,
"Retard throttles." Son responds, "Engines normal,
sir." (This indicates that Maj. Osipovich's heat
seeking missile has
missed its mark.) KAL 007 continues its climb (it
will do so until it
reaches 38,250 ft. in altitude -- Plot 1, line 1) when at
twenty seconds after
missile detonation a click is heard in the cabin -- which
is identified as the
"automatic pilot disconnect warning" sound. Pilot or
co-pilot
has disconnected the autopilot and is now manually
thrusting the control column
forward (Plot 1, line 3) in order to bring down the
plane. But we see that
though the autopilot has been turned "off" (Plot 2, line
8), manual
mode will not kick in for another twenty seconds (Plot 2,
line 9). This
failure of manual to engage upon being commanded indicates
again, failure in
hydraulic systems No. 1 and No. 2. But there is
progress, of sorts!
Though still rising in altitude, with the thrusting
forward of the control
column, KAL 007's nose begins to come down. That is,
pitch is being
corrected (Plot 1, line 2). Nevertheless, Capt. Chun
absorbed with the
danger of the rising altitude, calls out, "Altitude is
going up!...
Altitude is going up!" (18:26:22 and 18:26:24) But
immediately
another problem presents itself.
Chun (18:26:25): Speed brake is coming out!
Son (18:26:26): What? What?
Chun (18:26:29): Check it out!
But, according to the DFDR, the speed brake was not
coming out. The
pilots immediately return to the main problem.
Son (18:26:33): I am not able to drop
altitude -- now unable.
Chun (18:26:38): Altitude is going up.
Chun (18:26:40): This is not working.
This is not working.
And here, a change takes place.
If we could perceive what tapes cannot reveal, we would
identify -- and
identify with -- the transition from utter despair to
jubilation through to
quiet confidence and determination.
At 18:26:41, Capt. Chun apparently orders First Officer
Son to again
disengage the autopilot "manually." Son appears to
do so at the
same time he despairingly says, "cannot do manually"
(18:26:42) and a
second later reiterates, "not working manually
also." But, at
that moment two things happen. The sound of the
autopilot disconnect
warning is heard once again and the autopilot kicks in to
the desired manual
mode (Plot 2, line 9). Capt. Chun is once again in
control.
At 18:26:45, First Officer Son again reports, "Engines
are normal,
sir." Once again, there is confirmation that the
heat-seeking missile
failed to hit its mark.
Though Capt. Chun does not move the control column any
more forward than it
already is (Plot 1, line 3), the altitude (Plot 1, line 1)
begins to come down
and is now in line with the pitch (Plot 1, line 2).
Both airspeed (Plot 1,
line 4) and acceleration (Plot 1, line 5) increase rapidly
as KAL 007 begins a
quick descent.
Still in descent, Capt. Chun and Flight Engineer, Kim
Eui-Dong blurt out (one
second apart):
Kim (18:36:50): Is it power compression?
Chun (18:36:51): Is that right?
Kim (18:36:52): All or both.
Chun (18:36:53): Is that right?
For the next nine seconds there is silence, but Capt.
Chun will be at the
height of activity. As KAL 007 reaches its peak of
acceleration and
descends to slightly under pre-missile altitude, Capt.
Chun brings the nose up
for about eight seconds (Plot 1, line 2), acceleration
decreases markedly and
then levels out at pre-missile rate.
Prior to the eight-second pull-up, First Officer Son is
on the High Frequency
Radio No. 1 calling Tokyo Air Traffic Control Center (Plot
2, line 7):
Son (18:26:57): Tokyo Radio, Korean Air
Zero Zero Seven
Tokyo (18:27:02): Korean Air Zero Zero
Seven, Tokyo
Son (18:27:04): Roger, Korean Air Zero Zero
Seven... (unreadable)
Ah, we (are experiencing)...
Chun, interjecting (18:27:09): ALL
COMPRESSION
Son (18:27:10): Rapid compressions.
Descend to one zero
thousand.
As First Officer Son's call to Tokyo concludes, Capt.
Chun begins his gradual
descent, which will eventually take KAL 007 to a
water-ditching off the shores
of tiny Moneron Island.
Though yawing has continued through to the end of the
tape and, presumably,
to the end of the flight, all the other major parameters
indicate that KAL 007
exhibits a good measure of airworthiness and
control. The dive has been
stopped and the jumbo jet is in a slight descent.
Pitch is in line with
the angle of descent. "Indicated Air Speed" (IAS,
Plot 1, line
4) has returned almost exactly to what it was prior to
missile detonation (310 knots),
after rapid acceleration in dive, and rapid deceleration
at the end of the
eight-second pull-up, KAL 007 is now at steady, normal
acceleration -- as it was
prior to missile detonation -- and the autopilot, now in
the command position
off, is operating as it should with Capt. Chun in manual
control. But
there is work to do at hand. From the flight deck
(the transcript does not
identify the voices):
18:27:20: Now... We have to set this
18:27:23: speed
18:27:26: Stand by, stand by, stand by,
set!
KAL 007, with its flight crew of three, 240 passengers
including 22 children,
20 cabin attendants, and 6 "deadheaders" (repositioning
flight
personnel), has escaped destruction!
Note: Maintaining control of KAL 007 with three of
its four hydraulic
systems damaged or out might well have been difficult but
by no means
impossible. Appendix E (in Rescue
007) contains the transcript of
an aircraft being flown eighteen miles with all hydraulics
out.
G. Norris and M. Wagner in Boeing (MBT
Publishing, Osceolo, WI 1998)
explain (pg. 128) the safety benefits of multiple
redundant hydraulic systems
for the 747 and give an example.
The explanation -- "The hydraulics provided actuation for
all the
primary flight controls; all secondary flight controls
(except leading edge
flaps); and landing gear retraction, extension, gear
steering, and wheel
braking. Systems 1 and 4 could be used for all
purposes [KAL 007's
hydraulic system no. 4 was undamaged], while systems 2 and
3 were normally used
for flight control only... System 4 also had a third
electrical power
source. Each primary flight control axis received
power from all four
hydraulic systems."
The example -- In July of 1971, Pan Am's flagship
aircraft, a Boeing 747,
registered N747PA, hit a light gantry upon take-off from
San Francisco
International Airport. The crew had misjudged the
speed of the aircraft
and the length of the runway. As the plane pulled up
sharply in an attempt
to clear it, the rear end of the fuselage came down on the
gantry. The
aircraft continued to take off and with the gantry stuck
in its cargo area and
with three of the hydraulic systems destroyed. The
jumbo jet circled the
airport and made a safe landing -- still with the gantry
stuck through its cargo
area and only one hydraulic system operational.
The Black Box tapes handed over by the Russians end one
minute and forty-four seconds after missile detonation. It
is clear from the available tape that the plane did escape
destruction and regained a good measure of control. We
know from Soviet and Japanese radar trackings that the
flight lasted at least an additional ten minutes or so. We
also have Soviet ground-to-ground communications from this
period. These sources together confirm to us that KAL 007
was airworthy, under control and able to navigate
accurately.
- After missile detonation, KAL 007 made a turn to the
north. Gen. Kornukov was surprised, apparently, that the
jumbo jet had not only survived the attack and was able
to maneuver, but that it turned north, deeper into
Soviet territory rather than west to international
waters.
Lt. Col. Gerasimenko (6:28): The target has
turned to the north.
Gen. Kornukov: The target turned to the
north?
Gerasimenko: Affirmative.
Kornukov: Bring the [MiG] 23 in to destroy
it!
- When KAL 007 had descended to 5000 meters (16,400
ft.), the altitude at which crew and passengers could
breath without assistance, it slowed down and continued
in level flight for four minutes. (Rescue
007, pg. 54)
- It is clear that KAL 007 ended these four minutes of
level flight at 5000 meters to begin a spiral descent
precisely over Moneron Island. (Soviet efforts at
deception would later try to make it seem that the
flight crashed either 11 miles north in Soviet waters or
22 miles north in international waters. (Rescue 007, Appendix B, pg.
131ff.) Please review these points:
- The exact point in time at which the spiral
descent began is startling. It also destroys any
assumptions that the plane was out of control, not
to mention cart wheeling uncontrollably to its
demise.
- The Tatar Strait is a body of water bounded on the
north and west by the Soviet mainland and on the
east by 590-mile-long Sakhalin Island. To the south
is the Sea of Japan. In this whole body of water,
there is one tiny little island-Moneron. It is about
25 miles west of Sakhalin and some 125 miles from
the mainland. The nearest land besides these is the
small Japanese island of Rebun about 53 miles to the
south.
- On September 1, 1983, at 18:36 GMT, as reported in
the ICAO report, the cloud cover was full at an
altitude of 2000 meters. This prevented the Soviet
fighter planes from finding the jumbo jet once it
had descended into the clouds. It was also night,
not quite two hours before dawn.
For KAL 007 to descend, after four minutes of level
flight, from 5000 meters to precisely the one and only
spot where a water-landing could be effected close
enough to a land mass to provide safety, through clouds,
at night, demonstrates a very high degree of
airworthiness and navigability as well as a good
knowledge of the area.
Thus, any idea that KAL 007 was destroyed by missile
impact or at any time in its twelve-minute descent to the
surface of the Tatar Strait is untenable and contrary to
all evidence.
Records exist covering the flight of KAL 007 for a total
of twelve minutes after it was attacked. At the time of
the attack, the plane was cruising at an altitude of about
35,000 feet. Immediately upon impact, the nose pitched up
and the plane rose to an altitude of 38,250 feet. Capt.
Chun was able to turn off the autopilot and regain control
of the aircraft bringing it back down to the cruising
altitude of about 35,000 feet. This took 1 minute and 13
seconds (see Question 5 in this FAQ). Three minutes after
being hit, the plane was at 30,000 feet
(Republican Staff Study/"CIA
Report", pg. 45, based on Japanese Self Defense
Force radar, Wakkanai, Hokkaido, Japan). The Captain then
began a rapid emergency descent to 16,400 feet (reported
as 5000 meters in the ICAO 1993 report) where passengers
and crew could breathe without assistance. This descent
lasted for two minutes. There is some uncertainty about
the progress of KAL 007's descent for the next four
minutes. One source indicates that the plane descended
slowly to 5,000 ft., then began circling and descending
more slowly to 1,000 ft over the final three minutes
before disappearing. Other sources indicate that Capt.
Chun leveled the aircraft's flight at 16,400 ft. and flew
for at least four minutes of level flight before beginning
a spiral descent that lasted until the plane went off the
Soviet radar screens. During the four-minute period, the
plane was heading from Sakhalin to Moneron Island.
Though not all sources cover the full twelve minutes, they
all agree in presenting the composite picture that KAL 007
flew for twelve minutes from the moment of attack until it
disappeared from the radar screens and that the speed of
descent decreased (rather than increasing) which, along
with the flight pattern, demonstrates that the aircraft
was under control for the entire period. It finally
circled Moneron, the only landmass, a tiny island, in the
entire Tatar Strait; the only place a water ditching could
be effected with the greatest possibility of survival once
Sakhalin had been left behind.
We believe that KAL 007 did, indeed, level off at 5000
meters (16,400 ft.) and did maintain level flight until it
had reached Moneron Island where it descended in a wide
spiral.
The various pertinent sources are quoted below (all times
given are Greenwich Mean Time-Zulu. Missile detonation
occurred at 18:26:02.):
- "After this fast, 5 minute spiral descent, but still
consistent with standard flight procedure in the
circumstances, KAL-007 then remained airborne for at
least about 7 more minutes, en route to a location in
Soviet territorial waters between Moneron Island and
Sakhalin Island. KAL-007 was thus airborne for a
total post-attack flight time of at least 12 minutes.
Moreover, KAL-007's altitude after a total of 9
minutes of flight was about 5,000 feet.
"The original U.S. special intelligence raw data, as
publicly reported in the U.S. statement to the United
Nations Security Council on September 1, 1983 by U.S.
Ambassador Charles Lichenstein, stated: 'At 1830 hours
[after 4 minutes], the Korean aircraft was reported by
radar at an altitude of 5,000 meters...
"Moreover, also on September 1, Secretary of State
George Shultz also stated more fully: 'At 1826 hours the
Soviet pilot reported that he fired a missile and the
target was destroyed. At 1830 hours [or 4 minutes later]
the Korean aircraft was reported by radar 5,000
meters [16,400 feet]. At 1838 hours [12 minutes after
being hit] the Korean plane disappeared from the radar
screen.'"
Republican Staff
Study/"CIA Report", pg. 43 (quoted exact,
including bracketed comments and underlining) (Note: the
statement of 18:30 hours was later corrected to 18:31
hours.)
- Concerning KAL 007's ability to level out at 5000
meters and maintain a level flight of 4 to 5 minutes,
from transcripts included with the 1993 ICAO Report
Information Paper No. 1, pg. 134-135:
Gen. Kornukov (18:32): Tell the 23
[MiG]... afterburner. Open fire, destroy the target,
then land at home base.
Lt. Col. Gerasimenko (acting commander, 41st Fighter
Regiment, viewing radar): Roger
Kornukov: Altitude... What is the altitude
of our fighter and the altitude of the target?
Quickly. The altitude of the target and the altitude of
the fighter!
...
Why don't you say anything? Gerasimenko!
...
Gerasimenko (18:33): Gerasimenko. Altitude
of target is 5,000.
Kornukov: 5,000 already?
Gerasimenko (18:34): Affirmative, turning
left, right, apparently it is descending.
- "The last plotted radar position of the target was
18:35 hours at 5,000 meters." (ICAO 1993, pg. 53, para.
2.15.8)
- Concerning the location of KAL 007's descent,
precisely over the island of Moneron, from transcripts
included with the 1993 ICAO Report:
Gen. Kornukov (18:36): ...you know the
range, where the target is. It is over Moneron...
(ICAO, 1993, Information Paper No. 1, pg. 136.)
Lt. Col. Novoseletsky (commander, Smirykh Air Force
Base) (18:39): So, the task. They say it has
violated the State border again now?
Flight Controller Titovnin: Well, it is
the area of Moneron, of course, over our territory.
Lt. Col. Novosletsky: Get it! Get it! Go
ahead, bring in the MiG 23
(ICAO, 1993, Information Paper No. 1, pg. 90.)
Gen. Strogov (18:55): What ships do we
have near Moneron Island, if [they are] civilians, sent
(sic.) [them] there immediately
(ICAO, 1993, Information Paper No. 1, pg. 96.)
- "The geographic coordinates, showing where KAL-007 was
hit, where it then went, and where it disappeared from
Soviet radars, are known from special intelligence with
a fair degree of precision, and these points have been
plotted on U.S. Intelligence maps. For example, at 9
minutes after being hit, and at an altitude of 5,000
feet, KAL-007's last tracked location, it was located
approximately at co-ordinates 4617N-14115E. The special
intelligence showing Soviet radar tracks indicate a
flight path from Sakhalin Island toward Moneron Island,
approaching from the North headed toward the south, and
a ditching or crash site probably inside Soviet
territorial waters, reportedly 2.6 kilometers North of
Moneron Island, according to the June, 1991 NSA
re-analysis." [This location would allow for the final 3
minutes to be spent circling around Moneron.] Republican Staff Study/"CIA
Report", pg. 46-47 (Note: "special intelligence"
refers to electronic intercepts.)
The "CIA Report" is a
study that appears to have been prepared by the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee Republican Staff at the
request of Senator Jesse Helms in June 1991. It is based
on information from a variety of sources including the
Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security
Agency. We think it may have been given to the CIA and
then leaked to the head of the opposition party in the
South Korean National Assembly, Sonn Se-Il. He produced it
during a legislative session demanding that further
investigations into the fate of those aboard KAL 007 be
investigated. The following is a further discussion of
this document and the information it contains.
History
Avraham Shifrin was an Israeli émigré from the Soviet
Union and an investigator researching Soviet prison and
labor camps with many contacts in the USSR. He had also
been a personal friend of Congressman Larry McDonald, a
passenger aboard KAL 007. Shifrin testified on Soviet
labor camps numerous times before both US Senate and House
committees.
In June, 1990, through sources in the Soviet Union,
Shifrin began to receive evidence that the flight of KAL
007 did not end with the death of all aboard, that the
people and baggage had been taken by the KGB and that the
Black Boxes from the plane had been salvaged-all of which
had been initially, and later again denied vehemently by
Soviet authorities.
As he began to acquire more information, Shifrin contacted
Senator Jesse Helms, ranking minority member of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations. He informed Senator Helms
that eyewitnesses had seen the plane land and the
passengers taken and that the black boxes had been
retrieved. Helms immediately had his staff begin looking
into this. Shifrin thought that during these initial
discussions, word of this leaked out and got into the
hands of the Soviets. The Soviet newspaper, Izvestia,
immediately began its own investigation. Beginning in
December 1990, Izvestia published a series of articles on
"The Mystery of KAL-007" that extended well into the
following year.
In January 1991, Helms sent staff-member David Sullivan to
Jerusalem to meet with Shifrin and see what evidence he
had to show. In May, Sullivan returned with Dr. James P.
Lucier, Minority Staff Director for the Committee and
Victor Fedei. According to Timothy Maier, in an article
titled "KAL 007 Mystery", published in Insight
Magazine, April, 16, 2001, Fedei (or Fediay)
was a senior defense-intelligence analyst. Shifrin turned
over to the three of them his notes and information on KAL
007. Maier states that in June 1991, the following month,
Senator Helms ordered that a study of the evidence be
conducted and a report made. Sullivan informed Shifrin
that his material had been turned over to the CIA.
Members of Helms' staff, with access to information from
the CIA and the NSA, prepared the report drawing on
Shifrin's material, information in the earlier articles in
the Izvestia series, information from the CIA and "special
intelligence", electronic intercepts from the NSA. The CIA
was able to corroborate some of Shifrin's material and
added additional information not previously revealed.
According to Maier, the FBI later determined that Victor
Fedei was the author of the report. In personal
correspondence to this author, Maier stated that there
were several authors. We think that all three of those who
visited Shifrin had a hand in its preparation. Fedei died
in 1992 and the others will not speak for the record about
the report.
Based on information received from Shifrin and presented
in the study, Senator Helms wrote to Russian President
Boris Yeltsin on December 10, 1991 asking for specific
information on KAL 007. (More on this below.) Within a few
weeks of this writing, something happened that caused
Helms to drop this subject and all efforts to investigate
it ceased. Lucier was dismissed and Admiral Bud Nance was
installed in his place as Minority Staff Director. Lucier,
who is very active in conservative causes and a senior
editor for Insight Magazine, will not discuss this topic
or his years on Helms' staff with anyone. On Feb. 11,
1992, Nance wrote to Shifrin, informing him that his
materials had been turned over to the CIA and would be
kept confidential. He also enclosed a copy of the letter
that Helms sent to Yeltsin.
It appears that the report, along with the other materials
from Shifrin, remained with the CIA and was never released
formally. At some point, an unknown person gave a "cleaned
up" (see below) copy of the report to the head of the
opposition party in the South Korean National Assembly,
Mr. Sonn Se-Il. Sonn produced, quite dramatically, the
report during a session of the National Assembly,
explaining that it was a CIA Top Secret Report on KAL 007
that demonstrated that the plane ditched safely on the
waters off the island of Moneron and that all aboard had
been taken captive and might still be alive. This happened
on October 26, 1992 and caused quite a sensation in the
international press at the time.
Maier, in his Insight Magazine article, suggests that the
report was taken by the CIA (perhaps included in the
materials turned over to the CIA as reported by Admiral
Nance) and was then leaked to Sonn by someone who was
frustrated with the lack of action.
Marjorie Provan, producer of the conservative television
program, "Focus on the Issues", a personal friend of
Congressman McDonald, who had had Shifrin on her show,
read about the report in the press and telephoned
Assemblyman Sonn who sent her a copy. She then passed a
copy on to Shifrin who studied and published an "Analysis
of the Top Secret Codeworded CIA Report" in March 1993.
His copy of the report and his analysis are included in
the various sources used by Bert Schlossberg when he wrote
Rescue 007: The Untold Story of
KAL 007 and Its Survivors.
Description
The report, as we have
it, is 78 pages, typewritten, accompanied by six pages of
charts, showing the debris fields from other Boeing 747
crashes, and a proposed public statement. It refers to
three Annexes that are not included.
There is a cover sheet with a rubber stamp giving the seal
of the CIA, name and address of the CIA's Office of
Congressional Affairs and a box with TO: followed by a
blank. The title page carries the line "SENSITIVE
RESTRICTED ACCESS." The next line begins with UNITED
STATES." This is followed by a space where words have been
deleted, most likely the name of the organization that
produced the report or for which it was prepared.
Throughout the report, any reference to the study or the
group preparing it is deleted with one exception. Every
page, beginning with the title page (but not including the
debris field charts at the end), again, with one
exception, bears the rubber stamp TOP SECRET/CODEWORD. The
one exception is page 43, which was apparently overlooked
when the report was being cleaned up prior to release to
Sonn Se-Il. The last sentence of the next-to-the-last
paragraph reads as follows: "This June, 1991 National
Security Agency re-analysis was requested for use in this
Republican Staff Study."
From this one sentence, we learn that the report was a
study of the matter prepared by Republican Staff, which
would be the minority staff of the Committee on Foreign
Relations. We also learn, as corroborated elsewhere, that
the National Security Agency (NSA) was willing to
reexamine its highly classified findings concerning KAL
007. This, along with other materials used in the report,
indicates that the authors had access to top secret NSA
materials as well as CIA information.
The report is similar in nature, albeit in draft form, to
other studies produced by the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Republican Staff such as the report of May 23,
1991 titled, "An Examination of U. S. Policy Toward
POW/MIAs."
Importance
Regardless of its official standing, this report, this "Republican Staff
Study", is extremely important in that it presents
material from Avraham Shifrin's research along with other
information from CIA and NSA sources as well as an
analysis of statements in the early Izvestia articles,
which, taken together, make a very strong case for the
ditching of KAL 007 near Moneron and the survival of
passengers and crew. The author(s) clearly believed this
to be true and called for diplomatic action to gain
answers to the questions raised.
On December 10, 1991, within a few months of the
completion of the report, Senator Helms wrote to Boris
Yeltsin a letter striking in its acceptance of and
reliance on the material in the report. In the letter, he
asks "that the government of the Russian Republic gain
access to the files of the former KGB and of the Ministry
of Defense in order to resolve the attached questions."
The questions include asking for depositions of the eye
witnesses who saw the plane land, the exact location of
the landing, transcripts of all military radio
transmission related to the entire flight of KAL 007, the
names of surviving passengers and crew, a list of luggage
and other items removed from the plane, copies of reports
of the Soviet search and rescue efforts, detailed
information on the fate of U.S. Congressman Larry McDonald
and information on camps where surviving members of the
passengers and crew are being held.
Six months later, on June 17, 1992, Yeltsin revealed the
existence of a memo from the KGB to the Communist Party
Central Committee reporting the existence of documents
pertaining to KAL 007. The memo included the startling
statement, "These documents are so well hidden that it is
doubtful that our children... those who come after us will
be able to find them." (The Washington Times 6/18/1992)
Three months after this, Yeltsin officially admitted the
existence of the Black Boxes. Shifrin was the first person
ever to reveal this fact publicly, to be corroborated
later by the Izvestia articles and the Staff
Study.
By December 1992, the Russian government had promised to
turn over to the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO, a United Nations agency) transcripts of all
electronic communications related to the flight of KAL
007. These transcripts were eventually published in the
ICAO report of May 28, 1993 and are quoted extensively in
Rescue 007.
Thus, we see a transmission of information from
clandestine Soviet sources to Avraham Shifrin and from him
to Senator Jesse Helms and his staff. Subsequent to
Shifrin's first conversation with Helms' staff,
information apparently leaks to Izvestia, which,
very quickly, launches a journalistic investigation
corroborating some of Shifrin's revelations and adding
additional information. (Much of the material in these
articles is quite likely "disinformation" intended to
confuse the situation as new revelations were becoming
known; nevertheless, with careful analysis, the articles
are useable.) Information in these sources-Shifrin's
material and the early Izvestia articles-is
included in the Republican Staff Study along with
additional corroborating material and new information from
the CIA and NSA. On the basis of this information, Helms
writes Yeltsin. Within a year, Yeltsin complies with a
substantial portion of the requests that Helms makes.
However, the Russians maintain to this day that there were
no survivors, yet they provide no information to
substantiate this claim while ignoring the evidence that
suggests otherwise. They do not offer any credible
explanation of the lack of bodies, life jackets and
luggage.
Because some of the material in the report has been proven
by subsequent events and because there has been no
authoritative explanation or evidence to support denials
of other information in it, we believe this report to be
extremely valuable and largely factual. We want to see any
substantial evidence that exists that does undermine the
assertions made either in the study or based on its
evidence. Until such material is produced, we continue to
call for a full investigation into all aspects of the case
of KAL 007 with an emphasis on finding out exactly what
happened to the passengers.
The State Department's dismissal of the possibility of
survivors is particularly hollow. State Dept. spokesman
Richard Boucher was quoted on October 27, 1992-the day
following Sonn Se-Il's bombshell revelation-as stating,
"President Yeltsin replied that there had been no
survivors, and we have no reason to doubt the Russian
government's statement." (The Washington Times,
10/27/1992)
Among those who are convinced that KAL 007 landed safely
and that the passengers were rescued and luggage removed,
there are two theories as to where the plane landed. Both
theories and locations have a measure of support. We
believe that the plane ditched on the water off the tiny
island of Moneron but will present the pros and cons of
each position. The final result, in either case, is the
same as far as we are concerned-the passengers and crew
were taken captive and were not killed in the destruction
of the plane.
Sakhalin
It has been pointed out that the earliest reports of
politically controversial events are often the most
accurate. These are the reports that become public before
those who have a vested interest in a specific viewpoint
have the chance to begin efforts to control or "spin" the
reportage. The very first reports about the downing of KAL
007 all stated that the plane landed on the large Soviet
island of Sakhalin, home to several military and
commercial airfields. These reports are amply documented
in three articles written by Robert W.
Lee for The New American magazine.
He has a copy of a tape recording of FAA spokesman, Duty
Officer Orville Brockman, notifying Congressman Larry
McDonald's press aide Tommy Toles that the plane was
tracked to a landing on Sakhalin by Japanese Self-Defense
Force radar. Those who have listened to this tape also
comment on the tone as being very matter-of-fact which
lends credence to the idea that the spokesman believed his
report to be true and was simply passing on factual
information rather than participating in any false
reporting. Other accounts include an article in the New
York Times of September 1, 1983-the first article on the
shootdown by that paper-stating that early reports said
the plane was forced down and landed on Sakhalin and that
all aboard were believed to be
safe, and the very first UPI wire story, dateline Seoul,
Sept. 1, 1983 giving
much the same information. These reports came, according
to the article, from Korean Foreign Ministry officials
based on US CIA reports to them. The President of Korean
Airlines also traveled to Japan on his way to Sakhalin to
meet the passengers and crew, apparently believing them to
be alive.
On the other hand, Fred Smith, Congressman McDonald's
administrative assistant,
doubted these first reports and went to the Pentagon for
verification.
There he learned that the plane had been shot down. (From
personal
correspondence with the authors.)
It is also logical that the pilot of a stricken aircraft,
especially if he continued to have a measure of control
over it, would look for the nearest and best place to
land. This would certainly be a regular runway rather than
the open sea under cloudy skies in the dark.
The problem with this view is that there is no other
evidence to support it and some of the early reporters
later recanted; whereas, there is considerable evidence
from a variety of sources to support the contention that
the plane landed on the water off Moneron. None of the
reports of a landing on Sakhalin specify an airfield or
designate any specific landing site. It is conceivable
that "Sakhalin" may have been used to refer to the general
area of the large island and that it was passed along as
being more precise than it really was meant to be.
Moneron

Moneron Island
In regards to a water landing off Moneron, there are a
variety of sources, both official and unofficial, that
supports this. We consider it highly unlikely that they
would (or could) conspire to present a common false message.
- CIA/NSA sources as reported in the Republican Staff Study/"CIA
Report": There are several "special intelligence"
or NSA reports included in this study referring to radar
tracking of the flight and the behavior of Soviet Air
Force planes.
These reports include the information that KAL 007
descended from an altitude of over 30,000 feet to 1,000
feet in a period of twelve minutes in a constantly
decelerating rate of speed. When the plane went off
Soviet radars it was dropping at an average rate of 22.2
feet per second.
The following excerpt relates to the flight path:
The geographic coordinates, showing where KAL-007 was
hit, where it then went, and where it disappeared from
Soviet radars, are known from special intelligence with
a fair degree of precision, and these points have been
potted on U.S. Intelligence maps. For example, at 9
minutes after being hit, and at an altitude of 5,000
feet, KAL-007's last tracked location, it was located
approximately at co-ordinates 4617N-14115E. The special
intelligence showing radar tracks indicates a flight
path from Sakhalin Island toward Moneron Island,
approaching from the North headed toward the South, and
a ditching or crash site probably inside Soviet
territorial waters, reportedly 2.6 kilometers North of
Moneron Island, according to the June, 1991 NSA
re-analysis. (Republican
Staff Study/"CIA Report" ppg. 46-47)
The following excerpt relates to the location of the
site:
According to special intelligence, one of Pilot
Osipovich's wingmen reported abut 15 minutes after
KAL-007 disappeared from Soviet radar that he was making
"reference point circles." This fact suggests that this
interceptor was circling over the probable ditching site
or crash site of KAL-007, so that Soviet air defense
radars could more precisely locate the point.
Soviet interceptors circled Moneron Island, according to
special intelligence... (Republican
Staff Study/"CIA Report", pg. 54)
- Soviet transcripts in the ICAO report: The transcripts
of Soviet ground communications appended to the 1993
ICAO report and presented by Schlossberg in Chapter
Three of Rescue 007,
"Lost Over Moneron", make it abundantly clear that the
Soviet military authorities knew the plane had gone off
radar over Moneron after turning around the island.
Within minutes of the plane disappearing from their
screens two different rescue operations were ordered.
Smirnykh Air Base Fighter Division Acting Chief of Staff
Lt. Col. Novoseletski called for rescue helicopters to
be sent to the area and Deputy Commander of the Far East
Military District Gen. Strogov called for all ships in
the vicinity of Moneron to be sent to the island
immediately, both Border Guard and civilian ships.
- Eye witnesses as reported in the Republican Staff Study
/"CIA Report": There are two significant reports
recorded in the Republican Staff Study. The first, on
page 47, states simply that Japanese fisherman in the
area testified that KAL 007 circled Moneron Island. The
second report is quoted here in full:
The recent émigrés provide new information that KAL-007
actually ditched successfully in Soviet territorial
waters between Moneron Island and Sakhalin Island, and
reportedly that many passengers, including Congressman
Larry McDonald, may have survived. The ditched plane was
reportedly recovered largely intact by KGB Border Guard
boats under the command of KGB General Romanenkov, and
it was stripped of all its surviving passengers and
their luggage. The émigrés also report that a Soviet
helicopter pilot saw KAL-007 in one piece on the surface
of the ocean. It was then towed to Soviet territorial
waters near Moneron, and deliberately sunk in shallow
waters inside Soviet territorial limits.
But General Romanenko [sic] reportedly did not know what
to do with the survivors and their luggage, and he
forgot to retrieve the black boxes. He was reportedly
disciplined by Ogarkov, relieved, and sent to the Gulag
himself, because he made mistakes and knew too much. (Republican Staff Study/"CIA
Report", pg 75)
- Russian émigré report to Bert Schlossberg-from Rescue 007:
The morning of August 9, 1991, Exie and I entered the
crowded lobby of the Jerusalem Hilton. We had come to
meet Reuben V., a former map maker assigned to Soviet
Air Defense battery-Military unit 1845. This was the
radar unit that, according to Shifrin, had tracked KAL
007 to a safe water landing...
Reuben, in such ways, conveyed to us the following
story: On September 1, 1983, his commanding officer,
while yet a lieutenant on night duty serving at Military
Unit 1845 located on Soviet Gavan (the east coast of
Russia across from Sakhalin Island), had photographed
his radar screen which had been following the flight of
KAL 007 for several minutes prior to its being shot
down. After missile impact, the radar had continued
tracking the jumbo jet for over 12 minutes-until it had
descended to Point Zero [1,000 ft.-the lowest level
radar could track]. The name of Reuben's superior
officer was Ryzhkov. Ryzhkov and the whole of Military
Unit 1845 were part of the underground staff
headquarters located at Komsomolsk-na-amure.
Ryzhkov told Reuben he was certain that KAL 007 had
landed safely. Nor was his the only radar station that
had followed the flight of the stricken passenger plane
to point zero. Another of these was the radar station at
Yedinka, designated as Air Defense unit 2212 PT6. Reuben
drew a map of Soviet Gavan on hotel stationary and
placed Yedinka southwest of unit 1845 and on the coast.
Ryzhkov told Reuben that he had used three rolls of
film, each containing 36 exposures, in photographing his
radar screen. (Independent confirmation that the radar
screen was photographed has been received recently in
the Soviet Top Secret
Memos published here for the first time in
English. See Memo number four.) These rolls, the
lieutenant said, were later confiscated by the KGB. All
personnel at Unit 1845 as well as at the other radar
stations were commanded to maintain silence concerning
the tracking of KAL 007. Everyone understood that the
penalty for disobeying this order would be death or
exile.
"Why would anyone tell you all this?" I asked him.
"Especially in light of the penalties?"
"He was drunk," Reuben told us. "And he was bitter. They
had humiliated him-he had been passed over for promotion
while others involved in the incident went up a grade.
And when he inquired of the KGB why this was so, they
told him that it was because he had failed to load the
camera. But Ryzhkov knew better." (Rescue
007 ppg. 42-44)
- Japanese radar showing KAL 007 to have flown past and
west of Sakhalin as reported in the ICAO report:
At 23:30 hours [UTC or Greenwich Mean Time] JMSA
[Japanese Maritime Safety Agency] received information
from JDA [Japanese Defense Agency] that an aircraft had
been observed on radar about 100 NM northeast of
Wakkanai, moving in a southwesterly direction. This
contact was last observed by the JDA Wakkanai radar
surveillance station at 18:29 hours. Following receipt
of the above information, JMSA dispatched two patrol
vessels to the area west of Sakhalin Island and prepared
two aircraft for take-off at Wakkanai Airport. Between
06:10 and 14:30 hours, JMSA dispatched eight additional
patrol vessels to the waters west of Sakhalin Island.
(ICAO 1993 paragraph 1.11.5, pg. 17)
While this does not point directly to Moneron, it
clearly shows a flight in that direction beyond Sakhalin
and a search effort in the waters between Sakhalin and
Moneron or even waters west of Moneron itself.
- Izvestia articles: The Izvestia
articles contain mutually contradictory material and
testimony and, as such, are considered reliable only to
the extent that they agree with other sources. That
being said, there is a reference to KAL 007 circling
twice around Moneron before descending to (as thought by
the author) a crash landing.
The main problem with a water landing off of Moneron is
the extreme difficulty of accomplishing such a feat.
Yet, airline pilots do receive training for this
eventuality and procedures for ditching passenger aircraft
are provided on all airlines.
While reports of airliners ditching at sea are rare, it
has happened with
passengers, in all cases, surviving. (See Aircraft Ditchings
for further information.) Additionally, KAL 007
pilot Chun Byung-In, a colonel in the Korean Air Force,
was a seasoned veteran, highly skilled in flying large
aircraft. Because of his skill, he had seen service as
pilot on the Korean presidential aircraft flying Korea’s
president to the US in 1982. If landing the Boeing 747 on
the sea could be done, Captain Chun could have done it.
At the time of landing, it was dark and there was full
cloud cover at 2,000 meters.
In addition to this, we have received a second hand report
that a US Air Force service man stationed near Wakkanai,
Japan at the time of the shoot down, stated that the area
in question is visible from the hills near there. He
claims that no rescue operations were observed. However,
there is a problem with this in that Moneron is about 45
nautical miles from Wakkanai (54 statute miles, 86
kilometers).
The nearby islands of Rebun and Rishiri have peaks over
1,700 meters (over 5,000
feet) high but the peak on Hokkaido nearest to Wakkanai is
about 15 miles inland
and only reaches 427 meters (Planet Earth Macmillan World
Atlas). We do
not know where the US observation posts, referred to by
the Airman, are located
but, if they are on Hokkaido near Wakkanai, they would not
be high enough to see
to Moneron. As of this writing, we have not been able to
determine if there are hills near Wakkanai that are high
enough for this observation. If anyone reading this knows
about this, please convey the information to us.
In addition to the difficulty of landing, the plane would
have to remain afloat long enough for passengers and
baggage to be removed. Baggage in the cargo hold could not
be removed while the plane was afloat. We believe that all
baggage was removed. This could be accomplished by divers
after the plane sank by opening the cargo doors under
water. Another possibility is that this particular plane
was outfitted with a special cargo container on the main
deck so that the below-deck area could be used for other
purposes. Korean Airlines did this with
at least sixteen of their aircraft. We are unable to
determine whether or not this particular plane was so
equipped.
Our knowledge of the whereabouts of members of passengers
and crew of Korean Air Lines Flight 007, shot down on
August 31, 1983, is based primarily on information
received by the Research Centre for Prisons, Psychprisons
and Forced Labor Concentration Camps of the USSR.
This research center was established by the late Avraham
Shifrin, an Israeli who had, himself, spent time in the
Soviet prison camp system. As a major in the Red
Army and prosecutor for the Krasnodar Region, northeast of
the Crimea, he was responsible for sending many to the
Gulags. After he himself was convicted on charges of
spying for the US and Israel, he was sentenced to ten
years on the harshest of prisons; then seven years of
exile in Kazakhstan. Mr. Shifrin maintained an
extensive network of contacts within the Soviet Union and
its successor states. Much of the information that
we have was obtained at great personal risk by his
contacts.
The Centre’s investigations in 1989 to 1991 determined
that the passengers and crew of KAL 007 were taken, upon
rescue, to the KGB Coast Guard base on Sakhalin.
Within a few days (by September 4, 1983), everyone was
taken to the KGB base at Sovetskaja Gavan on the Siberian
mainland opposite Sakhalin, roughly 600 miles north of
Vladivostok. Here the men, women and children were
divided into separate groups. The men and women were
taken by train to Tynda on the Baikal-Amur Railway about
800 miles inland where at least some were put to forced
labor. The male adults were, at some point,
distributed to a number of different camps throughout
Siberia some of which were camps that also held American
POWs and other foreign prisoners. These camps are
identified as camps for foreigners by their total
isolation and the lack of villages around them.
Normally, when prisoners are released from prison camps
they are required to continue living in exile near the
prison. Their families join them and villages grow
up around the camps. Foreign prisoners are not
released; there are no villages around their prisons.
Congressman Lawrence P. McDonald, Democrat, 7th District,
Georgia, was separated from the rest of the passengers and
taken by special air transport to Moscow on or about Sept.
8, 1983. A special KGB guard unit was brought from
Khabarovsk to accompany him. The KGB had a fleet of
special aircraft, the 910xx series that was used
exclusively for transporting high profile prisoners, VIPs,
and others requiring the strictest security. These
were used for even very short trips rather than using
overland transportation.
The child passengers were kept in Sovetskaja Gavan in a
specially established isolated temporary orphanage until
the end of October. They were then gradually
transferred to various orphanages in Vladivostok, Omsk and
Barnaul, both near Novosibirsk, and Kazakhstan based on
their racial identity. The intent was to assimilate
them into the predominant racial populations in these
areas.
Congressman McDonald
Upon
arrival in Moscow, McDonald was taken to the Lubyanka KGB
prison where he was given the designation, “Prisoner
Number 3.” While at the Lubyanka, he was kept in
isolation, taken from his cell only for questioning.
(The halls of Lubyanka are carpeted so that the footsteps
of those being led away for questioning cannot be heard in
the cells. Everyone is kept under constant
observation through peepholes. Those who are allowed
a bit of exercise are taken to small fenced in exercise
yards on the roofs of the prison high above and invisible
from the streets below.) He was interrogated several
times by the head of the First Chief Directorate of the
KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov. (Kryuchkov was a member of
the core group, the “Gang of Eight”, who sought to seize
power from Mikhail Gorbachev in August 1991. He was
arrested when the coup failed but was later released. He
attended the inauguration of President Vladimir Putin—at
Mr. Putin’s personal invitation—in 2000. Mr.
Kryuchkov is now an internationally known lecturer.)
Following a number of questionings, Mr. McDonald was moved
to the Lefortovo KGB prison also in Moscow for continued
interrogation over a period of several months. In
Lefortovo, prisoners were kept in cells that were
artificially cooled to near freezing temperatures.
These cells were about 1.5 meters on a side or roughly 4.5
feet. The dirt floors were submerged in water so
that the prisoners either stood or lay down in mud.
There might be a slanted bench against which the prisoner
could lean with his feet against the opposite wall.
After a time in Lefortovo, Mr. McDonald was then moved to
a “dacha” (summer house) in Sukhanova near Moscow where
the interrogations continued. Mr. Shifrin’s sources
indicated that they had strong reason to believe that,
while in Sukhanova, McDonald was interrogated under drugs
that may have eventually resulted in identity loss.
He was brought eventually to a prison in Karaganda,
Kazakhstan, the region where the Soviets had important
nuclear missile test ranges and similar
installations. He may have been brought to this area
to be interrogated by experts there as part of the effort
to find out what he could say about the US nuclear program
and what he knew about the Soviet program.
Early in 1987, former NSA agent, Jerry Mooney, testified
before Congress about the “Moscow Bound” program and the
importance of Karaganda as a center of the Soviet nuclear
program and an area where certain highly-skilled American
POWs with technical knowledge were brought.
Following his testimony, the world press focused on this
area. In an apparent attempt to keep McDonald’s
presence there secret, he was moved in mid-1987, by
special transport, to a small prison near the town of
Temir-Tau, also in Kazakhstan. (The wardens of this
prison identified him from a photograph that had been
computer-aged to show what he would have looked like at
the time. It also showed a scar that runs from his
left nostril to the left end of his
lip.)

Computer-aged photo of Larry McDonald which was shown to
wardens of Kazakhstan's Temir Tau prison.
Here he was given special treatment but was not allowed
to communicate with anyone. In the summer of 1990,
he was taken to the transportation prison in
Karaganda. Here, as an unknown prisoner whose file
is sealed by the KGB, he remained. As of 1995, all
efforts to obtain additional information from the
Karaganda prison have failed. The congressman’s
present location is unknown—it may
be there or he may have been moved since then.
Child Passengers
Efforts to track down the children of KAL 007 have been
very difficult. Many of the youngest ones were
probably adopted into local families. Some
information was obtained about two young Caucasian
sisters, we believe they were the Grenfell children,
Stacey and Noelle, ages 3 and 5, of Rochester, NY.
It appears that they were placed in an orphanage in
Vladivostok until 1990. The older child, at about
12, was sent to Medical School 3, a type of vocational
high school, associated with the city hospital in
Khabarovsk for training. The girl in question, whom
we think is Noelle, graduated from there three years later
then was taken elsewhere and her file removed from the
school and hospital. At this point, her trail was
lost. This information came from the director of the
school.
A Female Passenger
Sources provided information on one young Oriental woman
who was set to work felling timber in the area of Tynda,
Siberia. Prior to 1985, she lost her left arm below
the elbow in a work accident. Subsequently, she was
sent across the vast Siberian landmass to the extremely
isolated village of Nakhodka on the Tazovskaya Guba
(Inlet) above the Arctic Circle where she remained until
sometime in the late summer of 1991 or 1992. By this
time, she was married and had several children. This
village consists of some 20-30 houses occupied by local
fishermen and a few Russian exiles. The villagers
live in sub-human conditions with almost no contact with
the outside world. Winter lasts for most of the year
and half the year is spent in Arctic darkness. The
conditions are so gruesome that the villagers—few of whom
speak Russian—care for nothing but survival and vodka.
The villagers of Nakhodka thought that the woman was of
indigenous Nenets origin because of her Oriental
features. She did not mix with and was generally
unknown to them. They were aware that she had been
removed by men in authority. This may have been
because the KGB had become aware of efforts by Avraham
Shifrin and his Research Institute to locate the
woman. He had tried to get his people to this
village a year earlier, before she was moved, but promised
funding to support the effort did not come through.
By the time he was able to raise the necessary funds and
recruit volunteers for this very dangerous mission, the
woman was gone.
An important point to note is that, even when prisoners
were released for whatever reason, they were often sent to
isolated villages such as Nakhodka. While apparently
having freedom of movement, there was no escape from the
pervasive KGB scrutiny. The Soviet KGB used local
informants to control residents of such villages.
The informants were in turn controlled by threats to the
safety of family members who were taken into custody for
just this purpose—to serve as “leverage.” The KGB
would select trusted members of the community to be their
informants. They would then test them by having
someone utter anti-Soviet remarks in their presence.
When an informant did not report such a remark to his KGB
“handler”, he would be informed that members of his family
would be deprived of food. If it happened again,
they would be shot. Shifrin considered the ingenuity
of the KGB to be both “diabolical and 100 per cent
effective.”
Even though the name has changed, the KGB is still as
pervasive and powerful as ever, even though it may keep a
lower profile. Russian President Vladimir Putin was
with the KGB before entering into politics.
Male Adult Passengers
Sources indicate that most of the male passengers and crew
were taken to a series of three ultra-secret prison camps
in the dense taiga region along the Amur river near the
village of Zapokrovsk not far from the Chinese
border. These are the same camps where American POWs
were known to have been located. They are quite
extensive. In the winter, smoke can be seen rising
from 80-90 smoke stacks—each barracks has two or three
stoves, some 30 or more barrack houses.
Unfortunately, all efforts to get to the camps and
identify passengers visually failed because of the intense
security in the area.
Additional camps were in the area of Cita, headquarters of
the Far East Theater of Operations of the Soviet military,
at Nercinsk, Nercinski Zavod and other locations.
At the time, there were also three other ultra-secret
camps for foreign prisoners on Roger’s Bay, Wrangell
Island in the Arctic Ocean. Mr. Shifrin had reason
to believe that some of the passengers and, especially the
crew, may have been taken to Wrangell because of their
aeronautical training. These camps have since been
abandoned and all inmates moved elsewhere.
This is the extent of our current knowledge concerning the
locations where the passengers and crew of KAL 007 were
taken after being rescued from the downed plane.
If anyone reading this has additional knowledge pertaining
to possible locations of our prisoners please contact us
at info@rescue007.org.
Thank you, very much.
[For a full understanding of the answer to this
question, please refer
also to FAQ #1.]
The fate of the passengers and crew of KAL 007 needs to
be viewed in the context of the Soviet Union's dealings
generally with captured foreign nationals. There are the
motives that are fairly well known to people that are
knowledgeable about American POW/MIA issues:
- The Soviets used captured foreigners as "bargaining
chips" for western political concessions, western
recognition of satellite regimes, and return of
apprehended espionage agents.
- The Soviets used captured foreigners for gaining
(extorting) economic "credit" from the west.
- Captured foreigners were used to supplement the slave
labor work force for a failed economic approach -
Communism. (In fact, it has recently been revealed
that the Russians continue to use foreign slave labor in
camps located in the same area where we believe KAL 007
survivors were/are kept. See KAL 007 Survivors and the
Forced Labor Concentration Camps of the Russian
Federation.)
- Since the execution of KGB head Laventry Beria and his
lieutenants - Colonel Kabulov, et al - in 1953, it had
become clear that today's jailors and their
supporters would be the jailed of tomorrow. Thus
the fear of retribution diminished the practice of
execution (as well as the most severe torments) among
political prisoners.
- Glasnost, and the opening of the books of the KGB and
the Soviet repressive state system in general, would
place the perpetuators of the killings of KAL 007
passengers and crew at great risk. This danger would
inhibit their execution.
- And finally, a still Biblically oriented America, a
society still formed by the Christian concept of mercy
may find it difficult to understand the
Soviet-period-formed mentality that captured peoples are
not simply to be "let go" to return to their homes or
necessarily killed. They must be punished or required as
conquered peoples to work it off - for life. This
"working" is not so much for economic benefit to the
conqueror but because the conquered have it coming to
them and it is for the vindication of the
victorious. To illustrate - Secretary of State
under President Truman, James F. Byrnes, was told in
London in September of 1945 by Soviet Commissar of
Foreign Affairs, Molotov (in reaction to the US's
policy of simply demobilizing the Japanese Army and
sending them home), "They [the Japanese] should be
held as prisoners of war. We [the Allies] should do
what the Red Army was doing with the Japanese it had
taken in Manchuria [about 500,000] - make them
work..."
On Monday, September 26, 1983, a delegation of seven
Japanese and American officials arriving aboard the
Japanese patrol boat Tsugaru, met a six-man Soviet
delegation at the port of Nevelsk on Sakhalin
Island. KGB Major General A. I. Romanenko, the
Commander of the Sakhalin and Kuril Islands frontier
guard, headed the Soviet delegation.* Romanenko
handed over to the Americans and Japanese, among other
things, single and paired footwear. With footwear
that the Japanese also retrieved, the total came to 213
men's, women's and children's dress shoes, sandals, and
sports shoes. The Soviets said that all that they
had retrieved, they had found floating in the water or
washed up on the shores of Sakhalin and Moneron islands.
Family members of KAL 007 passengers would later state
that these shoes were actually worn by their loved ones
for the flight on that fateful night. Sonia Munder
had no difficulty recognizing the sneakers of her
children, one of Christian age 14 and one of Lisi age 17,
by the intricate way her children laced them. (Sonia
confirmed to me personally that her children were wearing
these shoes when they boarded the flight). Another
mother says, "I recognized them just like that. You
see, there are all kinds of inconspicuous marks which
strangers do not notice. This is how I recognized
them. My daughter loved to wear them." And
yet, another mother (and maybe it takes a mother!), Nan
Oldham identified her son, John's, sneakers from a photo
in Life magazine of 55 of the 213 shoes --
apparently, a random array on display those first days at
Chitose Air Force Base in Japan. "We saw photos of
his shoes in a magazine," says Nan, "We followed up
through KAL and a few weeks later, a package
arrived. His shoes were inside: size 11 sneakers
with cream white paint." John Oldham had taken his
seat in row 31 of KAL 007 wearing those cream white paint
spattered sneakers. He had just come from painting
his suburban Washington, D.C., family home.
From an examination of the shoes in the photo of Life
magazine, pairing the sets and counting them with the
single shoes, and relating them to the whole, it turns out
that the total amount of shoes retrieved account for 198
of the 269 people of KAL 007 - or almost 74% of the total.
The Soviets retrieved the shoes of some portion of this
74% of the flight's passengers, yet claimed not to have
found one single body, not one person. This adds
great weight to the question "Where are the bodies?"
Either the shoes were on the bodies and removed by the
Soviets (or the Japanese), or they were removed by the
wearers and retrieved by the Soviets (or Japanese).
Why were these shoes loose? Were they taken off in
preparation for the landing or were they simply removed
during the course of the flight? In either case, the
one great question remains. Is it really possible
for so many shoes to be found and not one single person
found to wear them? And if we should negate that the
shoes were taken off in preparation for a ditching - that
there was no time to do so, or the aircraft was in an
exploded and too disintegrated condition to do so, then
another question arises - If the non appearance of bodies
is explained by their flesh being eaten by crabs, and,
contrary to expert opinion, bones eaten by sea creatures,
is it really credible, that not one of the 213 items of
footwear had a foot, or a toe or a toe bone within it?
* Note - Gen. Romanenko would meet a bad end due
(according to the Republican Staff Report) to his handling
of KAL 007 matters. The Republican Staff Study
reports that he was probably sent to the Gulag
himself. The Israeli Research Centre for Prisons,
Psych-Prisons, and Forced Labor Concentration Camps of the
USSR, resting on informant information reported,
independently and prior to the Staff Study, that
Romanenko's name no longer appears in KGB computers.
(Once in, a person is noted as reassigned, deceased,
retired, etc., but never deleted. It is as if Gen.
Romanenko never existed). And finally, Hans
Ephraimson-Abt, the head of the US families of the victims
association, reports that while he was in East Germany at
the Soviet embassy, he was informed by embassy officials
that Gen. Romanenko, whom he had come to enquire about (he
had not!), had committed suicide. Of course, each in
its own time, could have been true.
If, as we believe, KAL 007 ditched successfully off of
Moneron (see FAQ 9), it could have been
possible to remove carry-on baggage in the passenger
compartment -- the plane would have had to remain afloat
long enough for passengers and baggage to be
removed. Baggage in the cargo hold could not have
been removed while the plane was afloat. Based on
eye-witness reports relayed to us by the Research Centre
for Prisons, Psychprisons and Forced Labor Concentration
Camps of the USSR and reports of divers, we believe that
all baggage was removed. This could be accomplished
by divers after the plane sank by opening the cargo doors
under water. Another possibility is that this
particular plane was outfitted with a special cargo
container on the main deck so that the below-deck area
could be used for other purposes. Korean Air Lines
did this with at least sixteen of their aircraft. We
are unable to determine whether or not this particular
plane was so equipped.
A number of intentional passenger (cargo) airliner
ditchings have been documented. The following
figures show survival rates for passengers and crew:
- US Airways Flight 1549, Airbus A320, New York
City to Charlotte/Douglas International Airport, 15
January 2009, made a controlled safe water ditching into
the Hudson River after losing thrust in both engines due
to bird strike at about 3000 feet altitude three minutes
into the flight; 155 passengers and crew made an orderly
evacuation as a NYC fireboat towed the floating aircraft
with passengers standing on the wing, 100% survival rate
- Tuninter Air, Flt. 1153, August 6, 2005, of the
coast of Sicily, 39 occupants, 23 survivors, 59%
survival rate
- Miami Air Lease Convair CV-340, December 4,
2004, Mall lake, Florida, 2 occupants, 2 survivors, 100%
survival rate
- Ethiopian Air Lines 767, November 23, 1996, off
the Comoros Islands, 175 occupants, 45 survivors, 26%
survival rate
- Though not a passenger plane, still relevant -
Columbian AF C 130 Hercules, October 1982, en route
between the Azores and Bermuda stayed afloat for 2 days!
- ALM DC9, May 2, 1970, the Caribbean, 63
occupants, 40 survivors, 63% survival rate
- Aeroflot Tupolev 124, October, 1963, Neva river,
52 occupants, 52 survivors, 100% survival rate
- Flying Tiger's Super H Constellation
passenger aircraft with a crew of 8 and
68 U.S. military (paratrooper) passengers.
Sept. 28, 1962. Aircraft ditched in the
North Atlantic about 500 miles west of Shannon,
Ireland, after losing three engines on a flight
to Frankfurt, Germany. Forty-five of the
passengers and 3 crew were rescued, with 23
passengers and 5 crew members being lost in the
storm-swept seas. All passengers
successfully evacuated the
airplane. Those who were lost succumbed
in the rough seas. 100% survival rate for landing and
evacuation.
- Pan Am Flt. 943 Stratocruiser "Sovereign of the
Skies", October 16, 1956, in the Pacific between
Honolulu and San Francisco, 30 passengers and crew, 30
survivors, 100% survival rate
- Northwest Orient Airlines Flt. 2, Boeing
Stratocruiser, April 2, 1956, ditched in 430 feet Puget
Sound, 38 passengers, all survived the ditching but 4
could not recover the freezing waters, 87% survival rate
Until now, there has never been an instance of a
passenger plane water ditching in which there have
not been any survivors!
For additional information see the Ditchings
page.
Addendum:
Based on reports that had come to the Israeli Research
Centre for Prisons, Psychprisons, and Forced Labor
Concentration Camps of the USSR, we believe that the
passengers and crew, with their luggage, were boarded onto
Soviet boats and ships and abducted. We believe these
boats and ships to be both the coastal patrol boats under
command of KGB General Romanenko and the civilian trawlers
ordered to the rescue by Deputy Commander of the Far East
Military District, General Strogov at 6:54 - just 16
minutes after KAL007 had descended to 1,000 feet, the
altitude under which Soviet radar could not track. (See Story Section -- Escape From
Destruction). We believe, in accordance with the statement
to Izvestia by Commander of the Soviet Pacific Fleet,
Admiral Vladimir Vasilyevich Siderov, that "small boats"
had already arrived at the site 27 minutes after KAL's set
down ("crash", according to the Admiral - who also
maintains that there were no bodies in the water).
Furthermore, according to reports to Izvestia by amazed
Soviet divers who had visited KAL 007 underwater just 2
weeks after the downing, no bodies were found on board or
anywhere else (See KAL 007, The U.S.
7th Fleet, and the Great Russian Ruse). And
according to the Soviet official claims, there were no
bodies found on the surface of the water at "impact" site
(though the Soviets did return 213 fished out footwear -
representing 74% of the 269 occupants of KAL 007! See FAQ 12 - Do any of the items belonging to
the passengers which were returned by the Soviets bear on
the question of passenger rescue? What about the shoes?).
If, contrary to our belief, the passengers and crew of KAL
007 had not been rescued and abducted, and if, as in fact,
there were no bodies found on top of the surface of the
sea or found under the surface of the sea within KAL 007's
wreckage, then there should have been live people, if not
in KAL 007's own life rafts, then floating in the waters
off Moneron Island until the arrival of the Soviet "small
boats" - within one half hour. This is supported by the
following survival manual survival rates for persons able
to swim or who are wearing life jackets or who have use of
some floating support, in waters of 50 degrees - the
temperature of the waters off Moneron Island that morning:
Up to 50 minutes - Practically 100% survival
Up to 3 1/2 hours - 50 % survival
Past 3 1/2 hours - Acceleratingly, down to 0% survival
(figures are survival manual figures referred to in the Republican Staff Study)
But there were no people, living or dead found on or
under the waters. Where, then, are our people?
I [Bert Schlossberg] have often thought of the state of
children's' minds and early memories as they grow older
and when and how we could hear from them as they attempt
to communicate to the world their apprehensions of their
true identities. I have not fully succeeded to my
satisfaction. Nevertheless, some light does come and it is
generally through the experiences of Avraham Shifrin, the
Israeli researcher into KAL 007 who passed away in 1998.
Avraham Shifrin, as a Red Army Major and prosecutor for
the Krasnodar Black Sea region, sent many people to the
Gulags - by his own admission - until he himself was
convicted for spying for the US and Israel. After many
years in several gulags and exile and after acquiring
intimate knowledge of Soviet practices, he shared with us
the following:
There were 22 children under 12 years of age aboard KAL
007. This is relatively not a large number - though every
one is precious to someone and no mere statistic. Avraham
said that the usual practice in the Soviet Union when
having captured foreign national children, which did
occur, was to disperse them in populations that bore
their physical characteristics to be brought up in
orphanges and other institutions as well as families. Most
of the children of KAL 007, being of Korean, Japanese,
Chinese, and Filipino parentage, would have been sent to
the "oriental republics" along the Sino-Soviet border.
Thus the children of KAL 007 would not be unique in that
respect.
But that did not mean the KAL 007 children were free. In
the Soviet Union and also in the Russian Federation, at
least until the late 90's, there existed the phenomenon of
fully closed cities as well as partially closed villages
and towns. These towns and areas, in the earlier days,
were fully guarded and controlled with little hope of
unmonitored entry or exit for, in some cases, their
considerable civilian populations, and it is therefore
possible that the children, now grown up, would have many
memories to share to the world - but with no access to do
so. It is hard for us in the open West to conceive of all
this (we are familiar with closed and guarded "military
reserves", but not civilian population centers) - but that
is the way it was in the USSR. There is also the
possibility that these children, because of the special
circumstances related to their capture, abduction, what
have you, would be segregated out from all other types of
captive populations and kept alive totally isolated.
Even the very young ones, of course, would have glimmers
and apprehensions of the past and I suppose the younger
they would be the more freedom they would be allowed. Of
course, there would come a time when there would be new
relations formed and new lives entered into and less and
less motivation to "go against" what now existed for them.
Perhaps, the recent examples of the
kidnapped Japanese who were able, at different ages,
of course, to begin new lives with their "host" North
Korean captors without the rest of the world hearing about
it from them or anyone else can illustrate for us the
psychosocial and physical forces available to a
totalitarian dictatorship over its weak and disadvantaged
subjects - from whatever sources.
There is also a lot to learn from the normal
psychological "silencers". A victim of child abuse rarely
will feel free enough and strong enough to expose the
abusing parent - in that direction is no safety. A social
worker in the field of child neglect and abuse, as I was
for a number of years, will tend to suspect the "loved and
defended parent" almost as much, or sometimes more, than
the parent that seems on the surface the uncaring and
menacing one. There may be a lot to lose for a young child
to suddenly begin talking about his early memories.
Shifrin believed that the survivors would be monitored at
all times - no matter their differing growths in awareness
and circumstances.
This FAQ is the work of Bert Schlossberg and Ben Torrey. |