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TO:
DID KAL-007 SUCCESSFULLY DITCH AT SEA AND WERE THERE SURVIVORS?

HOW THE SOVIET MILITARY’S COVER-UP OF THEIR MANY MISTAKES IN THEIR 1983 SHOOTING DOWN OF KOREAN AIRLINES FLIGHT-007 LED TO THE SOVIET “SPY PLANE” DECEPTION COVER-STORY, WHICH IS NOW FINALLY UNRAVELLING.
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DID KAL-007 SUCCESSFULLY DITCH AT SEA AND WERE THERE SURVIVORS?

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“...Anyone who has once proclaimed violence as his method must inexorably choose the lie as his principle.”

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn

“Afterall, behind the secret of the ‘black boxes’ are the career secrets of still acting marshals, generals, and politicians.”

Izvestya, May 22, 1991

Abstract:

This intensive study has found, on the basis of the aggregation and analysis of extensive evidence, that KAL-007 probably attempted to “ditch at sea.” The evidence and analysis suggests further that KAL-007 may have successfully ditched at sea.

If KAL-007 successfully ditched at sea, the evidence suggests that there may have been some survivors.

If KAL-007 tried to ditch at sea, this would have been the very first attempted ditching at sea of a Boeing 747 airliner. Thus if KAL-007 successfully ditched at sea, this would also have been the first successful ditching at sea of any Boeing 747.

Finally, if KAL-007 actually successfully ditched at sea, then this would have been a truly extraordinary event in world aviation history, because the weather and visibility conditions were unfavorable to a successful ditching at sea, and further, KAL-007 was probably seriously damaged.
The principal mystery of the 1983 Soviet shoot-down of Korean Airlines Flight KAL-007 over international waters is the confirmed failure by the U.S. Navy search and salvage ships, and the apparent failure of the Soviet naval search and salvage ships, to recover any identifiable bodies, luggage, “black boxes,” or any significant wreckage from KAL-007.

There were 269 innocent people aboard KAL-007, which was shot down by the Soviets on the night of August 31/September 1, 1983.

But as of September 1, 1983, there had never been a crash, at sea, of a Boeing 747 passenger airliner. No one knew what to expect from a crash at sea of a Boeing 747, in terms of the amount and dispersal of wreckage and debris.

Therefore, it may not have seemed too surprising to some, at least then in 1983, that only about 848 unidentifiable, very smashed chunks of metal from an aircraft and some passengers’ cabin articles, were recovered in September and October of 1983. Reportedly, all but two of these 848 small pieces were unidentifiable and were not positively from KAL-007. The other identifiable debris specifically related to KAL-007 was the identity card of a Canadian passenger, Mary Jane Hendrie, 25 Ottawa, Canada, and some business cards from a Taiwanese passenger.

Moreover, there was a long gap before any debris or body parts were recovered—no debris or body parts were recovered at all until as long as 8 days after KAL-007 went down.

This very low number of small-sized items recovered including of 2 unrecognizable bodies, not identifiable as KAL-007 passengers plus 11 other pieces of unrecognizable human remains.

Thus in sum, only two of these 848 various debris items, and none of the bodies or various human body parts, could ever be specifically identified with either KAL-007 itself, or any specific passenger of KAL-007. And nothing was recovered for the first 8 days.

Therefore not only was there a mystery concerning the dearth of debris from KAL-007, but there was also a mystery concerning both the origins and identity of the very small amount of remains recovered at the time of the KAL-007 incident, and also the lateness of their recovery.

About 772 small debris items, or about 90 per cent of these 848
small items, were recovered by the Japanese, because they were washed up as "flotsam and jetsam" on Hokkaido’s beaches. But to re-emphasize, only two of these items—reportedly a single identity card and a business card—could ever be positively identified as coming from KAL-007, and these two items were reportedly recovered by the Japanese.

On September 8, 1983, the Soviets claimed that they had "recovered" a few pieces of KAL-007 debris, but they claimed that they found all of this debris floating on the surface. On September 26, 1983, the Soviets turned over to an international commission only about 76 of these small items, only less than about 10 per cent of the 848 items of total debris found, none of which were human remains, after apparently having some items of recovered clothing drycleaned.

It is significant that none of the debris items or remains turned over by the Soviets could be specifically identified with either KAL-007 itself, or with any of its passengers.

SIMILAR SOVIET SHOOT-DOWN OF KOREAN AIRLINES BOEING 707 NEAR MURMANSK IN APRIL, 1978

At this point, we need to consider the main aspects of the similar Soviet shoot-down near Murmansk in the Western USSR in April, 1978, of another Korean Airlines passenger liner a Smaller Boeing 707. This description of this similar shoot-down is based upon special intelligence.

This April, 1978, similar incident is significant for the following reasons:

--1) This KAL passenger airliner shoot-down was a Boeing 707, but the Soviet interceptor pilot who shot it down identified it first as a Boeing 707, and then as Boeing 747, illustrating the great difficulty of distinguishing between these two types of Boeing passenger liners;

--2) The Soviet pilot finally identified this KAL Boeing 707 clearly as a civilian passenger airliner, and he even described the “Korean Airlines” markings visible on it, but he was nevertheless ordered to shoot it down anyway, suggesting that the Soviets probably also would have shot down KAL-007 anyway, even if they had properly identified it;

--3) The Korean Airlines pilot reportedly repeatedly broadcast “Mayday” calls heard all over Europe, which may have saved the lives of the passengers by causing the Soviets to release them. The Soviets later repatriated the crew and passengers from this airliner, although 2 passengers were killed in the shoot-down. This KAL Boeing 707 reportedly flew around the Strategic Kola Peninsula for about 90 minutes after being hit by the Soviet
missile, before crash-landing on a frozen lake near Murmansk. But after repatriating the surviving crew and passengers, the Soviets reportedly retained the intact airliner, which mysteriously disappeared later.

Therefore, it can not be excluded that all of the alleged “KAL-007 debris” may instead have come from the Korean Airlines Boeing 707 that the Soviets had much earlier shot down and forced to land on a frozen lake near Murmansk in April, 1978. As noted, the Boeing 707 airframe was retained and mysteriously disappeared. Perhaps in September, 1983, the Soviets finally found a good use for this Boeing 707 hulk.

Regardless of the plausibility of this theory about the origin of the KAL-007 “debris,” it also remains likely that most of the “debris” ostensibly from KAL-007 that was recovered from Japanese beaches was deliberately set adrift by the Soviets, was intended by the Soviets to be discovered by the Japanese, and finally, was intended to be mostly unidentifiable, especially the unidentifiable debris turned over by the Soviets themselves.

DID KAL-007 ACTUALLY “CRASH”?

According to the “conventional wisdom” perpetrated by the December, 1983 report of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), KAL-007 has always been thought either to have catastrophically exploded at high altitude, or to have plunged into the sea at such a high speed and angle that its impact was catastrophic.

For example, the ICAO report concluded that:

“As a direct result of the [Soviet] missile attack, KE007 [KAL-007] crashed and sank into the Sea of Japan southwest of Sakhalin Island.”

Moreover, U.S. Intelligence also concluded in early September, 1983, that KAL-007 had catastrophically “crashed.” In its current intelligence reporting of September 9, 1983, U.S. Intelligence stated:

“The Korean airliner probably broke up at a fairly high altitude and pieces most likely are widely scattered.”

However, as shall be seen below in great detail, this “crash” assessment was completely contrary to the evidence of KAL-007’s controlled flight path for 12 minutes after it was hit, as derived from extensive special intelligence and Japanese radar tracking. Neither the ICAO nor U.S. Intelligence was ever asked to explain why it assessed a ‘breaking up at high altitude’ resulting in a “crash,” when this was totally inconsistent with the flight path
evidence. And there was never any hard evidence at all that KAL-007 “crashed” in the first place.

EXTENSIVE DEBRIS AND BODIES FROM TWO OTHER BOEING 747 CRASHES AT SEA

But since 1983, there have now been 2 other Boeing 747 catastrophic crashes at sea— one in 1985, and the other in 1987. Thus we now have extensive empirical, albeit tragic, evidence on the extent of wreckage and bodies, and their dispersal, that should result from the catastrophic crash of a Boeing 747 at sea.

Like CIA’s assessment that KAL-007 catastrophically broke up at high altitude and allegedly “crashed,” the 1985 and 1987 crashes at sea of Boeing 747s also were both clearly catastrophic. The 1985 Boeing 747 exploded at high altitude, as KAL-007 was thought to have done according to U.S. Intelligence’s widely accepted scenario. And the 1987 Boeing 747 also apparently exploded at medium altitude.

But unlike KAL-007, massive amounts of wreckage, bodies, and luggage have been recovered from both of these 2 later Boeing 747 catastrophic crashes at sea. And these massive amounts of wreckage, bodies, and luggage recovered were widely dispersed, even though both of these crashes occurred over very deep water, unlike the probable site of KAL-007’s impact in shallow water:

A. The Air India Boeing 747 Crash at Sea, June 23, 1985

On June 23, 1985, an Air India Boeing 747 with 329 persons aboard suddenly exploded from what is believed to have been a terrorist bomb, in mid-air at an altitude of 31,000 feet, in the North Atlantic Ocean, Southwest of Ireland.

A total of 132 bodies of passengers was recovered, 123 of them on the same day as the crash. Eight more bodies were recovered the second day. This was the recovery of about 40 per cent of the bodies within 2 days of the crash.

Astonishingly, all 132 bodies recovered were identified.

Moreover, several thousand pieces of wreckage, some of them huge, were also recovered along with the black boxes, from a depth of about 6,700 feet. The debris was scattered over 5 1/2 square miles of sea bottom, and hundreds of square miles of ocean surface. According to the official report of the crash investigation:

“Soon after the accident, a number of light weight parts of the aircraft were found floating over a wide area at the crash site...the floating wreckage recovery continued for 4 days...the floating wreckage recovered constituted approximately 3 to 5 per cent of the aircraft structure.”
Some wreckage washed up on the West coast of Ireland, and some wreckage washed up on the West coast of England. (See attached chart of wreckage pattern viewed on ocean floor.)

The black boxes were also recovered, even from this great depth of 6,700 feet. Comparison of the radar tracking and the data extracted from the black boxes indicated the following: at 0713 ZULU the Boeing 747 disappeared from radar, and at 0714.01 the flight recorders stopped recording.

This means that the plane exploded in mid air at either 31,000 feet, its last reported altitude, or whatever its altitude was when it disappeared from radar, and plummeted to the sea in about 1 minute.

As compared to KAL-007, from which no debris or body parts were recovered for the first 8 days in much shallower water, this Air India Boeing 747 was definitely a catastrophic crash, but 40 per cent of the bodies were recovered by the second day, 3 to 5 per cent of the aircraft structure was floating and was recovered within 4 days, and the black boxes were recovered from a depth of 6,700 feet. Moreover, KAL-007 stayed in the air for 12 minutes after it was hit, yet the Air India plane fell in only 1 minute.

B. The South African Airlines Boeing 747 crash at Sea, November 28, 1987

On November 28, 1987, a South African Airlines Boeing 747 “Combi” (Configured to carry half cargo and half passengers) apparently exploded from a cargo bay fire in mid-air at about 14,000 feet over the Indian Ocean. This Boeing 747 dropped to the surface in 3 minutes from that altitude, according to the official investigation report of this crash.

A total of 15 bodies from the total of 159 persons aboard was recovered, about 9 per cent of the bodies, and also several thousand pieces of wreckage, were recovered along with the black boxes, from a depth of about 15,000 feet.

In this case, the debris was scattered over several hundred square miles of ocean bottom and surface. Months later, a piece of debris was found on a beach in Natal, South Africa, 2,000 nautical miles away, and other debris also later washed up on Mauritius and Malagasy. (See charts of scattered debris pattern on ocean bottom.)

DEARTH OF REMAINS FROM KAL-007 SUGGESTS THAT IT DID NOT CRASH

It is therefore now possible to conclude about KAL-007 from empirical evidence that:

--No other Boeing 747 crash at sea, or indeed any other major
airliner crash at sea, has had such a mysterious dearth of remains, nor did it take 8 days for any debris or body parts to be discovered.

Several books and many articles have been written about the KAL-007 incident, but none have been able to explain satisfactorily the mystery of the lack of remains from KAL-007.

Almost all of KAL-007’s wreckage, luggage, and all of the 269 innocent people on it seem to have simply disappeared completely on the night of August 31-September 1, 1983, almost without a trace.

The debris associated with KAL-007 has been linked to that from a crash of a Piper Cub. Thus the lack of debris from KAL-007, as compared to empirical evidence from other events presumed to be similar to the KAL-007 incident involving massive amounts of debris, suggests that massive amounts of debris also should have been recovered from KAL-007, if it indeed “crashed.”

Because of the fact that there was a dearth of remains from KAL-007, and such little debris was late being recovered, it is reasonable to speculate that maybe KAL-007 did not “crash” after all. But if it did not “crash,” then what did happen to it?

There were 61 Americans aboard KAL-007, including a sitting U.S. Congressman, Larry McDonald, Democrat of Georgia, all of whom mysteriously disappeared.

Despite this mystery, or more likely because of a reluctance by the U.S. State Department to try to solve the mystery by pressing the Soviets for information, the only official report done on the KAL-007 shoot-down was released in December, 1983, by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a body affiliated with the United Nations. But like all documents from United Nations bodies, this ICAO report appears to have been politically influenced.

DESPITE THE MYSTERY OF THE DEARTH OF REMAINS OR DEBRIS, THERE WAS NO OFFICIAL U.S. GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATION OR REPORT ON KAL-007

It is troubling that no official U.S. Government investigation nor final report on the KAL-007 incident was ever completed, by either the Executive Branch or by the Congress, despite the mysterious dearth of debris from KAL-007, the mystery of the origin and identity and late recovery of what scant remains were associated with KAL-007, and the mysterious disappearance of a sitting U.S. Congressman and the 60 other American citizens on board.

The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board and the Federal Aviation Administration did begin investigations in September 1983, but these early inquiries were reportedly abruptly aborted,
and all investigatory responsibility was reportedly turned over to the State Department. By late 1983, the State Department reportedly refused to continue the investigation, and according to a legal finding from a court case, allowed the U.S. Air Force to routinely erase the tapes which had recorded the initial radar tracks of KAL-007 off of Alaska. These initial radar tracks showed how far KAL-007 was off course at the beginning of its flight, and might have helped to explain why it was off course. Finally, the State Department reportedly even suppressed a “White Paper” report on KAL-007 that it had prepared.

On September 1, 1984, one year after the incident, then-Assistant Secretary of State Richard Burt stated: “The U.S. investigation into the incident is over, even though the plane’s `black box,’ or flight recorder, has never been found.” It seems that soon after all the initial harsh rhetoric and confrontation with the Soviets over this incident had subsided, the State Department wanted to get back to diplomatic business as usual--detente and arms control negotiations with the Soviets.

In fact, also on the one year anniversary of the incident, then-Secretary of State George Shultz said that the incident should not preclude the improvement of relations with the Soviet Union.

DRAMATIC NEW REVELATIONS

This was inspired by some dramatic new revelations shedding new light on the mystery of KAL-007.

This study is based upon a thorough review and analysis of all the “raw” special intelligence reporting on the KAL-007 incident from the National Security Agency, as well as all the finished, all-source, then-current national intelligence reporting, and also the main all-source national intelligence research studies, prepared by the analytical branches of the U.S. Intelligence community--the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

A careful study was also made of the classified “KAL Flight 007 After Action Report,” dated November 15, 1983, from Rear Admiral W. T. Piotti, the Commander, Surface Combatant Force, Seventh Fleet, of the U.S. Navy. This was the final report of Task Force 71, the U.S. Navy search and salvage squadron of ships which tried to find the wreckage from KAL-007 during the period September 1 through November 6, 1983.

This Study was undertaken because there is now strong new evidence on the mystery of the disappearance of KAL-007’s wreckage, passengers, and luggage. This new evidence comes from two sources:
--1) There is a recent series of now over 18 detailed articles in the official Soviet government newspaper Izvestya, spanning December, 1990 through late May, 1991, which is still ongoing. Although this series clearly contains a significant amount of continued Soviet disinformation, it convincingly reveals for the first time, and contrary to the official “spy plane” cover-up explanations in 1983, that:

   a) the Soviets actually discovered the KAL-007 “wreckage;”
   b) actually recovered the black boxes;
   c) surprisingly found no bodies or luggage or “spy” equipment;
   d) used decoy “pingers” to misdirect U.S. Navy search vessels;
   e) and deliberately conducted a major deception operation to mislead the U.S. about what happened to KAL-007.

--2) There is also new sensitive, highly provocative evidence from some recent Russian emigres.

This extremely sensitive new evidence, which has been partially verified, states that:

   a) several Soviet air defense radars tracked KAL-007 during its controlled descent to the surface;
   b) that KAL-007 successfully ditched at sea in Soviet territorial waters between the Soviet Moneron and Sakhalin Islands;
   c) that there were KAL-007 survivors;
   d) that these KAL-007 survivors were immediately imprisoned in the Soviet “Gulag” slave labor prison system;
   e) that KAL-007 was immediately moved further inside Soviet territorial waters off of Moneron Island, was immediately stripped of everything aboard including the black boxes, was immediately sunk in shallow waters, and was then immediately exploded under water in Soviet territorial waters, and also that there was immediately a massive Soviet deception operation directed by the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal Nicolai Ogarkov, to cover up all this.

   f) Moreover, the emigres report that expert Soviet technical analysis of the black boxes by aviation engineers at two Moscow aviation institutes proved that KAL-007 was not a “spy plane,” and also proved that it had made a controlled descent to a
successful ditching at sea.

EVIDENCE SUPPORTING A SUCCESSFUL KAL-007 DITCHING AT SEA

In support of both of these bodies of new information, there is hard evidence from special intelligence that within 4 hours of the Soviet shoot-down of KAL-007, the Soviet military knew from pilot reports:

--1) That a civilian passenger airliner had been shot down by mistake instead of a U.S. reconnaissance plane;

--2) Probably where the civilian passenger plane was located;

--3) That Soviet military command posts were all busy preparing briefings and reports to the General Staff in Moscow on the incident;

--4) And that Soviet forces were engaged in rescue operations for civilian passengers who were probably innocent of spying, whom they had already identified from the air as Americans.

This hard evidence strongly suggests that KAL-007 successfully ditched at sea.

Moreover, we also know from hard evidence that KAL-007 stayed airborne for a full 12 minutes after it was hit, and empirical evidence shows that if it had exploded catastrophically at high altitude or catastrophically plummeted into the sea, it would have fallen in only about 2 1/2 minutes, not 12.

Finally, if KAL-007 had catastrophically crashed into the sea after its 12 minute descent, it is highly likely that it would have disintegrated immediately upon crashing into the sea, and that much of its debris would either have sunk quickly or have been unrecognizable from the air. Moreover, in such a crash, if any bodies survived physically intact, some would probably have been floating on the surface.

But of course, the fact that KAL-007 was a civilian passenger airliner and the nationality of some of the bodies as American, would have been very difficult to identity in the event of such a catastrophic crash, especially by Soviet pilots reporting from the air. Moreover, at the time, about four hours after KAL-007 disappeared, the Soviet airborne pilots could have known from their own intelligence reports only that a Korean, not an American airliner had disappeared.

Thus if KAL-007 had catastrophically crashed at sea, it is highly unlikely that the Soviets could have identified the plane as a civilian passenger airliner at all, especially within 4 hours, or that it had carried some American passengers, all from the pilots
Indeed, if KAL-007 had crashed at sea, it is highly likely that the Soviet pilots would have been unable to determine what type of plane they had attacked at all, would have been unable to identify any remains whatsoever of the plane on the surface, and especially would have been unable to identify any remains or bodies presumably floating on the surface of any passengers who could have been characterized as Americans.

Thus if KAL-007 had crashed, the Soviets would probably not have known what type of plane they had attacked or the nationalities of its passengers for several days.

This hard evidence thus suggests a successful ditching at sea, and it is fully consistent with the new evidence from both of the two new sources.

Moreover, on September 8, 1983, the Soviet Ambassador to Japan officially stated to the Japanese government that the Soviets had not recovered any survivors or bodies. From what we know now about the massive duplicity of the Soviets regarding KAL-007, it is more likely that this negative Soviet diplomatic statement can be interpreted as positive evidence that the Soviets did recover survivors.

Finally, using extensive evidence of Soviet radar tracking of KAL-007 derived from special intelligence, and more limited tracking data from a Japanese military radar, we have done a detailed analysis of KAL-007’s 12 minute flight path after it was hit by the Soviet missile. This analysis shows that while KAL-007 flew for at least 12 minutes after it was hit, it conducted a controlled descent fully consistent with standard airline procedures for a ditching at sea. Its descent was in large spirals and its descent rate actually decelerated gradually as it came to lower altitude.

In short, the flight path evidence is fully consistent with a successful ditching at sea, which is also suggested by the special intelligence evidence and the new emigre evidence.

MASSIVE SOVIET DECEPTION CONFIRMED

This new evidence from these two new sources, when combined with all the special intelligence evidence that is already known, thus strongly supports the possibility that KAL-007 successfully ditched at sea, and further, that there may well have been survivors.

Moreover, the two new sources of evidence are fully consistent with the existing, extensive special intelligence evidence of a massive Soviet military deception operation. This convergence of
all the evidence clearly confirms that there was in fact a massive Soviet cover-up and deception of what happened to KAL-007 by the Soviet military.

In fact, the best corroboration for the new HUMINT evidence from the recent Soviet emigres is the fact that their evidence provides details about the Soviet deception effort and Marshal Ogarkov’s decisive role in it previously known only from special intelligence.

The evidence indicates that the Soviet military was highly embarrassed that it took them so long and so much effort to shoot down an innocent civilian airliner over international waters that they had mistakenly identified as a U.S. reconnaissance plane. There is compelling evidence from special intelligence, to be discussed in detail below, that the Soviet military thus made many serious operational mistakes in shooting down KAL-007.

In order to hide their mistakes from the Soviet political leadership, and in order to try to put the blame on the United States, the KAL-007 “spy plane” cover story was immediately concocted by the Soviet military in its early “after-action” reports.

The very first Soviet military “after-action” reports sent only hours after the incident to Marshal Nicolai Ogarkov, who was then the Chief of the Soviet General Staff and also the chief of strategic deception, contained false, deceptive, and incomplete information that became the basis for the official “spy plane” cover-story.

Most significantly, these initial military “after-action” reports cited alleged evasive maneuvers by KAL-007 proving that it was a ‘spy plane,” self-criticism such as equipment failures (radar inoperability), and communications failures, but glossed over the the failure to identify KAL-007.

Marshal Ogarkov embellished these early, initial military “after-action” reports with even more falsifications and deceptions, and then Ogarkov passed them on to the Soviet Foreign Ministry and to the Politburo. The official Soviet “spy plane” cover-story was thus accepted by the political leadership as the official Soviet public explanation of the incident.

The reportedly ditched Korean airliner was probably found by the Soviets within only 4 hours of the shoot-down, probably in Soviet territorial waters between the Soviet Sakhalin and Moneron Islands, as Izvestiya reveals. As part of the deceptive KAL-007 ‘spy plane” cover-story, the probably ditched airliner was reportedly immediately stripped of its possibly surviving passengers, bodies, luggage, reportedly towed further inside Soviet territorial waters North of Moneron, and sunk at sea inside shallow Soviet territorial
waters North of Moneron off Sakhalin. The black boxes were then retrieved, packed in sea water, and the airframe, then was reportedly blown up underwater, so that there would never be any physical evidence susceptible to being discovered by the U.S. which could contradict the Soviet “spy plane” cover-story.

Marshal Ogarkov evidently reasoned within 4 hours after the shoot-down that a sunken, ditched, American-built but Korean-operated, passenger plane mysteriously stripped of all bodies, luggage, and black boxes, and then exploded under water, was somehow a more credible “spy plane” than any wreckage later discovered complete with all the recovered debris, bodies, and black boxes. But in order for this cover-up story to be credible, the Soviets themselves had to recover and keep the black boxes from KAL-007 at all costs, which Izvestiya admits occurred, because any U.S. analysis of the flight data recorded on them could expose the complete falsity of the “spy plane” cover-story.

The aggregation of the evidence from these three sources—special intelligence, the emigre report, and the Izvestiya series—is consistent, and confirms that the KAL-007 “spy plane” cover-story was clearly a massive Soviet deception operation originated by Marshal Ogarkov. Thus the little “debris” later recovered and the underwater demolition of KAL-007, or alternatively, could have been debris from the KAL Boeing 707 shot down in April, 1978, which was brought to the Far East and deliberately set adrift by the Soviets and allowed to wash up on Japanese beaches.

As noted, there is sensitive special intelligence that the first Soviet military reports of the incident to the General Staff in Moscow came within only 4 hours. But these reports clearly ommitted significant details, such as any references whatsoever to passengers or survivors, which suggests that survivors were handled in another, even more secret, separate channel.

These early after action reports also ommitted the blinking identification lights on KAL-007 reported three times by the Soviet interceptor pilot, but included the erroneous detail that the Soviets had first detected KAL-007 25 minutes later than they they actually had, thus reducing the time available to Soviet interceptor pilots for their failed attempts at positive identification of KAL-007. And as noted, the “after-action” reports cited radar failures, communications failures, and glossed over the Soviet military’s failure to properly identify KAL-007. But they emphasized the alleged “evasive actions” taken by KAL-007 as “proof” that it was a spy plane.

In sum, sensitive special intelligence reveals that Marshal Ogarkov himself immediately embellished the false information in these initial military “after-action” reports. Moreover, special intelligence also indicates that Marshal Ogarkov’s deception
operation consisted of over 16 deliberately false statements, some introduced by Ogarkov himself into the secret Soviet, military “after-action” reports to the Soviet political leadership, and also explanations of the shoot-down. These 16 deliberate Soviet public lies, which the Soviets knew from their own information at the time to be totally false, were designed to make the credulous world believe that KAL-007 was really a U.S. Intelligence “spy plane.”

In addition, we now know that Marshal Ogarkov’s deception managers:

-1) provided completely false geographic coordinates to the U.S. on the alleged location of the presumed “crash” site well outside of Soviet territorial waters;

-2) that the Soviets denied permission for the U.S. searches inside Soviet territorial waters after a deliberate delay;

-3) that the Soviets used their own submarines and 5 submersibles to actually move U.S. underwater sonar reference markers on the ocean floor search area in international waters, and even that they placed several decoy “pingers” on the ocean bottom far out into international waters, all in order to simulate the location of the presumed black boxes and to further misled U.S. navy search efforts;

-4) that the Soviets used false flags and false light signals during their search operations, in order to confuse the U.S. searchers;

-5) that the Soviets further deliberately hindered deceptive search efforts, including conducting live fire shellings from Soviet warships near Moneron island, live radar “lock-ons” controlling Soviet ship-borne weapons, provocative over-flights of Backfire bombers armed with anti-ship nuclear missiles, and even threatening armed boarding parties;

-6) that Marshal Ogarkov himself gave a totally deceptive press conference on September 9, 1983, elaborating the more than 16 deliberate lies in the “spy plane” cover-story;

-7) and finally, that the Soviet Annex to the December, 1983 ICAO report also contained Ogarkov’s 16 lies comprising the “spy plane” cover-story.

Thus the whole Soviet “search” effort, after the Soviets had probably themselves already found KAL-007 immediately after it was shot-down, was an elaborate ruse.

This elaborate ruse was designed to completely mislead the U.S., and to totally hinder U.S. search efforts. And the Soviets
deliberately violated the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement at least 21 times by seriously interfering with U.S. naval movements, probably in order to try to convince the U.S. of the seriousness of their “search” efforts for a “wreck,” which they had long ago already found.

In sum, we must finally inquire into the presumed Soviet purpose underlying such an extensive and elaborate deception operation. It is reasonable to conclude that the astonishing magnitude and systematic nature of the massive Soviet KAL-007 deception operation is itself evidence that KAL-007 probably successfully ditched at sea, and the Soviets had to go to great lengths to cover up this event.

U.S. INTELLIGENCE FAILURE TO PERCEIVE AND UNRAVEL THE SOVIET DECEPTION

Concurrently, there was also a major failure of U.S. Intelligence to provide our own “all-source” location of the probable “crash” site and large scale maps of the bottom contours promptly to the U.S. Navy task force, and to focus on the timing and nature of the Soviet search and rescue operations in order to unravel the massive Soviet deception. Thus U.S. Intelligence has been completely fooled by the magnitude and purpose of the Soviet deception effort since 1983.

The new evidence from the two new sources has forced the aggregation of all the individual pieces of existing special intelligence evidence of Soviet deception collected in 1983.

This new evidence has finally allowed the exposure of the details, scope, scale, nature, and even the probable purpose of the original Soviet deception effort. But much further investigative work and research efforts remains to be done in order to reveal and verify more details of what really happened to KAL-007, as well as to more fully verify and evaluate the new HUMINT evidence.

FINDINGS: KAL-007 PROBABLY SUCCESSFULLY DITCHED AT SEA, AND THERE MAY HAVE BEEN SURVIVORS

The following seven bodies of evidence suggest that KAL-007 probably successfully ditched at sea:

--1) The testimony of Soviet emigres, the credibility of which has been partially verified, states that a successful ditching at sea of KAL-007 in fact occurred;

--2) The flight path analysis, derived from special intelligence, clearly shows that a controlled, spiral descent of KAL-007 occurred during the 12 minute post-attack flight by KAL-007;
--3) The obvious dearth of debris from KAL-007, and the 8 day gap before any debris was recovered, compared to the massive and widespread debris immediately recovered from 2 later Boeing 747 crashes at sea, suggests that KAL-007 did not crash catastrophically. The most probable alternative is that KAL-007 successfully ditched at sea;

--4) The key evidence from special intelligence, derived from the reports of Soviet pilots, refers to Soviet “rescue operations” for “American passengers” on the “civilian” airliner, only 4 hours after KAL-007 went down. This hard evidence strongly suggests that KAL-007 successfully ditched at sea. Moreover, it is almost certain that if KAL-007 crashed catastrophically at sea, the type of aircraft and the nationality of some of the passengers as “Americans” would have been unknown to the Soviets for several days, because much of the wreckage would probably have sunk immediately and any floating debris and the bodies would have been unidentifiable by Soviet pilots from the air;

--5) The magnitude and nature of the Soviet military’s deception operation, especially the total lack of reference to passengers or survivors from all the early military after action reports, suggests that the Soviets had a special channel for reporting something very serious to cover-up, such as possible survivors from a successful ditching;

--6) The Soviets are confirmed to have engaged in massive lies in regard to the KAL-007 incident, yet the Soviets told the U.S. in diplomatic channels in early September, 1983, that they had not recovered any survivors or even bodies. The reverse interpretation of this Soviet diplomatic statement is more likely to be correct.

--7) Almost all of the presumed debris and bodies and human remains from KAL-007 was unidentified, and could not be specifically associated with KAL-007, except for only two items. Thus the mystery of the identity of the small amount of debris is consistent with a ditching at sea, if the Soviets disposed of the real wreckage themselves.

The following evidence suggests that there may have been survivors from KAL-007:

--1) The partially verified emigre testimony that there were survivors from KAL-007:

--2) The complete lack of identifiable bodies from KAL-007, and the paucity of all human remains from KAL-007:

--3) The Izvestiya suggestion that there may have been survivors from KAL-007:

--4) The special intelligence referring to “American”
passengers from KAL-007, in the context of “rescue” operations;

5) The emigres’ description of the Soviet Forced Labor Camp System, or Gulag, where the KAL-007 survivors were reportedly sent, and the corroboration of the overall Gulag descriptions from the emigres by U.S. Intelligence.

IMPLICATIONS

THE Soviets clearly violated all the international laws governing civil aviation by their cold-blooded shoot-down of KAL-007, and they also violated the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement during the search and salvage phase of operations.

If any passengers survived the ditching at sea, then the Soviet Union is guilty of concealing their survival, and their subsequent death or imprisonment. But even if KAL-007’s passengers did not survive the landing at sea, then at the least the Soviet Union is guilty of concealing their deaths, or failing to return their bodies to the families, and in either case, of lying to the whole world on a grand scale.

KAL-007 SHOOT-DOWN DIRECTLY VIOLATED AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT

Moreover, in addition to violating all the international laws governing civil aviation and the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement, the Soviet Union violated another important international agreement by their action of shooting down KAL-007.

In particular, the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, between the United States and the Soviet Union, was signed as an Executive Agreement and entered into force on June 22, 1973. This Agreement states:

“...The parties agree that they will act in such a manner as to prevent the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations, as to avoid military confrontations...The Parties agree...to proceed from the premise that each Party will refrain from the threat or use of force against the other Party, against the allies of the other Party...in circumstances which may endanger international peace and security.”

The shoot-down of KAL-007 clearly violated all aspects of the above language, as well as the many other international agreements governing international civil air transportation and naval movements at sea.

Note; The Possible Manipulation of U.S. Intelligence Evidence Due to a Benign View of the Soviets Within U.S. Intelligence

Finally, in addition to failing to provide the “crash” site coordinates and the large scale bottom contours to the U.S. search
force in a timely fashion, and failing to unravel the Soviet deception operation by focusing on the Soviet search and rescue efforts, U.S. Intelligence seems to have manipulated 2 key pieces of intelligence evidence related to KAL-007.

In one case, the manipulation came a year after the incident, and seemed to be designed to extenuate the circumstances of the shoot-down in Soviet favor.

In the second case, the “conclusive” raw intelligence report within 3 days of the incident carelessly characterized a key piece of evidence with a crucial mistake. This mistake seriously contradicted the public statement of the U.S. Secretary of State, reinforced the original U.S. Intelligence judgement that KAL-007 “crashed” catastrophically, (which was consistent with the original Soviet explanation), and had the effect of obscuring the massive Soviet deception effort.

Moreover, there are credible reports that some key evidence and analysis was deliberately suppressed by high ranking CIA officials, and was withheld for several days after the incident. Further, key evidence was also reportedly withheld for much longer periods by the National Security Agency, and was not promptly disseminated.

In sum, the reporting and analytical record of U.S. Intelligence was not good, and these failures may require some legislated reforms.

(End Summary.)
TOP SECRET/CODEWORD

I. INTRODUCTION: UNJUSTIFIABLE SOVIET ATTACK ON KAL-007

Korean Airlines Flight-007, "KAL-007," was clearly attacked by one or two air-to-air missiles fired by a Soviet SU-15 interceptor about one hour before dawn on the night of August 31, and September 1, 1983, quite clearly after KAL-007 had left Soviet territorial airspace off of Sakhalin Island, and after it had already entered international airspace.

The initial, raw special intelligence clearly showed this fact, because the timing of KAL-007’s departure from Soviet territorial airspace indicated by Soviet radar tracking clearly came before it was attacked. Thus KAL-007 had already exited from Soviet airspace over Sakhalin Island, the Soviets knew this before they attacked, and they deliberately attacked it anyway after it had already exited into international airspace. The original U.S. current intelligence reporting during the first week of September, 1983, also supported this fact.

But later U.S. Intelligence analytical assessment in 1984 and 1987 tried to qualify and obscure this fact, suggesting that the timing evidence was ambiguous, in an apparent effort to extenuate the Soviet culpability for the shoot-down. This was in keeping with the usual bias of U.S. intelligence, evident for many years prior to 1983, to try to put all Soviet actions in as benign a light as possible.

This deliberate Soviet attack on KAL-007 in international airspace over international waters was a fundamental, irrevocable crime against international law, committed by Soviet air defense forces.

By attacking KAL-007 carrying 269 innocent civilians, including 66 Americans, in international airspace, the Soviet military must have known that they had committed a terrible crime and a serious violation of international law. Of course, these kinds of crimes and deadly violations of human rights are routine in the Soviet Union, but when they are committed over international waters, and there is thus some danger of the world finding out about them, the Soviet military must immediately cover-up their crime.

The Soviet military thereafter frantically sought a cover-story for what happened to KAL-007, which would somehow exonerate them from their crime and their many operational mistakes which led to their crime.

It is important to recall, however, that in April, 1978, the Soviets had clearly identified another KAL airliner as a civilian passenger plane, yet they went ahead and shot it down anyway.
Therefore it is likely that even if the Soviets could have positively identified KAL-007 as a civilian airliner, they likewise would have shot it down anyway.

II. THE STRATEGIC NATURE OF THE KAMCHATKA IMPACT AREA

KAL-007 traversed across two important Soviet territories--the Kamchatka Peninsula and Sakhalin Island. (See attached map of the region and maps of KAL-007’s approximate flight route.)

The Soviet Kamchatka Peninsula is a highly strategic Soviet area, containing several key strategic facilities--a ballistic missile submarine base and several air bases.

But it is especially sensitive because all-sources intelligence reveals that a special area on Kamchatka, called Klyuchi, serves as the impact area for most Soviet test-flights of their Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). Thus the Klyuchi impact area on Kamchatka is where literally thousands of Soviet ballistic missile Re-entry Vehicles (dummy, non-nuclear warheads) have come down to earth since Soviet ICBM testing began in 1957. Even Soviets open sources reveal that Kamchatka and its especially important Klyuchi impact area are especially sensitive areas to the Soviets. (See map of Soviet missile test range heads and the flight trajectory to Klyuchi impact area on Kamchatka.)

Kamchatka is in fact one of the most important and most sensitive areas in the entire USSR to the Soviet military. Its entire airspace is specially controlled, and is completely off-limits to even Soviet civil air traffic. There is even a base for Soviet ballistic missile submarines, at Petropavlovsk, also on Kamchatka. The entire peninsula is totally forbidden airspace to all foreign aircraft. Indeed, because the Soviets have long known of U.S. Intelligence interest in Kamchatka, the Soviets would immediately suspect that any unidentified aircraft coming close to Kamchatka might be a spy plane.

Sakhalin Island is also a strategic military area entirely closed to foreign air traffic by the Soviets.

And after crossing Sakhalin, KAL-007 was headed for the key Soviet strategic naval, air, and military base at Vladivostok when it was shot down.

III. MARSHAL OGARKOV AND SOVIET STRATEGIC DECEPTION--“MASKIROVKA”

Special intelligence indicates that in 1970, Nicolai Ogarkov, then a General, was the Chief of the Soviet General Staff’s main Operations Directorate. U.S. diplomatic reporting indicates that at the same time, during the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between 1969 and 1972, General Ogarkov was also the chief Soviet
military delegate to the SALT I negotiations.

Special intelligence and sensitive clandestine sources reveal that early in 1970, General Ogarkov established a new department within the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff. This new General Staff Main Operations Directorate department for strategic deception was established in order to centrally design and manage all Soviet strategic deception activities.

There is strong, converging COMINT and HUMINT evidence on the origins and purposes of the then-new strategic deception department in the Main Operations Directorate, established under General Ogarkov’s initiative.

This new strategic deception or “maskirovka” department was charged with centrally designing, managing, and implementing all Soviet military strategies for deception in the negotiations of SALT I, which depended upon deceiving U.S. negotiators about the extent of qualitative improvements in the Soviet missile modernization program. Moreover, within the framework of deception, this new department designed a deliberate program for secretly expanding Soviet strategic capabilities which transcended SALT I.

As Chief of the Main Operations Directorate itself, General Ogarkov also became the new strategic deception department’s first chief while he was at SALT I. The new deception department’s task was to coordinate the camouflage and concealment of all the activity of Soviet offensive and defensive missile forces and bomber forces from U.S. Intelligence. As commander of this new deception department, General Ogarkov was deeply involved in planning all the deception activities to mask and conceal all Soviet strategic missile tests.

Special intelligence reveals that a program of warning Soviet military forces of the approaches of all U.S. reconnaissance satellites, begun much earlier in the mid-1960-s, was broadened and improved under General Ogarkov during the early-1970-s. Special intelligence and satellite photography also shows that continuously throughout the 1970s, all Soviet military forces, especially strategic forces, began to increase their camouflage, concealment, and communications security activities, and to construct extensive dummy and decoy equipment.

In sum, it is an ironic and little-known fact that the chief Soviet military negotiator during the 1969-1972 SALT I negotiations, General Ogarkov, was also chief of Soviet strategic deception.

When Soviet General Ogarkov was promoted to marshal of the Soviet Union, and took over as Chief of the General Staff in 1977, his the-new strategic deception or “maskirovka” department had already succeeded in deceiving the United Staes on all the key issues of
SALT I, and all the many Soviet circumventions and violations of
SALT I were already succeeding under the cloak of “maskirovka,”
some without U.S. detection and all without U.S. protest.

Indeed, it is reasonable to conclude that this Soviet military
success in strategic SALT I deception and secret cheating was one
of the main reasons why General Ogarkov was promoted in 1977 to
Marshal of the Soviet Union and also to Chief of the Soviet General
Staff.

Sensitive special intelligence also shows that in the mid-1970s,
the the-General Ogarkov instituted another new program of strategic
deception, institutionalizing “maskirovka” even beyond the Soviet
military. This new strategic deception program (called the “PDITR”
by the Soviets) was instituted by General Ogarkov in the late 1976,
and was intended to be implemented even by all Soviet defense
industry ministries at the factory level. It was intended to
include the camouflage and concealment of all Soviet defense
industrial activity from observation or interception by U.S.
reconnaissance satellites. Moreover, this program included new
communications security procedures to prevent U.S. SIGINT
collection. The General Staff program for warning of the approach
of and capabilities of all U.S. reconnaissance satellites was also
extended to the defense industries, in order for all defense
factories and design bureaus to take protective countermeasures.

In sum, by 1983, the evidence shows that an effective Soviet
General Staff command structure for centralized management,
planning, and control of all Soviet deception activities had
already been in place for 13 years, and Marshal Ogarkov was the
creator and direct controller of this entire centralized deception
network.

A. Soviet “Maskirovka” on Kamchatka

The Soviet military has known for decades that U.S. Intelligence
is particularly interested in their Kamchatka Klyuchi ballistic
missile impact area, because by observing what goes into Klyuchi,
U.S. Intelligence may be able to determine such key characteristics
as the accuracy and throw-weight of the Soviet strategic ballistic
missiles.

Hence the Soviets go to great lengths to conceal their ballistic
missile testing activities at the Kamchatka impact area from
observation by all U.S. Intelligence reconnaissance satellites.
Moreover, special efforts are made to conceal Soviet missile
activity from other U.S. collection platforms, especially the Cobra
Ball and the new “Cobra Eye” RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft, the
Cobra Dane range instrumentation ship, and the Cobra Judy radar,
all of which are based on Shemya Island at the end of the U.S.
Aleutian Islands chain off Alaska.
As examples of Soviet strategic deception efforts or “maskirovka,” at the Kamchatka impact area, the Soviets usually flight-test their ballistic missiles into Klyuchi at night, in order to obscure both their launchers at the far away Tyuratam, Plesetsk, and Nenoksa test range heads, and their warhead impacts about 24 minutes later into Klyuchi on Kamchatka, under the cover of darkness. Sensitive U.S. oblique-angle satellite photography during early dawn light, and U.S. satellite radar imagery during full night, shows that before dawn and thus before they think it is possible for U.S. satellites to observe, the Soviets often dig decoy ballistic missile warhead impact holes, and fill in the real ones. This dummy impact pattern is created in order to try to deceive the U.S. about the accuracy of their missiles.

Moreover, the Soviets completely encode or encrypt all the electronic telemetry signals emitted by all of their ballistic missiles and their Re-entry Vehicles enroute from their launch at far-away Tyuratam, Plesetsk, and Nenoksa test range heads to impact on Kamchatka. This full encryption is intended to prevent U.S. Intelligence SIGINT satellites, air intercept platforms, and ground intercept stations from determining the key characteristics, such as accuracy and throw-weight, of Soviet ballistic missiles fired into Kamchatka.

Sensitive SIGINT reveals that another, more dramatic, example of Soviet strategic deception on Kamchatka started in early August, 1983, just a few weeks before KAL-007’s fateful flight. At that time, the Soviet started the extraordinary concealment measure of flying special electronic warfare aircraft over Kamchatka, just as their ballistic missile warheads were re-entering the atmosphere and impacting on Kamchatka. The purpose of these special electronic warfare flights was to broadcast a special masking or jamming signal which prevented U.S. Intelligence from intercepting and analyzing the electronic telemetry signals from their missiles and warheads. (Sensitive SIGINT reveals that the Soviets have also used special electronic warfare ships off of Kamchatka for such jamming.)

In sum, Kamchatka was the focal point of many major Soviet strategic deception efforts.

B. Soviet Extreme Sensitivity in August, 1983, To The Unraveling of Their Deceptions Covering-Up SALT Violations

In early July, 1983, a U.S. reconnaissance satellite had just photographed and detected the Soviet Krasnoyarsk radar for the first time.

This detection was finally the “smoking gun” evidence of Soviet arms control violations, because Krasnoyarsk was a clearcut, indisputable violation of the SALT I ABM Treaty.
News of the U.S. detection of the clearly illegal Soviet Krasnoyarsk radar quickly leaked to the U.S. press in late July, 1983. The detection of the Soviet Krasnoyarsk violation naturally inspired a spate of articles in the U.S. major media in August, 1983, accusing the Soviets of many other violations of SALT I and SALT II which were less conclusive than the Krasnoyarsk violation but nevertheless strongly based in intelligence evidence.

This situation of accelerating U.S. accusations of Soviet violations presented the Soviets with a situation in which the whole world now knew about their deceptive practices and cheating in SALT I and SALT II.

Thus the period beginning in August, 1983, was highly sensitive for the Soviet military maskirovka program. This changed atmosphere must have presented a challenge to Marshal Ogarkov given his key role in designing and organizing Soviet arms control deception and violations. Thus it is reasonable to conclude that Marshal Ogarkov was on his guard in August, 1983, and was worried that his massive deception scheme covering-up the Soviet military’s violations of SALT I and SALT II might be unraveling and became exposed.

C. Soviet “Maskirovka” on SS-25 Flight Tests to Kamchatka

Thus there were many reasons why the Soviet military did not want any airborne intruders flying over Kamchatka, but especially on the night of August 31-September 1, 1983. A key reason was that they were secretly planning that night to flight-test from the Plesetsk range head into Klyuchi, under the cover of darkness and prohibited full encryption of telemetry, their new but completely illegal SS-25 mobile ICBM.

U.S. Intelligence had detected “tip-off” indications that the Soviet SS-25 ICBM was scheduled for flight test that night this was the reason that a U.S. RC-135 Cobra Ball reconnaissance plane was loitering in international airspace off Kamchatka.

But the SS-25 violated the then “politically binding” SALT II Treaty, both by being an illegal new type missile, and by using illegal encoded telemetry. (The SS-25 also violated SALT II in several other ways, too.) as noted, Ogarkov’s Soviet General Staff deception department went to great lengths to camouflage and conceal all SS-25 tests, by launching at night from concealed mobile launchers at the Plesetsk range head for impact in Kamchatka’s Klyuchi impact area also at night, and by [ ] encrypting all the telemetry from the SS-25.

Thus on the night of August 31-September 1, 1983, special electronic warfare aircraft outfitted with jammers were probably also alerted to be airborne during the re-entry and impact in Kamchatka’s Klyuchi impact area, of the SS-25 warhead.
All these elaborate Soviet deception and data denial precautions were designed to prevent U.S. Intelligence from determining the characteristics of this illegal missile, which would show that it violated SALT II in several important ways. Moreover, the Soviets were also involved in certain other sensitive activities at the Kamchatka Klyuchi impact area, such as using any illegal mobile ABM radar and other possibly illegal advanced technology sensors to monitor their ICBM RV impacts and simultaneously to conduct possibly illegal ABM research.

In sum, given these extensive Soviet efforts to hide the test and the illegal characteristics of their SS-25s, the Soviets were especially sensitive during late August, 1983, because they probably wondered whether the U.S. in turn would try to take active measures to neutralize or defeat their own active airborne jamming of our attempts to intercept their encrypted telemetry.

Marshal Ogarkov was thus faced with two problems in late August, 1983: he may have suspected that the U.S. might try to overfly Kamchatka itself with an RC-135 Cobra Ball, to collect telemetry at a closer range, or even use another aircraft to try to drive away or shoot down the Soviet airborne jammers.

IV. SOVIET AIR DEFENSE INCOMPETENCE OVER KAMCHATKA

Thus Soviet air defense should have been able to fully defend Kamchatka, and to prevent or deflect intruders.

Indeed, special intelligence indicates that Soviet air defense forces on the Kamchatka Peninsula and on Sakhalin Island were ordered to a much higher state of combat readiness throughout the summer of 1983, due to the U.S. Navy’s aggressive fighter intrusions into Soviet airspace over the Kurile Islands during the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier battle group exercise in April, 1983.

The Soviets strongly protested these airspace intrusions by diplomatic notes. Moreover, during the summer of 1983, the Soviets implemented a tightening of their State Frontier Law regarding the enforcement of their territorial airspace, probably as result of the U.S. Navy fighter incursions in April. Finally, due to the U.S. Navy’s April intrusions, the Soviet air defense commanders in the Far East ordered that the Soviets intercept all intruders into even the 200 kilometer air defense identification zone, and to use more intercepters for these interceptions than they would normally use.

But besides mistakenly shooting down KAL-007 in international airspace, special intelligence indicates that the Soviet air defense forces made many other serious operational mistakes that night. The Soviet air defense forces tracked KAL-007 on radar for about 2 1/2 hours as it was approaching and over-flying Soviet territory, first over the strategic Kamchatka Peninsula, and then over the also denied airspace over Sakhalin Island.
A. Intercept Fiasco Over Kamchatka

Special intelligence indicates that the Soviets at first scrambled only 2 Soviet intercepters over Kamchatka that night to intercept KAL-007. These 2 Soviet intercepters made several unsuccessful interception attempts against KAL-007 during these 2 1/2 hours while it was being tracked on Soviet radars approaching and over-flying Kamchatka. (But the 4 intercepters later scrambled over Sakhalin were more successful.) In short, there was an air defense fiasco over Kamchatka.

When KAL-007 first appeared on Soviet radar tracking, it was about 450 kilometers from Soviet airspace. A significant factor in the incident was the total coincidence that Soviet air defense radars on Kamchatka had already also been tracking for the 2 previous hours the circling U.S. RC-135 Cobra Ball, which was itself expecting to be able to track the impending Soviet SS-25 flight test.

Hence when KAL-007 was first detected, special intelligence shows that it was initially designated by the Soviet air defense forces to also be, erroneously as it turned out, an American RC-135. Because KAL-007 appeared by coincidence during the RC-135 tracking, and near the area where Cobra Ball routinely patrolled, it seemed reasonable at least initially for the Soviets to assume that KAL-007 was merely a second Cobra Ball.

But in sum, the Soviet air defense zone on Kamchatka performed very poorly that night in dealing with an unexpected but feared intruder. In fact, special intelligence suggests that the commander of the Kamchatka air defenses was reprimanded by Marshal Ogarkov after the incident, and was probably fired.

B. Details of Major Soviet Operational Mistakes and Failures to Follow Standard Operational Procedures

Here are some details from special intelligence of examples of the many serious operational mistakes committed by the Soviet air defense forces on Kamchatka during the night of KAL-007’s penetration on August 31-September 1, 1983:

--First, the Soviet Kamchatka air defense forces apparently failed to alert intercepters when KAL-007 initially approached the Kamchatka air defense “identification zone” about 200 kilometers off of Kamchatka, as Soviet standard operational procedure and especially the newly heightened readiness status required;

--Second, the Soviet Kamchatka air defense forces failed to scramble intercepters when KAL-007 first entered the Soviet air defense zone itself about 100 kilometers off of Kamchatka, as Soviet standard operational procedures also required. This failure was probably due to Soviet complacency engendered by the initial
Soviet misperception that KAL-007 was an RC-135 U.S. reconnaissance plane, as it was originally identified. During the years of detente since about 1970, RC-135s have almost never overflown Soviet airspace, especially the Cobra Balls, which instead almost always loiter off the coast of Kamchatka in international airspace, flying “figure eight” looping patterns.

But when KAL-007 failed to turn away from Soviet airspace near Kamchatka, as the Soviets from long experience had expected it to do believing that it was an RC-135, the now thoroughly alarmed Soviets changed the radar tracking designation for KAL-007 from RC-135 to “unidentified” intruder aircraft.

It is important to note that because KAL-007 was penetrating Soviet airspace, KAL-007 was not behaving like an RC-135, and so the Soviets therefore dropped their initial designation of it as an RC-135, and changed it into unidentified intruder, whose identity was still pending. Moreover, according to data from Soviet radars themselves, KAL-007 always had a distinct and separate radar track from the RC-135 Cobra Ball.

Thus as KAL-007 approached Soviet airspace over Kamchatka, the Soviets finally scrambled 2 intercepters to properly identify this unidentified intruder.

As this was happening, Cobra Ball’s fuel allowance for loiter-time seemed to have expired and therefore it routinely turned around and headed back to its base at Shemya Island, at the tip of the U.S. Aleutian Islands off of Alaska. It is clear that Cobra Ball never knew KAL-007 was around or was off course, never came closer than 75 miles to it, never communicated with it, and had been sitting on the runway at Shemya for about 1 hour when KAL-007 was finally shot down just before exiting Soviet airspace off of Sakhalin Island.

--Third, the Soviet Kamchatka air defense forces failed to locate, intercept, and most significantly, to properly and positively identify KAL-007 visually from the air, as their own military standard operational procedures required. Special intelligence indicates that the 2 Soviet intercepters that finally were scrambled over Kamchatka were given erroneous vectors, flew around aimlessly searching for the still-unidentified intruder, and totally failed to locate, intercept, and identify KAL-007. neither of the 2 intercepters ever came closer than about 50 miles to KAL-007.

--Fourth and most significantly, special intelligence reveals that the Soviet Kamchatka air defense forces experienced the serious malfunction and failure of several main Soviet air defense radars used for guiding interceptor aircraft and surface-to air missiles. These vital radars completely failed to function, and they therefore did not track KAL-007 at all. This radar
inoperability was a significant technical shortcoming by the air defense radar troops, for they were not maintaining their radars properly to keep them in an operational status. Indeed, Marshal Ogarkov publicly claimed that a Soviet long-range SAM-5 unit on Kamchatka could have shot KAL-007 down with a missile almost immediately, if they wanted to, instead of allowing it to proceed to Sakhalin. But this was probably another Soviet lie, because the SAM-5 radar on Kamchatka was not functioning.

--Fifth, special intelligence indicates that the Soviet Kamchatka air defense forces were as much as 4 minutes late in communicating important locations, speeds, and vectors for interception, communicated faulty radar tracking data, and experienced other communications problems, all leading to a serious breakdown in command and control, and resulting in the failure to intercept and properly identify KAL-007 over Kamchatka, as required by standard operational procedures.

But by far the most serious mistake made over Kamchatka was the failure to properly and positively identify the intruder, as was required by the Soviet military's own strict and well known standard operational procedures, and this was largely caused by the Soviet radar failures.

In sum, if the Kamchatka air defense zone had performed as expected, and had it at least properly identified KAL-007 as a civilian passenger airliner, then the whole tragic incident might have been completely avoided. But then it is more likely that the Soviets would have shot down KAL-007 anyway, even if they had properly identified it.

A senior Soviet diplomat in Moscow told a western news correspondent several days after the shoot-down that Soviet radar failures over Kamchatka caused the incident to occur, because they should have been able to properly vector Soviet interceptors for a positive identification. This was probably an accurate assessment, but the Soviet military would never admit this publicly, or even privately to the Soviet political leadership.

Moreover, a reliable clandestine source reported that the Soviet military had lied for about the first 3 days to the Soviet Foreign Ministry about the KAL-007 incident. This source also reported that the Soviet political leadership, especially then-Foreign Minister Gromyko and then-President Andropov, were not pleased with these military lies covering up the military’s bad performance. And they were not pleased with the indecisive command and control caused by the military’s “buck passing” during the incident.

V. SOVIET AIR DEFENSE FAILURES OVER SAKHALIN

Special intelligence reveals that despite their many serious operational failures, the command post duty officers and the
commander of the Soviet air defense zone of Kamchatka at least did succeed in alerting the Sakhalin air defense zone of KAL-007’s approach toward Sakhalin. In fact, the Sakhalin air defense had already been on alert for about 2 hours, since KAL-007 had first penetrated Soviet territorial airspace over Kamchatka. But as a desperate last sign of their frustration, Kamchatka also sent up a final 3rd fighter to patrol in the wake of KAL-007’s passage, in order to try again to intercept the still unidentified intruder in case it tried to return to Kamchatka.

When KAL-007 left Soviet territorial airspace over Kamchatka and proceeded over the international waters of the Sea of Okhotsk, there was a gap in Soviet radar tracking of it lasting about 18 minutes.

During this 18 minute gap, and before Soviet air defense radars on Sakhalin re-acquired KAL-007 for tracking, special intelligence shows that the Soviets scrambled the SU-15 interceptor from the Sakhalin air defense zone that actually found KAL-007 almost immediately, and eventually shot it down. This scrambling of intercepters from Sakhalin, before the actual acquisition of KAL-007 by Sakhalin radars, was a clear indication that the already alerted Sakhalin air defenses were tipped-off about the approaching unidentified intruder by the Kamchatka commanders.

At least 3 other intercepters from several air bases on Sakhalin were eventually scrambled, but only the originally scrambled SU-15 played any role in the shoot-down. The fact that a total of about 4 intercepters were scrambled over Sakhalin, but only about 2 over Kamchatka, is an indication of the increasing priority that the Soviets placed on dealing effectively with this unidentified intruder.

This first SU-15 that was scrambled, which later successfully attacked KAL-007, was flown by a senior and experienced Soviet pilot, then-Major Gennadiy Nikolayevich Osipovich.

Pilot Osipovich was an excellent pilot, and he was quite competently vectored by his ground controllers. He quickly located KAL-007 while it was still in international airspace over the Sea of Okhotsk. Pilot Osipovich immediately achieved radar guidance “lock-on” for his air-to-air missiles in order to attack the still unidentified, intruding airliner, even before KAL-007 re-entered Soviet territorial airspace off of Sakhalin. This indicates that the Soviets intended to shoot KAL-007 down even if it was in international airspace.

It is significant that the SU-15 Pilot, then-Major Gennadiy Osipovich, was reportedly later promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and decorated for his actions that night, suggesting that top Soviet military leaders refused to take any blame for having ordered his actions.
A. Failed Efforts to Positively Identify KAL-007

Special intelligence shows that KAL-007 was electronically queried passively at least twice by Soviet Identification-Friend-or-Foe (IFF) signals, and KAL-007’s failure to respond in code at least indicated to the Soviets that it was a non-Soviet aircraft. But KAL-007’s pilots had no knowledge of these passive electronic IFF queries, which might have alerted them to the fact that they were way off course.

Pilot Osipovich followed KAL-007 for about half an hour as it flew toward and briefly over Sakhalin Island, and special intelligence shows that he frantically attempted throughout this half hour period to describe the “target” unidentified intruder to his ground controllers, in a series of serious but ineffective efforts to positively identify it. Three times he noted the plane’s navigation lights, which 3 times he described as lighted and flashing. Probably puzzled by the reports that an unidentified intruder would have its navigation and identification lights on, his ground controllers kept urging him to make a better, more positive identification of the intruder aircraft. He even broke missile-guidance radar lock-on in order to try one last time for a positive identification, probably on the order of the Commander of the Far Eastern Military District himself.

Special intelligence reveals that meanwhile on the ground at Sakhalin, an air defense ground controller for the first time declared KAL-007 a “border violator.” Moreover, not only was KAL-007 not a Soviet-Bloc aircraft due to its failure to respond to the Soviet IFF signals, but KAL-007 was also declared a “non-Soviet Bloc military reconnaissance aircraft.” Even more ominously, a surface-to-air missile unit on Sakhalin once again identified KAL-007 as a U.S. “RC-135” military reconnaissance plane, and this unit received the order to shoot it down immediately, apparently ignorant of the fact that the Kamchatka radar trackers had changed KAL-007 from the initial designation of an RC-135 to the designation of an unidentified intruder. To re-emphasize, this changed designation was made on Kamchatka because KAL-007 did not behave like an RC-135--it had penetrated Soviet airspace over strategic Kamchatka as RC-135s never did.

However, these new designations in effect seem to have been interpreted as positive identifications by the Soviet duty officers in the command structure, and the commanders themselves. But they were not based upon visual, positive identification from the air, only upon inexact SAM radar tracking and inference by the operators. However, the combined effect of the these Sakhalin designations from ground radar--border violator, non-Soviet Bloc military reconnaissance aircraft, and American RC-135--gave the Soviets the obligation to shoot KAL-007 down immediately under their own standard operational procedures.
B. The Order From General Trtyak to Attack Before Positive Identification

Also while KAL-007 was still over Sakhalin, at about the time Pilot Osipovich was ordered to fire his cannons in order to try to warn KAL-007, special intelligence indicates that the Soviet Commander of the Far East Military District, General Ivan M. Tretyak, and the more senior Commander of the Far East Theatre of Operations, General Vladimir L. Govrov, finally consulted with each other on what to order the Sakhalin air defense zone to do about this insolent border violating American RC-135. This occurred about 11 minutes before KAL-007 was shot down.

According to special intelligence, the first thing that General Tretyak did was to order Pilot Osipovich to positively identify the target. This order resulted in Pilot Osipovich breaking missile-guidance radar lock-on to make one last effort to fly close enough to KAL-007 in order to identify it positively. Also at about this time, the Sakhalin SAM units were advised of the three new designations for the target, which in effect made KAL-007 seem to have been positively identified. And Pilot Osipovich’s last attempt to positively identify KAL-007 took valuable time.

Indeed, while Pilot Osipovich was trying one last time to positively identify KAL-007, it was now about to exit from Soviet territorial airspace off Sakhalin. Thus the Soviet air controllers urgently ordered that this final attempt to identify KAL-007 itself be prematurely broken off, in a desperate attempt to shoot down the still-unidentified intruder before it finally exited Soviet territorial airspace a second time.

General Tretyak was an experienced ground forces, combined arms commander, but he seems not to have been too familiar with air intercept procedures. Nevertheless, under the circumstances of an improperly identified intruder about to escape from Soviet airspace, and headed for another strategic area—Vladivostok, General Tretyak finally gave the order to attack KAL-007. General Tretyak’s order was to “kill the intruder.” Marshal Ogarkov confirmed that General Tretyak gave the order to shoot KAL-007 down in his September 9, 1983 international press conference. The order was given to kill the intruder about 6 minutes before KAL-007 was shot down.

But due unnecessary radio chatter and the confusion engender by it, General Tretyak’s order to kill the target intruder had to be repeated about 6 times before Pilot Osipovich heard and understood it. This insight comes from some military self-criticism in the early Soviet “after-action” reports revealed by special intelligence. Thus by the time General Tretyak’s order was executed by Pilot Osipovich, KAL-007 was clearly in international airspace. General Tretyak had probably concluded that all reasonable efforts had been made to achieve positive identification.
visualy from the air, that SAM radars appeared to have achieved positive identification, and that KAL-007 was about to escape again into international airspace.

The evidence suggests that the Sakhalin air defense forces were under extreme pressure that night not to allow further penetration of Soviet airspace by KAL-007. They had scrambled 4 intercepters, instead of the 2 used over Kamchatka. But while the Sakhalin air defense forces performed better that those on Kamchatka, they still wasted about 30 minutes trying to identify the intruder after they had successfully intercepted it, and all their efforts resulted finally in the unpalatable choice between letting it go completely, or shooting it down without positive identification. Thus even over Sakhalin, there was a paralysis in the command structure, and indecision.

It is not known for certain whether either General Tretyak or General Govrov reported the circumstances of this intrusion to the Soviet General Staff in Moscow, or sought further guidance from the General Staff, because the special intelligence evidence of consultations with Moscow during the 1 1/2 hour incident is sparse. But from what is known about Soviet military operations, doctrine, and command staff procedures, it is highly probable that the General Staff in Moscow was at least made aware of the tense air defense situation that had developed that night over Kamchatka and then over Sakhalin. Indeed, it is likely that Marshal Ogarkov himself cancelled the illegal SS-25 ICBM flight test that night, because because as Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Ogarkov himself was likely to have approved of the planned special flight test that night of the illegal SS-25 ICBM using extensive maskirovka. Thus he was probably the one who also cancelled the special SS-25 flight test and the special covering airborne jammers after KAL-007 began its unexpected intrusion.

There is some evidence in special intelligence of a status report to the Soviet Air Force staff and to the General Staff in Moscow before the shoot-down.

Thus it is probable that Marshal Ogarkov was fully informed of all the circumstances of the intrusion as they were occurring, in real time, including General Tratyak’s order to destroy the target.

Before attacking KAL-007, Pilot Osipovich expressed great frustration over his inability to identify KAL-007 as anything other than his “target,” but he was also irritated with his ground controllers because of their indecisiveness over what to do about the intruder. Toward the middle of his half hour intercept operation, Osipovich exclaimed urgently that he thought he should have been ordered to shoot down the intruder much earlier than he was ordered to do so.

It seems that Pilot Osipovich was continually worried that he
would not have enough fuel to return to his Sakhalin base. But he clearly failed to properly identify his target, as the Soviet military's standard operational procedures required him to do, and he clearly failed to warn or try to force the plane down, as he was also required to do. Ominously, he described KAL-007’s slowing down during its climb from 33,000 feet to about 35,000 feet, as authorized by Tokyo radio at about 1820 ZULU, in such a way that suggests that he and his ground controllers thought the "border violator RC-135" was taking evasive maneuvers. KAL-007 reported to Tokyo that it had reached an altitude of about 35,000 feet at about 1823 ZULU. But at about that same time, Pilot Osipovich reported that the “target” was at an altitude of about 10,000 meters, or about 33,000 feet. This pilot report was probably erroneous, and it may in fact have been Osipovich’s own altitude, because he was always about 2,000 meters or 2 kilometers below KAL-007.

C. Soviet Difficulties in Identifying KAL-007 From the Air

It is highly significant that Soviet SU-15 Pilot Osipovich was always several kilometers behind and below KAL-007 during his entire one half hour intercept, except for one moment when he was below and “abeam” of KAL-007.

The distinctive curvature of the forward cabin roof bulge, hump, or dome of the Boeing 747 was thus almost certainly not observable by him at any time throughout his intercept. If Osipovich had merely flown above, next to, or in front of KAL-007, he might have been able to easily identify the dome, and thus the aircraft as a Boeing 747.

He might then have realized that in 1983 there were no military versions of the 747 being used by the United States or by any other nation, that the 747 was in use by many nation’s air lines as a civilian cargo carrier, but that its most common international use was a civilian passenger airliner. Thus he could have concluded that KAL-007 must have been a civilian passenger airliner of unknown nationality.

But when viewed only from below and behind and at night, with no visual reference points to suggest relative size, many aviation experts believe that a Boeing 747 airframe could easily look like the Boeing 707 airframe of the U.S. RC-135 reconnaissance plane.

The attack on KAL-007 occurred about 1 1/2 hours before dawn, and with about 45 per cent of the moon’s disc illuminated at about 66 degrees above the horizon, on a partly cloudy night, according to the December, 1983, report of the International Civil Aviation Organization. According further to this report, the moon set at 0413 local time in September 1, 1983, and KAL-007 was hit at about 0630 local time, thus after the moon had set. Thus visibility conditions for identifying KAL-007 were poor.
As Pilot Osipovich claimed in his 1991 retrospective interview with Izvetiya, Soviet air defense pilots allegedly did not study the silhouettes of Western civilian aircraft. But he also claimed that KAL-007 was not like any of the pictures of U.S. military or reconnaissance aircraft that he had ever seen. He seemed ambivalent after the fact about whether he should have shot down the “target intruder” without positively identifying it, and he claimed that he would not have shot it down if he had known it was a passenger airliner.

It is relevant to recall the circumstances of the Soviet shoot-down of another Korean Airlines passenger airliner near Murmansk, in April, 1978. This Korean Airlines flight was a Boeing 707. Special intelligence indicates that the Soviet pilot in this case flew right up next to the Boeing 707 aircraft, described it as a four-engine jet transport, clearly identified the plane as a civilian passenger airliner, and even noted that it had “Korean Airlines” markings painted on it.

He identified it first as a Boeing 707, and then as a Boeing 747, showing how difficult it was to tell these two similar aircraft apart.

But despite this clear identification, the Soviet commanders nevertheless ordered the plane destroyed. The Soviet pilot twice questioned the order to shoot it down, but finally fired a missile at it, partly disabling it. The Korean airliner then descended to a lower altitude, but remained airborne for a full 90 minute more, finally crash-landing on a frozen lake.

But this 1978 episode shows how difficult it is for Soviet pilots to distinguish a Boeing 707 from a Boeing 747, which was precisely the problem that Pilot Osipovich had that night in 1983.

D. Soviet Air Defense Philosophy of Full Ground Control Hindered Positive Identification

Also in his 1991 Izvestiya retrospective interview, Pilot Osipovich referred to Soviet interceptor pilots as “sheep dogs” sent aloft to sort things out in the air, implying that this is an ultimately futile and thankless task, especially when tethered to ground controller “masters.”

This sheep dog task is even more difficult and thankless, as Izvestiya pointed out, when Soviet air defense commanders have so little confidence that their interceptor pilots will not defect (as Lieutenant Belenko did from Sakhalin in 1976 in a MIG-25), that the pilots are deliberately limited to carrying less than a full fuel load.

Ultimately, Pilot Osipovich stated that he still believed the initial cover story that KAL-007 was a “spy plane,” perhaps so that
He could avid facing up to the moral responsibility of having used deadly force without positive target identification against an innocent civilian airliner in international airspace.

Thus standing Soviet air defense procedures themselves inhibited the Soviets from making the crucial positive identification of KAL-007 these same procedures required before using deadly force against it, because Soviet pilots are constrained by low fuel, and are not allowed to use initiative and common sense. Soviet ground controllers always keep always keep Soviet intercepters under very tight control, for fear that they will defect. But in fact, these tightly controlled Soviet air defense pilots with their limited fuel and their tight control from ground commanders are also required to make full and positive identification of all intruders before they shoot them down.

Indeed, as noted special intelligence indicates that Pilot Osipovich was constantly worried about his remaining fuel supply throughout his intercept. This worry about running too low on fuel probably caused him to forego maneuvering his SU-15 much closer to KAL-007 and all around it, in order in order to try more effectively to positively identify it.

Thus Soviet air defense procedures themselves, especially their fear of allowing pilots enough fuel to defect, impaired the Soviets from identifying KAL-007.

In contrast, American intercepter pilots are under minimal ground control, have full fuel tanks, and during intercepts they are encouraged to fly all around and very close to any unidentified aircraft, taking full initiative in order to positively identify it.

In sum, it is clear from the evidence that at the time of the attack, the Soviet ground controllers erroneously thought that KAL-007 was an American RC-135, a non-Soviet Bloc military reconnaissance aircraft, and a border violator-intruder aircraft, on the basis largely of supposition but not direct, visual, aerial observation. It is clear that Pilot Osipovich never visually, positively identified KAL-007, nor did he succeed in warning it, or even successfully signaling to it. General Tretyak’s order to attack came only after one last, ultimately futile, effort by Pilot Osipovich to positively identify KAL-007.

E. Conclusion: The Soviets Clearly Did Not Follow Their Own Standard Operational Procedure--The Order To Attack Came Without the Required Positive Identification

The Soviets thus clearly did not follow their own standard operational procedures to positively and conclusively identify KAL-007 visually, warn it, and force it to land, before ordering the use of deadly force. The order to attack was improperly given,
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despite the possibility that General Tretyak mistakenly thought the ground controllers had achieved positive identification. Moreover, it is also clear from special intelligence that Soviet air defense forces on both Kamchatka and Sakhalin made many serious operational mistakes in failing to intercept or positively identify KAL-007 for 2 1/2 hours over Soviet territory.

But it is significant that even if the Soviets had correctly identified KAL-007 as a civilian passenger airliner, they probably would have shot it down anyway, as they had in April, 1978, when they shot down the Korean Airlines Boeing 707 which they had correctly identified as a civilian passenger airliner.

F. Soviet Military Retribution for Soviet Air Defense Failures

In sum, KAL-007 was mistakenly shot down in international airspace because the Soviet air defense system on Kamchatka and Sakhalin performed very badly. There were radar failures and communications failures. Moreover, there was indecisiveness, “buck passing,” and a break down in command and control. They spent 2 1/2 hours dealing ineffectively with what could have been a serious hostile military operation of their airspace. The Soviet commanders probably were presented with a dilemma. The only way for them to correct their operational mistakes was for them to shoot down the intruder, yet they had not properly identified the intruder. They seemed to have a vivid fear of military discipline for their operational malfeasance that was more frightening to them than their concern for international legal niceties. Thus they seemed to believe that their serious operational mistakes could only be corrected by shooting down the intruder. Even though they knew that they had not positively identified the intruder, they seemed to be more afraid of military discipline for bad performance than they were afraid of violating international law.

And to re-emphasize, even if they had correctly identified KAL-007, the Soviets probably would have shot it down anyway, just as they had also shot down the Korean Airlines 707 that they had correctly identified as a civilian passenger airliner in April, 1978.

As noted, special intelligence suggests that Marshal Ogarkov later reprimanded the Kamchatka air defense commander, and probably also relieved him. In fact, there is evidence that at least 3 Soviet air defense generals were relieved of their duties due to these major air defense failures.

Special intelligence and biographic data suggest that General Semen Romanov, chief of the main staff of the Soviet Air Defense headquarters in Moscow, was fired and demoted to a lesser job shortly after the KAL-007 incident. COMINT and biographic data also suggest that Lt. General Mikhail Beregovoy, the general commanding all the Soviet air defense radar troops, was fired and
retired in apparent disgrace. Finally, special intelligence suggests that the officer in charge of all air forces in the Far East Theatre of Military Operations, Marshal of Aviation Petr Kirsanov, was also apparently relieved and reassigned to a lesser job.

Moreover, there were other signs of Marshal Ogarkov’s dissatisfaction. SIGINT indicates that in early 1984, there were two Soviet military over-flights of Kamchatka and Sakhalin along exactly the same route as KAL-007, and all Soviet air defense radars along the route tracked each of these flights very carefully. In one case, interceptors were also scrambled. This suggests Soviet remedial actions, and special exercises to test their effectiveness. Finally, after the KAL-007 fiasco, special intelligence indicates that the Soviet air defense forces briefed to pilots and practiced the communications and force-down procedures needed to force down foreign civilian airliners, without shooting them down.

But in contrast, the two generals who seemed to have had the most direct responsibility for actually ordering KAL-007’s destruction, General Tretyak and General Govrov, were promoted soon afterwards.

It might seem that General Tretyak and General Govrov were being kicked upstairs to the Ministry of Defense in Moscow. It is more likely, however, that the political leadership decided that they had in the end made the best possible decision, despite the failure of positive identification. The fact that General Tretyak is now a Deputy Minister of Defense and also the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Air Defense Forces, and General Govrov is Deputy Minister of Defense for Civil Defense, suggests that the topmost level of the Far Eastern Military District and Theatre of Operations escaped responsibility for the operational mistakes.

And General Valentine I. Varennikov, who reportedly figures in the KAL-007 story later as a GRU deputy chief in 1983, is now also a Deputy Minister of Defense and Commander in Chief of the Ground Forces.

VI. KAL-007’S FLIGHT TIME AND FLIGHT PATH AFTER BEING HIT

Special intelligence indicates that at 1826 ZULU (or Greenwich Mean Time) time during the night of August 31-September 1, 1983, KAL-007 was hit by one or two Soviet air-to-air missiles, either one guided by radar or one guided by infra-red seeker, or by both.

What was KAL-007’s altitude at the moment it was hit? According to the ICAO report, at 1823 ZULU KAL-007 reported to Tokyo that it had reached “Flight Level 350,” or an altitude of 35,000 feet. Several minutes before the attack, Soviet radar trackers noted that KAL-007 had begun to climb, and they predicted that KAL-007 would rise to an eventual estimated altitude of about 12,000 meters, or
about 39,000 feet. But this estimated, predicted altitude was merely based upon a radar operator’s guess of when the plane would level off. KAL-007 was only cleared by Tokyo Air Traffic Control to climb from “Flight Level 330” or 33,000 feet, to “Flight Level 350,” or about 35,000 feet above “mean sea level.” But Flight Level 350 could actually have been at least 1,000 feet higher or lower than 35,000 feet above mean sea level, depending upon the atmospheric pressure, the resulting altimeter settings, and the regional flight rules for altimeter settings. Flight Level 350 could easily have been an actual altitude of between 34,000 feet or 36,000 feet above mean sea level, depending upon the atmospheric pressure in the area.

Thus when KAL-007 was hit, it had already climbed to an actual altitude of somewhere between 34,000 feet and 36,000 feet, even though Soviet radar tracking may have been predicting that its climb would have taken it to an estimated altitude of as high as about 39,000 feet.

Pilot Osipovich quickly reported that he had fired both missiles, as he immediately turned back to go to his base, but we do not know if they both hit their target, nor do we know from reliable evidence where the missiles hit or what damage they did. The shoot-down occurred about an hour and a half before dawn.

According to special intelligence, KAL-007 was reported by pilot Osipovich at an altitude of 10,000 meters, or about 33,000 feet, about 6 minutes before it was hit. But this report clearly came before KAL-007’s climb to about 35,000 feet. Osipovich’s altitude was always 2,000 meters lower than KAL-007’s. and KAL-007 had already finished its climb by 1823. it had taken 3 minutes, from 1820 to 1823 ZULU, for KAL-007 to climb from “Flight Level 330” to “Flight Level 350.”

As noted, according to the ICAO report, “At 1823 hours KE007 [KAL-007] reported reaching FL 350 [Flight Level 35,000 feet].

Thus there is direct evidence that KAL-007 was at an altitude of about 35,000 feet when it was hit 2 minutes later at 1826 ZULU. After being hit by at least one missile, KAL-007 almost immediately began descending from an altitude of about 35,000 feet, but it stayed in the air for a total time after being hit by the missile or missiles of at least 12 minutes.

Almost certainly, KAL-007 suffered a sudden “decompression,” probably resulting from a shrapnel puncture of the pressurized cabin, possibly from the missile’s destruction of the right outboard engine or a missile hitting the tail, or both.

At 1827 ZULU, or 1 minute after being hit, KAL-007’s pilot tried to inform Tokyo Civil Air Traffic Control radio about his situation as he was about to begin descending to an altitude of about 10,000
feet. The ICAO report indicates that KAL-007’s pilot said in his last, garbled transmission to Tokyo, just after he was hit: ‘rapid [de]compressions...descending to one zero thousand [10,000 feet]. At 10,000 feet, the surviving passengers could start breathing the atmosphere’s air again normally. (See targeting diagram.)

It is possible that the some passengers were sucked outside the aircraft at the time of the sudden decompression. The two decapitated, unidentified bodies which later washed up on the beaches of Hokkaido and which were presumed to have been the remains of KAL-007 passengers, could have thus been violently sucked out.

A. Two Credible, Mutually Consistent, Reports of KAL-007’s Post-Attack Flight Path

There are two creditable descriptions of KAL-007’s descending flight time and flight path, one based on special intelligence evidence from full Soviet radar tracking, and the other based upon more limited evidence from partial Japanese military radar tracking. But it is significant that these two descriptions are largely consistent with each other.

The most complete account, derived from special intelligence of full Soviet radar tracking, shows that after it was hit, KAL-007 descended from about 35,000 feet to an altitude of about 5,000 meters--16,400 feet--in about 5 minutes. During this rapid descent, KAL-007 made a spiral track on Soviet radar. But this type of rapid, controlled descent is fully consistent with standard flight procedure in case of sudden decompression--the pilots strive to get down to below about 14,000 feet as soon as possible, to provide normal atmospheric air for the passengers to breathe, as quickly as possible.

There was thus evidently a relatively fast descent from about 35,000 feet to about 16,400 feet in about 5 minutes, a rapid descent procedure or dive. But the Soviet radar track showed that KAL-007 slowed its descent at about 5,000 meters or 16,400 feet after about 5 minutes. At about 6 minutes after KAL-007 was hit, it was at about 4,000 meters, or about 13,100 feet. This highly significant fact means that KAL-007’s pilots were able to affirmatively reduce their rate of descent after about 5 minutes, in order to begin to smoothly decrease their rate of descent at 16,400 feet. Thus this data indicates that the pilots probably were in some degree of control.

There have been at least two credible simulations of KAL-007’s descent from 35,000 feet to 16,400 feet, and both indicates that the approximate 5 minute time span for this descent was quite reasonable. For example, the official report of the South African Airlines Boeing 747 crash of November 28, 1987, stated: “Tests with a Boeing 747 Combi simulator showed that the emergency descent
time from FL 350 [35,000 feet] to FL 14 [14,000 feet] was 3 minutes
and 30 seconds.” KAL-007 went from the same altitude, 35,000 feet,
to only 16,400 feet, in 5 minutes, which seems to be a reasonable
descent rate in an emergency.

After this fact, 5 minute spiral descent, but still consistent
with standard flight procedure in the circumstances, KAL-007 then
remained airborne for at least about 7 more minutes, enroute to a
location in Soviet territorial waters between Moneron Island and
Sakhalin Island. KAL-007 was thus airborne for a total post-attack
flight time of at least 12 minutes. Moreover, KAL-007’s altitude
after a total of 9 minutes of flight was about 5,000 feet.

The original U.S. special intelligence raw data, as publically
reported in the U.S. statement to the United Nations Security
Council on September 1, 1983, by U.S. Ambassador Charles
Lichtenstein, stated: “At 1830 hours [after 4 minutes], the Korean
aircraft was reported by radar at an altitude of 5,000
meters,” which is about 16,400 feet after 4 minutes.

Moreover, also on September 1, Secretary of State George Shultz
also stated more fully: “At 1826 hours the Soviet pilot reported
that he fired a missile and the target was destroyed. At 1830 hours
[or 4 minutes later] the Korean aircraft was reported by radar at
5,000 meters [16,400 feet]. At 1838 hours [12 minutes after being
hit] the Korean plane disappeared from the radar screen.”

In sum, given the inherent ambiguities in the reported times of
altitudes in radar tracking, both of these official public reports,
based on the original U.S. intelligence raw data, had KAL-007’s
altitude at about 4 minutes after the attack at about 16,400 feet.

Actually, we now believe that there was a delay of about one
minute in the timing of the reported altitudes from Soviet radar
operators, according to a later, June, 1991 National Security
Agency re-analysis of the special intelligence related to the KAL-
007 shoot-down. This delay was due to estimated operator analysis
and reporting lag-time. So the above 1983 public references to the
5,000 meter-16,400 feet altitude at 4 minutes from being hit should
really be the same altitude--16,400 feet--at about 5 minutes. This
June, 1991 National Security Agency re-analysis was requested for
use in this Republican Staff Study.

But the supposedly “conclusive” National Security Agency special
intelligence report issued three days after the incident, on
September 3, 1983, strangely changed KAL-007’s altitude after 4
minutes to 500 meters, or only about 1,640 feet. The basis for this
change, which completely contradicted the public statements of the
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and the U.S. Secretary of
State, is unknown. It could have been merely a simple typographical
error--the dropping of a zero from 5,000 meters. But
if this was not merely a typographical error, and the later data were to be taken as correct, then KAL-007’s pilots were superhuman--it was highly improbable that they were able to pull up from a 33,500 foot dive just before crashing into the sea, and then fly along for another 8 minutes. This defies credibility. Moreover, because Soviet radar data has KAL-007 at an altitude of about 5,000 feet at 9 minutes after attack, after this incredible recovery from a probable crash dive, the stricken airliner would have had to climb significantly, by about 3,500 feet, in only about 5 minutes, if the 1,500 feet altitude at 4 minutes were to be correct.

In sum, this seems to be a case of a typographical error--careless intelligence reporting. In point of fact, the much later, June, 1991 NSA analysis of special intelligence, confirms that the “500 meter” altitude after 4 or 5 minutes was erroneous, and that the correct information is "5,000 meters" after 4 or 5 minutes. Indeed, NSA also issued a correction of this error after it was originally reported on September 3, 1983.

But the correction was not issued, however, until as late as October 19, 1983, over a month and a half later, actually confirming that U.S. Intelligence did not realize the significance of this piece of evidence, or the significance of their mistake.

Thus despite the October 19, 1983 correction and the June, 1991 correction, this is a very serious, crucial error in the supposedly "conclusive" NSA report of September 3, 1983. It profoundly affects a determination of whether KAL-007 catastrophically crashed into the sea, or attempted or succeeded in a ditching at sea.

And the fact that the supposedly conclusive NSA report contained such a serious error only after 3 days after the event also confirms the fact that U.S. Intelligence was not all attentive to what happened to KAL-007 after it was hit by the Soviet missile, and therefore also did not inquire too closely into the key intelligence question--the timing and nature of the Soviet search and rescue efforts. Indeed, the significance of this U.S. typographical error was only discovered in 1991, proving that U.S. Intelligence did not ask the right questions in 1983.

We have relied on the original, corrected, and reaffirmed special intelligence data--a 5,000 meters-16,400 foot altitude after 4 or 5 minutes--as authoritatively and originally reported in public by the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Security Council and by the Secretary of State.

Further information seems to imply that there was engine failure. This could have been a reference to the probability that one engine was blown off by one of the missiles, but the extent of possible engine failure was not mentioned in the evidence. Evidence from special intelligence is consistent with the positioning of Pilot Osipovich’s SU-15 about 8 kilometers behind, about 2 kilometers
below, and to the right of KAL-007 when the missiles were fired, as well as with one of Pilot Osipovich’s retrospective account’s of having hit the outboard engine on the right wing, as well as the tail.

As noted, according to special intelligence, the last location plotted by Soviet radar operators came at 9 minutes after the attack, at which point KAL-007 was at about 5,000 feet, but Soviet radar tracking of KAL-007 clearly continued for at 3 more minutes, for a total at least 12 minutes after it was hit. Soviet radar tracking ended at 1838 ZULU, or 12 minutes after it had been hit at 1826 ZULU. As the September 1, 1983, U.S. statement to the United Nations Security Council stated: “At 1838 hours the Korean plane disappeared from the radar screens.” This fact of 12 minutes of tracking was also authoritatively noted by Secretary of State Shultz.

A second account of KAL-007’s post-attack flight path is from a Japanese Self Defense Force radar located at Wakkanai, on the tip of the Japanese Island of Hokkaido. This account is based upon more limited radar tracking, probably because the tracking radar was further away from KAL-007 than the Soviet radars.

The Japanese military radar tracking on Wakkanai suggests that KAL-007 dropped from where it was at an altitude of about 35,000 feet to about 30,000 feet about three minutes after being hit. This altitude of about 30,000 feet about three minutes after KAL-007 was hit means that KAL-007 dropped only a maximum of about 5,000 feet in the entire first 3 minutes after the attack, an initial rate of descent of only about 1,700 feet per minute.

But this initial rate of descent would clearly have been well within normal flight parameters of a controlled rapid descent.

Then KAL-007 dropped about 13,600 in about the next 2 minutes.

This would have been an accelerated rate of descent of an average of about 6,300 feet per minute, but even this faster rate of descent, too, would be within normal flight parameters of a controlled rapid descent.

Indeed, it is noteworthy that a normal, routine landing descent rate from high altitude for a Boeing 747 is between about 2,000 and 4,000 feet per minute. Thus this accelerating descent rate seems to be consistent with the approximate rate of descent indicated by Soviet radar tracking data in the first account.

The apparent initial hesitation during the slower 3 minute descent before the 2 minute fast descent was probably due to pilot decision time, while the situation was being assessed, and also to the time required to make the last radio transmission to Tokyo.
reporting decompression and the intention to descent to 10,000 feet. Moreover, there is an inherent lag time in radar, operator ability to detect tracking changes, so the apparent differences in the rates of descent could arise largely from this delayed reaction of the trackers, both Soviet and Japanese.

The fact that Tokyo Air Traffic Control received this last KAL-007 radio call at all, albeit in garbled form, probably was due to the likelihood that the pilots had donned their oxygen masks. It also suggests that the pilots of KAL-007 sent it from an altitude of over about 30,000 feet, because when KAL-007 descended to 16,400 feet, it was apparently too low to either receive or transmit radio communications from or to Tokyo Air Traffic Control.

This account, using the information from the Japanese Wakkanai radar, was published in the December, 1983, report of the International Civil Aviation Organization.

The differing average rates of descent are extremely significant.

During the period of the 5 minute descent from 35,000 feet to 16,400 feet, or a drop of 18,600 feet, KAL-007 was dropping at an average rate of about 3,700 feet per minute, or 61.6 feet per second, or 42 Miles Per Hour.

During the period of the 4 minute descent from 16,400 feet to 5,000 feet, or a drop of 11,400 feet, KAL-007 was dropping at an average rate of 2,878 feet per minute, or 47.9 feet per second, or 32.6 Miles Per Hour.

During the period of the 3 minute descent from 5,000 feet to 1,000 feet, or a drop of 4,000 feet, KAL-007 was dropping at an average rate of 1,333 feet per minute, or 22.2 feet per second, or 26 MPH.

Thus there was clearly a decelerating average rate of descent, rather than an accelerating average rate of descent. This declining average rate of descent shows that KAL-007 was not in a plummet or crash dive, and is another indication that KAL-007 was under some degree of control by the pilots.

The geographic coordinates, showing where KAL-007 was hit, where it then went, and where it disappeared from Soviet radars, are known from special intelligence with a fair degree of precision, and these points have been plotted on U.S. Intelligence maps. For example, at 9 minutes after being hit, and at an altitude of 5,000 feet, KAL-007’s last tracked location, it was located approximately at co-ordinates 4617N-1411E. The special intelligence showing Soviet radar tracks indicate a flight path from Sakhalin Island toward Moneron Island, approaching from the North headed toward the South, and a ditching or crash site probably inside Soviet territorial waters, reportedly 2.6 kilometers North of Moneron Island.
Island, according to the June, 1991 NSA re-analysis. (See previous maps, and following diagrams.)

In sum, special intelligence shows that Soviet radars tracked KAL-007 for at least 12 minutes after it was hit, and that the Japanese Self Defense Force radar at Wakkanai, Hokkaido tracked it for at least 3 minutes after it was hit. KAL-007 seemed to have quickly descended to a marginally safe breathing altitude of 16,400 feet in a very fast, 5 minute spiral, as if following standard airline flight procedures in case of rapid decompression, and thereafter it showed its descent.

Because it then seemed to reduce its rate of descent, while continuing to descend, this indicated that the pilots probably were in some degree of control. It then proceeded toward the area in Soviet territorial waters near Moneron Island. All this occurred during the 12 minutes after it was hit. At 9 minutes after being hit, it was at 5,000 feet. But after 12 minutes, it went below the altitude that allowed it to be tracked on Soviet radar, according to the 1991 Izvestiya series, about 1,000 feet. Other intelligence is consistent with a 1,000 foot minimum tracking level.

The 1991 Izvestiya series states that KAL-007 circled Moneron Island twice, and also that KAL-007 was airborne at least 10 minutes after being hit. Japanese fishermen in the area later also testified that KAL-007 circled Moneron Island. For KAL-007 to have circled Moneron Island at all, it must have been under some degree of control by the pilots. (See probable flight path plotted on map.)

B. Did KAL-007 Successfully Ditch at Sea?

It is also clear that to have remained airborne at all for at least 12 minutes after being hit, KAL-007 was probably under some degree of control by the pilots.

It is interesting that in the June 23, 1985, catastrophic crash at sea, the Air India Boeing 747 was last reported at an altitude of 31,000 feet, but it disappeared from radar tracking within only 4 minutes of its last radio transmission at that altitude. In the November 28, 1987, catastrophic crash of the South African Airlines Boeing 747 at sea, the plane was at the much lower altitude of 14,000 feet when it suddenly disappeared from radar tracking.

KAL-007 was under some degree of control by its pilots because it made a controlled descent, spiraled, slowed its rate of descent, stayed aloft for at least 12 minutes, and reportedly circled Moneron Island. If KAL-007 had exploded in mid-air at an altitude of 35,000 feet, or simply fell out of control from 35,000 feet, as U.S. Intelligence and ICAO originally believed, the debris or the plane would have plummeted to the surface in only about 2 1/2 minutes.
This important judgement is based upon the demonstrated fact that in both simulator exercises of Boeing 747 free-falling plummets, and more especially in the only historical record of an actual 31,500 foot free-falling plummet by a China Airlines Boeing 747, all four of whose engines had malfunctioned and almost flamed out on February 19, 1985, the empirical evidence showed that a Boeing 747 free-falling plummet time from an altitude of 35,000 feet to the surface would be only about 2 1/2 minutes.

The China Airlines Boeing 747 stalled and dropped out of control a total of 31,500 feet in 2 minutes and 20 seconds.

Moreover, on April 4, 1979, a TWA Boeing 727 entered an uncontrolled maneuver at 39,000 feet, and descended to about 5,000 feet in 63 seconds, or a plummet of 34,000 feet in slightly more than a minute.

Thus a catastrophic explosion of the KAL-007 aircraft at 35,000 feet, or a free-falling plummet of the damaged aircraft from that altitude, would probably have caused it to disappear from radar within only slightly more than about 2 minutes and 20 seconds. (Recall that the CIA’s then-current, September 3, 1983, intelligence reporting on KAL-007 stated that it was probably catastrophically destroyed at high altitude and probably plummeted into the sea, even though such an assumption was totally inconsistent with the original September 1, 1983, evidence. It was, however, consistent with the “conclusive” but erroneous September 3, 1983, NSA analysis, and also with the Soviet “spy plane” cover-story.)

The Boeing 747 is a very sturdly aircraft, built by Boeing to high standards after several decades of experience in manufacturing thousands of large, multi-engine, military and civil jet aircraft. The Boeing 747 has actually flown on only 1 engine during one extreme emergency. Actual flight experience with similar aircraft suggests that it could also fly with a portion of one wing or a portion of the tail knocked off, or even both, and even with severe hydraulic problems. But it would be extremely difficult to control in one or all these circumstances.

According to the 1991 Izvestiya series described in more detail below, SU-15 Pilot Osipovich thought that it would have taken as many as seven Soviet air-to-air missiles to have knocked down KAL-007. As noted, in one of his retrospective interviews, Osipovich claims that one of his missiles hit the tail, possibly causing the rapid decompression, and the other destroyed the outboard right engine and part of the right wing. But a 747 should probably still be controllable even in these dire circumstances.

The time span and the descent profile of a flight of at least 12 minutes after being hit could be consistent with a scenario of either a controlled ditching at sea or a crash at sea. Even the
1991 Izvestiya series claims that KAL-007 flew for at least 10 minutes after it was hit, and if it indeed made two turns around Moneron Island, as Izvestiya and Japanese fishermen witnesses both also claimed, then it probably was under some degree of control.

Moreover, KAL-007 possibly could have flown longer than 12 minutes after being hit, at a very low altitude beneath the reported 1,000 foot radar detection threshold, before ditching or crashing.

It thus remains possible that the stricken 747 may have somehow been able to turn around, and somehow to limp back at a low altitude to land on one of the several long runways on Sakhalin Island, as was originally stated in reports attributed to the Japanese Self Defense Forces, the U.S. FAA, the CIA, and the Korean CIA, and as quoted in the Korean press. For example, The New York Times reported on September 2, 1983, that “Korean Foreign Ministry officials cited the United States Central Intelligence Agency as the source for the report that the plane had been forced down on Sakhalin, but American officials in Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington said they could not confirm or deny the report.”

On September 2, 1983, a Soviet official stated in diplomatic channels that KAL-007 did not land on Sakhalin Island. Given what we know about Soviet deception, however, this denial could be interpreted in reverse as a possible confirmation.

No “Mayday” distress calls were monitored from KAL-007. But this anomaly could have resulted from any of the following factors:

--1) KAL-007’s presumed “Mayday” calls could not be heard by Tokyo Air Traffic Control radio because its altitude was too low for reception, or, alternatively, the presumed “Mayday” calls may have been on the wrong frequency;

--2) KAL-007’s pilot may have believed that he could have landed on Sakhalin Island, so that he did not need to send any “Mayday” calls;

--3) KAL-007’s pilot may not have been aware of the dire seriousness or cause of his problems, and therefore he may not have believed that his situation was serious enough to warrant any “Mayday” calls.

The official investigation of the South African Airlines Boeing 747 crash of November 28, 1987, stated: “There is a natural reluctance on the part of professional pilots to declare a ‘Mayday’ except as a 1st resort.” This was the explanation for why the South African pilot requested full emergency landing procedures on Mauritius, but nevertheless still did not declare a “Mayday.”

Moreover, it is interesting to note that the first Soviet reports
on the incident, from the Soviet news agency TASS, came on September 1, 1983. While still denying any Soviet responsibility for any shoot-down, TASS stated that: “the plane did not have navigation lights, did not respond to queries, and did not enter into contact with the dispatcher service. Fighters of the anti-aircraft defense, which were sent aloft towards the intruder plane, tried to give it assistance in directing it to the nearest airfield.” Soviet interceptors had in fact at least tried to force KAL-007 to land on Soviet territory, implying that KAL-007 might have done so.

All in all, however, the evidence from the radar tracking of the flight path suggests that KAL-007 was probably under some degree of control during its 12 minutes or more of descent. The balance of the flight path evidence is consistent with either a safe landing on Sakhalin, an attempt to make a controlled ditching at sea near Moneron Island, or catastrophic crash at sea.

Thus neither a safe landing on Sakhalin nor safe, successful ditching of KAL-007 at sea can be excluded.

All pilots for international airlines receive training in procedures for ditching at sea, and these procedures are explained to all passengers on all over-water air flights. However, a ditching at sea of a Boeing 747 passenger airliner has never been known to have been attempted, and it would be very difficult to accomplish successfully even in the most optimal circumstances.

A successful ditching of a 747 at sea has to overcome three basic problems: rapid decompression, potential damage to the fuselage, and potential injury to the passengers and crew. These problems could be minimized by selecting the optimum ditching heading.

How can a pilot select the optimum ditching heading? One international airline flight handbook procedure states that when a pilot is unable to obtain sufficient information for determining a ditching heading, the best observation of the ocean’s surface conditions can be made at an altitude of 2,000 feet. Lower altitude observations appear quite different, and should be disregarded. Generally, the optimum ditching heading is parallel to the swells. Individual swells appear to be regular and smooth, with considerable distance between the rounded crests. Local winds have little effect on the swells. So swell direction should not be used to determine surface wind direction. Waves or chop conditions on the surface are caused by local winds and are characterized by surface irregularity or short distances between crests and white caps.

Ditching techniques, as described by experienced pilots and established airline procedures, would have the following characteristics:
--1) Substantially different landing techniques than runway landings, because depth perception over water is very unreliable, the probably undulating water surface makes low altitude judgement difficult, and the high nose attitude required for ditching may cause the tail to drag first, and therefore may throw the fuselage downward with great vertical force;

--2) The landing gear wheels would be up, in the retracted position;

--3) The flaps would be down full;

--4) Proper sink rate and attitude are critical to a successful ditching. A sink rate of 200 feet per minute, or less, to the point of water contact, should be maintained. Using this fly-onto-the-surface method, a last second "flair" is neither necessary nor desirable. But with one or more engines inoperative, it may be necessary to use partial flaps to maintain a sink rate no greater than 200 feet per minute.

--5) The preferred ditching heading is landing parallel with the swells. The best touchdown spot is on the top of a swell.

A tendency to make a spot landing may induce a desire to flair and reduce power, but his type of landing would be very difficult to achieve, due to the unreliable depth perception and to the constantly changing surface height. And the pilot would try to use minimum control speed and to land on the top of a wave, but would try to avoid skipping into the lower trough, so as to avoid coming to a stop at the bottom of a wave, thereby being engulfed by the wave.

In sum, in the best of circumstances, a daylight ditching at sea is an extremely operation. At night, in bad visibility, with one engine out, and possibly part of a wing gone, possibly with the tail damaged, a successful ditching at sea might be an extremely unlikely possibility.

Needles to say, few pilots have ever had the opportunity yo practice ditching more than once, except using flight simulators, although there have been many successful aircraft ditchings at sea.

There are, as noted, many uncontrollable hazards in a ditching, such as the sea-state and the visibility.

In the sea-state in the area was reasonably calm, and if the presumed sea landing were highly skillful and very lucky, it is conceivable that KAL-007 successfully ditched at sea instead of crashing at sea, and even floated on the surface for as long as several hours after the possible ditching. In such a successful ditching scenario, some or even many of the passengers could have survived.
Weather information in the area of Moneron Island and Sakhalin Island that night seems consistent with a sea-state which was probably calm enough for a successful ditching, although visibility conditions seemed poor.

But as we have noted, the lack of evidence of bodies, luggage, and debris, strengthens even further the successful ditching at sea possibility. And beyond this lack of evidence, as we shall see, there is even some positive evidence actually consistent only with the ditching possibility, bolstering this successful ditching possibility even more strongly.

C. Mystery of Absence of Passenger’s Bodies, Luggage, and Debris Supports the Successful Ditching Hypothesis

As noted at the outset of this study, no other known loss of a Boeing 747 or any other major airliner at sea has had such a dearth of debris, wreckage, or traces of the passengers or their luggage.

Even the 1991 Izvestiya series quotes a Soviet salvage diver who observed KAL-007’s underwater “wreckage” as saying:

“The main thing was not what we had seen there, but what we had not seen. The divers found practically no human bodies or remains.”

This is a highly significant Soviet admission.

As noted, the only traces of KAL-007 that were recovered were about 848 small fragments of debris and cabin items, and 13 pieces of unidentifiable human remains. Most of these items were recovered by the Japanese, from “flotsam and jetsam” washed up on Japanese beaches. Among the 13 recovered pieces of human remains were 2 decapitated, unidentifiable bodies washed up later on Hokkaido, but while the mangled condition of these bodies can possibly be explained by the sudden decompression, they also can not be correlated with any known passengers on KAL-007. Moreover, the Soviet-supplied debris, only about 10 per cent of the reported 848 fragments recovered, were mostly of such small size that none of the pieces could be precisely correlated with KAL-007. And the Soviets reportedly even dry-cleaned the clothing fragments, allegedly from KAL-007, that they returned. None of the Soviet-recovered debris could be correlated specifically with KAL-007.

The largest single piece of debris, about one meter across, reportedly washed up on a Hokkaido beach. It may have come from KAL-007’s tail rudder, and seemed to have had part of the KAL logo on it. (See photograph.)

The Soviets claimed that the little debris that they found was all floating on the ocean surface, because they claimed at the time that they had not discovered the “crash” wreckage. But the Soviets
reportedly drycleaned the clothing fragments that they returned on September 26, 1983, suggesting that they may have been something to hide.

It seems that the only specific correlation of items of debris with known passengers from KAL-007 was a business card and an identity card.

This fact, plus the obvious absence of bodies, suggests that the Soviets might know more about what happened to the passengers than they have revealed so far.

Until KAL-007 in 1983, there had never been a “crash” of a Boeing 747 at sea. But later, comparable, real crashes at sea of Boeing 747s involved the recovery of many items more debris, luggage, and bodies than the alleged “crash” of KAL-007.

For example, the bodies of 132 persons, about 40 per cent of the total number of passengers, much luggage, and large sections of the fuselage were immediately recovered from the Air India Boeing 747 that was blown up by a terrorist bomb over the North Atlantic on June 23, 1985. Moreover, it is interesting that the main wreckage from this tragedy was located on the ocean floor at a depth of about 6,700 feet. Thus it was an extraordinary event that large sections of its fuselage and all its black boxes were recovered from this great depth of 6,700 feet, by a special “Scarab” robot submarine. Indeed, four months after the crash, another body was even recovered from the depth of 6,700 feet, still strapped into its seat inside a large section of fuselage. Luggage from this crash was reported still floating on the surface of the Irish Sea a month after the crash.

There was a similar widespread dispersal of extensive debris on the ocean’s surface and bottom, resulting from the crash of the South African airlines Boeing 747 on November 28, 1987, in the Indian Ocean near the Island of Mauritius. The debris, bodies, and luggage, were reportedly scattered over an area of about 150 square miles, in water about 15,000 feet deep. Much wreckage was recovered, as were the black boxes. Moreover, at least 15 bodies of the 159 passengers aboard were recovered. Extensive debris, including luggage, were also reportedly spotted on the ocean surface several days later, from this tragedy.

Finally, when a U.S. AEGIS crusier, the U.S.S. Vincennes, mistakenly shot down an Iranian airbus over the Persian Gulf war zone on July 3, 1988, during Operation Earnest Will at the end of the Iran-Iraq war, killing 290 persons, hundreds of bodies and pieces of luggage were recovered from the surface of the Persian Gulf.

In sum, the mystery of what happened to the bodies, luggage, black boxes, and wreckage of KAL-007 helps to decide the questions
of whether or not KAL-007 successfully ditched at sea.

The only way to explain the lack of wreckage, bodies, and luggage from this great airliner incident is to assume that after its 12 minute flight in search of a landing spot, KAL-007 successfully ditched at sea, and that the Soviets either rescued all the passengers who survived, and recovered their luggage, or that the Soviets recovered all the bodies, wreckage, and the luggage. Since the Soviets are now known to have recovered the black boxes and the wreckage, as revealed in 1991 by *Izvestiya*, it is reasonable to presume that the Soviets also recovered at least all the passengers, dead or alive, and all the luggage.

Given the fact that a successful ditching can not be excluded, it also can not be excluded that there were survivors who were picked up by the Soviets. In fact, there is no conclusive evidence which would cause us to rule out survivors. Indeed, as we shall see, there are many other factors suggesting that there were survivors.

VII. COMPLETE SOVIET KNOWLEDGE ABOUT KAL-007 WITHIN FOUR HOURS RESULTING FROM QUICK SOVIET SEARCH AND RESCUE EFFORTS

According to special intelligence, one of Pilot Osipovich’s wingmen reported about 15 minutes after KAL-007 disappeared from Soviet radar that he was making “reference point circles.” This fact suggests that this interceptor was circling over the probable ditching site or crash site of KAL-007, so that Soviet air defense radars could more precisely locate the point.

Soviet interceptors circled Moneron Island, according to special intelligence, and also the port of Nevelsk on Sakhalin Island, for about 1 1/2 hours after KAL-007 disappeared from Soviet radar at 1838 ZULU, suggesting that they too were observing and marking the point of KAL-007’s presumed ditching or crash, and that this is the area where the plane went down.

About 2 hours after KAL-007 disappeared from Japanese and Soviet radar, the Tokyo Air Control Center transmitted a message to the Soviet Khabarovsk Air Control Center declaring that there was a distress situation in effect for KAL-007, and asked if the Soviets had any information on the missing Korean airliner. About 1 1/2 hours later, “Khabarovsk ACC replied that it had no information,” according to the December, 1983, International Civil Aviation Organization Report. Khabarovsk was a civilian air control authority, and may not have been informed by the military of the intense air defense activity that night in the Kamchatka and Sakhalin regions. But given the 1 1/2 hours that Khabarovsk had to make further inquiries before replying, it is more likely that this negative response was the first Soviet lie on KAL-007.

Thus the Soviet cover-up may have started as early as then, about 4 1/2 hours after KAL-007 disappeared.
According to unclassified information from the U.S. Government, 8 Soviet rescue ships were dispatched within 1 hour after KAL-007 went down.

According to special intelligence, about 2 1/2 hours after KAL-007 disappeared from Soviet radar tracking, 3 large Soviet aircraft began search and rescue operations off of Sakhalin. These planes could have observed the area of the presumed ditching or crash.

About 6 1/2 hours after KAL-007 went down, according to special intelligence, a Soviet Anti-Submarine Warfare torpedo-armed coastal patrol boat was reported searching the area near Moneron and Nevelsk. This cutter could have gotten to the area much earlier, and could have carried the first Soviet rescuers to the site of the ditching or crash. It is likely, however, that the 8 other Soviet rescue boats first reached the site where the stricken airliner ditched or crashed even sooner than 6 1/2 hours after it disappeared from radar, possibly even before the aerial response began.

Indeed, there is evidence suggesting that the Soviets rescued some KAL-007 passengers within four hours after the shoot-down. This evidence comes from sensitive special intelligence. This evidence also indicates that the Soviet air defense forces were involved in reports on the incident to the General Staff in Moscow as soon as within 4 hours hours after the shoot-down.

A. Evidence That After Only Four Hours, the Soviet Military Had Knowledge That KAL-007 Carried Some American Passengers

Most significantly, according to key evidence from special intelligence, only four hours after KAL-007 went down, Soviet air defense command posts were reporting a very curious set of circumstances: that Soviet pilots said that a civilian passenger airliner had been shot down by mistake, instead of a U.S. Air Force RC-135 reconnaissance plane, as the Soviets had originally thought. Moreover, the Soviet command posts were expressing the regret that they had not shot down the legitimate military target of the American RC-135, but instead had shot down by mistake a civilian passenger airliner carrying some Americans, because they feared that soon the Americans would be accusing them of killing “Americans,” presumably the innocent civilian passengers.

The fact that Soviet pilots had identified KAL-007 as a passenger airliner carrying innocent Americans within 4 hours of its being shot down is a highly significant piece of evidence.

B. Circumstances of Soviet Pilot Knowledge Suggests Ditching

How could Soviet pilots tell the passenger function of an airplane that they observed while they were themselves in flight? We have already seen how extremely difficult it was for the Soviet
pilot Osipovich, flying below and behind KAL-007, to identify it at night as a passenger airliner before he shot it down. And the Soviet pilot in 1978 could not tell the difference between a Boeing 707 and a Boeing 747. More importantly, how can airborne pilots tell the nationality of the passengers of the airliner?

First, this evidence indicates that either the fighter pilots or the transport aircraft pilots circling near Moneron had finally identified KAL-007 as a passenger airplane at some time after it was hit. This identification could have occurred while KAL-007 was still airborne, or after it had hit the water. While a Boeing 747 is most commonly used as a passenger aircraft, and while there are civilian cargo versions also, as noted, in 1983 there was no military version of the 747 in use by the American armed forces or by the armed forces of any other nation. And the Boeing 747 was in wide use all over the world as a passenger airliner by airlines of many nations.

Thus it would seem that the Soviet pilots had finally identified KAL-007 as an America-built, Boeing 747 passenger airliner. But just identifying KAL-007 as an America-built, Boeing 747 passenger plane would not have permitted the further identification of the nationality of some of its passengers as Americans.

We must thus try to answer more precisely these two questions--how could Soviet pilots identify KAL-007 as a passenger plane from the air, and how could Soviet pilots identify some of the passengers as innocent Americans, also from the air?

First, this evidence suggests that the Soviet pilots in fact had finally identified KAL-007 as an American-built, Boeing 747, passenger aircraft.

But the fact that the Soviet pilots reported KAL-007 as an American passenger airliner rather than as an American RC-135 spy plane, and that they suggested that the Soviets did not want to be accused of killing some “American” passengers, is highly significant. This evidence requires some extended analysis.

It was possible, from the air, to identify KAL-007 as an American-built, Boeing 747 passenger plane. But the only way to know from the air that KAL-007 was an American-built, Boeing 747 passenger airliner, was to see its distinctive curved forward cabin bulge or dome.

Therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that the distinctive dome was finally seen from above by a pilot, possibly when the 747 was floating on the surface of the ocean, at the ditching site. But this possible sighting of the dome, however, would only have indicated that KAL-007 was an American-built, Boeing 747 passenger airliner, and would not have revealed the nationality of some or even many of its passengers.
This assumption that the 747’s dome was identified is reasonable, because if KAL-007 crashed catastrophically into the sea, as the Soviet wanted us to believe, it probably would have been in unidentifiable fragments which probably would have quickly sunk. Thus no Soviet pilots could have seen the dome, and thereafter no Soviet pilots could have identified the plane as an American-built passenger airliner.

Indeed, it seems reasonable to conclude that the type of plane, and the nationality of its crew or passengers, would probably have been unknown to the Soviets for some time if it had crashed catastrophically.

Moreover, when Tokyo had called Khabarovsky about 2 hours after KAL-007 disappeared, Tokyo had reported that a Korean airliner was missing, so how could the Soviet pilots know about any American passengers at all within the next 2 hours, unless the Soviet pilots had actually seen or heard from the American passengers?

Thus the further curious problem of how the Soviet pilots specifically identified the nationality of some of the passengers as “Americans” remains to be explained.

As we have noted, it is reasonable to conclude that the Soviet pilots must have identified KAL-007 as an American-built Boeing 747 passenger airliner, and that the most likely way for them to have done so was to have seen KAL-007’s Boeing 747 airframe floating on the surface after its reported ditching. But since many nation’s airlines used Boeing 747 passenger airliners, just identifying KAL-007 as an American-built 747 plane would not necessarily have allowed identifying the nationality of some of the passengers as Americans. Moreover, if the airplane was on the surface, and by 4 hours after the shoot-down there had been daylight for about 3 hours, its Korean markings would have been clearly visible to the Soviet pilots. Moreover, the Soviets had been informed less than 2 hours earlier that KAL-007 was a missing Korean airliner.

Even visually sighting passengers in life boats, or the bodies of passengers floating on the water, would not have revealed their nationality.

Thus the only way that the Soviet pilots could possibly have identified the nationality of some of the KAL-007 passengers as Americans, from the air, would have been from possible emergency radio communications, which U.S. Intelligence did not intercept, from either the stricken airliner ditched at sea, or from its life rafts, or from Soviet rescue boats.

In sum, therefore, the fact that KAL-007 was identified by Soviet pilots as a civilian passenger airliner carrying some American passengers, within only four hours of the shoot-down, strongly suggests that it did not crash on the ocean surface
catastrophically, but that instead, it was able to successfully ditch at sea, and further that some of its survivors were Americans who somehow communicated with the Soviet search and rescue aircraft or boats. Any survivors presumably would have soon identified the nationalities of all the surviving passengers, some 66 of whom were Americans.

According further to special intelligence, the Soviet air defense command posts went on to state that everyone in the command posts was busy compiling reports on the incident. They also stated that Soviet search and rescue operations were already underway. Again, this was about four hours after the shoot-down, and the reference to “rescue” operations at that time also strongly implies that there was a successful ditching with some survivors to rescue.

Moreover, as already noted, the air defense command posts stated that the commanders wished that the airplane shot down had been an American RC-135 spy plane, because since it was a passenger airliner instead, the Americans would now be accusing the Soviets of killing Americans, the presumably innocent passengers. This information suggests that the Soviet “spy plane” cover story was a deliberate Soviet lie from the beginning, because the Soviets knew within only 4 hours that some of the passengers were American civilians who were probably innocent of any spying activity.

C. The Soviet Cover-up Began After Only Four Hours

In sum, this special intelligence evidence clearly indicates that within 4 hours, the Soviet air defense forces;

--knew what type of plane was down;

--probably where it was;

--were engaged in rescue operations for civilian passengers who were probably innocent of spying, whom they had already identified as Americans;

--and were already involved in preparing reports on the incident, which became a cover-up of their many serious operational mistakes that night.

The reference to being blamed for killing innocent Americans does not necessarily indicate that all of the passengers on KAL-007 were killed. It does suggest, however, that the Soviets knew that at least some Americans may have been killed in the ditching or crash.

Eight hours after the incident, according to special intelligence, a Soviet search and rescue plane reported kerosene on the ocean’s surface near Moneron Island. But this kerosene could have come either from KAL-007 crash at sea, or a ditching at sea. Indeed, in either case, a stricken airliner looking for a place to
land or ditch would have been likely to dump fuel. If KAL-007 in fact successfully ditched at sea, it was unlikely to have remained afloat for as long as 8 hours. Thus the kerosene slick on the surface could have come either from a largely intact, but sinking fuselage, or alternatively, from a crash.

About 15 hours after the incident, the Soviets canceled airborne search and rescue operations for the day, suggesting that they had already found either intact aircraft and survivors, or the wreckage and bodies by then, and were fully dealing with the incident.

VIII. THE LATENESS AND INCOMPLETENESS OF U.S. KNOWLEDGE OF KAL-007’s SHOOT-DOWN

In contrast to full Soviet knowledge of the incident within four hours, U.S. Intelligence did not receive the first CRITIC spot report message with raw intelligence on the incident in Washington until about four hours after the shoot-down happened at 1826 ZULU. Moreover, this first message was abruptly canceled, and was then re-issued with changes in the raw intelligence about half an hour later.

Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone admitted publicly that he did not find out about the shoot-down until 7 hours after it happened.

Moreover, during the first 3 days after the incident, U.S. Intelligence was confused and uncertain about many of the details of what had happened near Sakhalin, and reacted much more slowly than the Soviets, who were already engaged in search and rescue operations within four hours after KAL-007 disappeared.

As Aviation Week and Space Technology stated in its issue released on September 5, 1983, but dated September 12, 1983: “It will take at least another week, he [the senior U.S. official] said, before the intelligence community can sort out specific transmissions related to Soviet air defense tracking of the commercial transport and messages from Kamchatka and Sakhalin Island through the chain of command to Moscow.”

Neither Secretary of State Shultz nor President Reagan were reportedly informed of the shoot down until as late as about 8 hours after the event, and the President did not know fully what had happened until about 20 hours after the event. The early intelligence reports after the event were clearly fragmentary and uncertain.

Changes in the original raw intelligence data were still being made as late as 11 days after the event, and one highly significant change occurred a month and a half later.
But there is further evidence of significant failures by U.S. Intelligence, such as the failure to promptly and accurately locate the spot where KAL-007 went down.

A. The Japanese and the United States Searched in the Wrong Area for Two Days

According to the December, 1983, International Civil Aviation Organization Report, the initial main search area for KAL-007 was erroneously established by the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency 2 1/2 hours after KAL-007 went down.

This initial main search area was established at route check point “NOKKA,” on route R-20. But this was an erroneous initial main search area, because it was about 600 nautical miles away from where KAL-007 actually went down, a point which the Soviets were immediately searching, already within 4 hours. Twelve vessels and 5 aircraft, most of the available search and rescue assets, were dispatched to search this erroneous main initial search area on R-20 in the Pacific Ocean. U.S. Air Force planes from the 5th Air Force were among these assets.

(It is true that about 6 hours after KAL-007 went down, the Japanese did send 2 boats and 2 aircraft to look somewhere in waters West of Sakhalin Island, on the basis of the 3 minute Japanese Defense Ministry radar track from Wakkanai, but this was not the initial main search area, and these searchers found nothing. And KAL-007’s fuselage could easily already have sunk or been deliberately sunk by then.)

According further to the ICAO Report, “On 2 September 1983, upon receipt of information from the Japanese Defense Ministry that KE-007 [KAL-007] had presumably been downed over the Sea of Japan West of Sakhalin Island, Tokyo ACC withdrew the search and rescue activities in the vicinity of NOKKA.”

Thus in sum, for the crucial first two days, the U.S. and the Japanese were erroneously focusing most of their search and rescue assets on the wrong initial main search and rescue area, about 600 nautical miles to the East of where KAL-007 probably went down.

The U.S. Navy Task Force 71 searching for the wreckage of KAL-007 did not begin searching in international waters near the most likely “crash” area in international waters around Moneron Island until as late as September 5, 1983.

B. Three Days Before U.S. Intelligence Had a Complete Understanding

It is also clear from a study of all the raw U.S. special intelligence evidence available after KAL-007 went down, and after detailed discussions with U.S. intelligence analysts who worked on
the KAL-007 incident reports at the time, that no U.S. reconnaissance satellite imagery, or even aerial imagery, or even satellite SIGINT, whatsoever, was available of the Moneron Island area West of Sakhalin Island within the first three days after KAL-007 went down. Moreover, no U.S. SOSUS remote underwater sonar data seems to have been available to indicate the sound of the ditching or crash, or possible later underwater demolition of KAL-007.

Finally, it is clear that U.S. Intelligence did not have a full or complete understanding of the facts and circumstances of the incident until a full three days after the incident. This is because the supposedly "conclusive" National Security Agency report on the special intelligence evidence was not disseminated until a full 3 days after the event. But as noted, even this supposedly "conclusive" NSA report 3 days later contained a very significant error, which totally contradicted the public statements of U.S. Secretary of State Shultz.

In turn, this is because it took 3 days for U.S. Intelligence to compile all its information, acquire and translate transcripts from Russian to English, or from Russian to Japanese to English, correlate the evidence from the various transcripts, and analyze it. Intercept tapes even had to be specially flown to the United States from Japan for this analysis. Moreover, as noted, there clearly was at least one serious factual error in this supposedly conclusive analysis, coming 3 days after the event--the reported altitude of KAL-007 4 to 5 minutes after being hit as only 500 meters, versus the 5,000 meters in the original evidence, and also in the June, 1991 re-analysis.

As an official U.S. Government statement on the KAL-007 incident prepared in 1990, (see Annex number 2), stated:

"Neither military nor intelligence components of the U.S. Government had any knowledge, contemporaneous with the event, that a civilian airliner was flying off course over Soviet territory...our understanding of Soviet actions towards KAL-007 developed only the next day when information from many sources was collated and analyzed."

These facts mean that there was at least a two day period during which the Soviets could easily have disposed of the evidence of what really happened to KAL-007, and thus could easily have concocted their "spy plane" cover-up scenario and deceptive cover story, without any fear whatsoever that U.S. Intelligence would detect their "maskirovka."

C. Soviet Delay U.S. Search Efforts

As noted, the classified U.S. Navy "after action" report on the U.S. search and salvage operations indicates that U.S. naval search
and salvage operations only began in international waters off of Moneron Island only September 5, 1983, 5 days after the KAL-007 shoot-down.

The main reason the 5 day delay in the U.S. search efforts, besides the 3 day intelligence lag, was the State Department’s perceived need to request permission from the USSR to search within Soviet territorial waters off Moneron Island. Of course, the Soviets denied this requests, but they took several days to issue their denial, thus further delaying the U.S. search effort.

Thus, in sum, the U.S. naval task force did not begin diligently searching in international waters off Moneron until as late as September 5, 1983. The State Department’s request to the Soviets to allow searches inside Soviet territorial waters off Moneron Island delayed the U.S. search from September 2, until September 5, 1983, after which time we were obviously searching in the wrong area, which was clearly in international waters.

Moreover, the U.S. Navy task force did not even receive the geographic coordinates, as estimated by U.S. Intelligence from the Soviet radar tracking data combined with the Japanese Defense Force Wakkanai radar tracking data, of the probable KAL-007 wreckage site, until as late as October 14, 1983.

This is almost incredible failure of U.S. Intelligence to have critical information available in a timely way at the right place where it is needed.

As the U.S. Navy Task Force 71 after-action reports notes:

“Had Task Force 71 been permitted to search without the restriction imposed by claimed Soviet territorial waters, the [KAL-007] aircraft stood a good chance of having been found...the operation established, with a 95 per cent or above confidence level, that the wreckage does not lie within the probability area outside the 12 nautical mile area claimed by the Soviets as their territorial limit...Had the Soviets permitted the Task Force to search within their territorial waters, the aircraft may have been found.”

D. Ogarkov Provides the U.S. With False Coordinates of the “Crash” Site

It is interesting to note that even before the U.S. Navy task force arrived off Moneron on September 5th, and during the same period that the U.S. State Department was asking for Soviet permission to enter Soviet territorial waters to search and while the Soviet Foreign Ministry was deliberately delaying its response, the Soviets were eager to provide to us their own version of the geographic coordinates of the probable KAL-007 “crash” site.
It is also interesting that this alleged “crash” site was located by the Soviets in international waters of great depth, far from Soviet territorial waters off of Moneron.

Marshal Ogarkov stated at his September 9, 1983 press conference that:

“We could not give a precise answer about the spot where it [KAL-007] fell because we ourselves did not know the spot, in the first place. And as for the accretions in the Western press that the USSR is hindering searches by the U.S., Japanese, or any other forces, that does not correspond to reality at all...Moreover, the Soviet Government has reported that fragments of an aircraft, which may be taken for the aircraft that fell into the sea, have been found in a certain area. And this government has given the coordinates of these areas where we have found fragments, where our ships and aircraft are also conducting a search. Another matter is that the Soviet Government will for the time being consider that there is no need to enter the territorial waters of the Soviet Union, because the fragments have been found a considerable distance from the borders of the Soviet Union’s territorial waters, and on the strength of this, evidently the search should be made where these signs exists.”

On September 8, 1983, the Soviet Ambassador to Japan gave 4 geographic coordinates of the locations on the ocean where the Soviets had allegedly found debris. But it is interesting that this search area was far away from where the main Soviet search efforts was concentrated, and the depths were at least 900 feet to much deeper. And U.S. Intelligence was misled by this Soviet information into believing that this was where KAL-007 went down.

But Ogarkov was almost certainly lying. As evidenced by the Soviet interceptors engaging in reference point circling over the probable “crash” site, to facilitate radar location efforts, the Soviets probably knew immediately where KAL-007 had gone down. Within 4 hours of KAL-007’s shoot-down, Soviet radar data and Aerial reconnaissance had probably allowed them to pin-point the precise site where KAL-007 had probably ditched on the surface, and this point was probably inside Soviet territorial waters just North of Moneron. Thus the Soviets had clearly mis-reported the location of the area where they supposedly had “found” KAL-007 “crash” debris.

Therefore, the Soviet delayed refusal to allow U.S. searches inside their territorial waters had a deliberate purpose--they wanted to prevent any U.S. discovery of the wreckage of black boxes which could provide evidence under-cutting their cover story that KAL-007 was a "spy plane."

The 1991 Izvestiya series reveals that the Soviets actually recovered KAL-007’s wreckage and black boxes only 11 miles north of
Moneron, thus inside Soviet territorial waters, in relatively shallow water only about 300 feet deep.

But all U.S. searches were in international waters beyond the Soviet 12 mile limit, with depths from between 500 to 2,500 feet, according to the Task Force 71 after action report. Moreover, the 4 Soviet-provided coordinates for the U.S. search in international waters turned out to be deceptive and deliberately wrong.

In sum, Marshal Ogarkov thus surely did intend to hinder the U.S. Navy search as much as he could get away with, and he deliberately tried to delay us, and mislead us into futilely searching in precisely the wrong place. This is thus another good example of Soviet deception, and this deception was directed personally by Marshal Ogarkov himself.

The attached unclassified map comes from the U.S. Navy after action report of the search operations. The shaded area was where the U.S. Navy searched for KAL-007 wreckage, and it spans part of the circumference of the 12 mile limit of Soviet territorial waters to the North of Moneron. It is clear that the U.S. Navy searched only outside the Soviet 12 mile limit. The Soviet decoy “pingers” were placed in the middle of the rectangular area. The three corners of the rectangular area were the false coordinates provided by the Soviets.

But in contrast, the Soviet Navy search was concentrated on the area just inside their 12 mile limit, and they vigorously prevented the U.S. Navy from entering the Soviet 12 mile limit. The Soviets thus searched mainly within the 12 mile limit. It was within this limit that the Ministry of Oil Drilling self-propelled drill ship, the Mirchink, with place-keeping capability at sea, was active or moored. Many (19) Soviet diving activities of several submersibles occurred off the Mirchink, probably to simulate recovery of some KAL-007 debris.

Moreover, the Soviet Navy and its auxiliary vessels committed many serious violations of the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement in these efforts to hinder and disrupt the U.S. search, such as the attempted ramming of several U.S. and allied ships, presenting false flag and false light signals, locking-on the radar guidance of their weapons against U.S. ships, and even sending an armed boarding party to threaten to board a Japanese auxiliary vessel chartered by the U.S. They engaged in a naval live-firing exercises northwest of Moneron Island, and sent Backfire bombers armed with air-to-surface nuclear-armed missiles to threaten the U.S. Navy search task force. The Soviets even went so far as to move U.S. sonar markers delimiting the search area on the ocean bottom. They had a Victor III class submarine, and at least 4 types of submersibles, for this purpose. Finally, the Soviets also manipulated the U.S. Navy search efforts into searching for decoy “pingers” on the sea bottom in very deep, international waters, in
an area designated by the Soviets which was far from where the KAL-007 wreckage was actually located.

Thus our search efforts were in actuality little more than a charade, being played out while the Soviets engaged in their own ruse of pretending themselves to “search” for a wreck they had probably already immediately located, stripped, probably sunk, and probably destroyed under water.

In sum, these facts indicate that U.S. Intelligence was far behind the Soviet air defense forces and the general Staff in figuring out what had happened to KAL-007. Indeed, it took the 1991 Izvestiya series to tell us why we never found any traces of KAL-007—we were searching in the wrong place, having been deliberately sent off the right track by marshal Ogarkov’s wrong search area coordinates, decoy “pingers,” and the displaced reference point markers.

IX. U.S. INTELLIGENCE REFUSAL TO ANALYSE EVIDENCE IT HAD COLLECTED OF SOVIET DECEPTION OVER KAL-007

U.S. Intelligence never seriously considered either the possibility that KAL-007 may have landed safely on Sakhalin, as was originally reported in a press story in Korea attributed to the CIA, or that KAL-007 may have successfully ditched at sea near Moneron or Sakhalin, and that there may have been survivors.

An NSA briefer mentioned the initial Korean report of KAL-007’s survival in a September, 1984 briefing [ ], but he did not describe any intelligence efforts to ascertain the origins or the accuracy of that initial report. No such verification efforts were undertaken, however, because U.S. intelligence precipitously jumped to the conclusion that KAL-007 had catastrophically crashed, when in fact the absence of bodies or luggage or debris was evidence to the contrary. And all the flight path evidence after the hit also indicated a controlled descent.

Moreover, U.S. Intelligence never considered the possibility of a massive Soviet military deception operation and cover-up regarding KAL-007, in the event that any of these possibilities had occurred—that KAL-007 HAD landed safely on Sakhalin, or had successfully ditched at sea near Moneron, or had even crashed—in order to cover-up the many serious Soviet operational mistakes, and to instead to portray the incident as the successful shoot-down of a U.S. reconnaissance plane.

U.S. Intelligence correctly understood that the Soviets were lying about some things, and also that the Soviets were capable of fabrication evidence about the incident, but CIA never stopped to ask why or what the identified lies were intended to cover-up.
U.S. Intelligence did in fact collect extensive evidence in 1983 which could have allowed the conclusion that there was a major Soviet deception effort related to KAL-007, but this evidence was never aggregated and fully analyzed.

The reason that U.S. Intelligence failed to consider or understand its own evidence of Soviet deception over KAL-007 is that U.S. Intelligence had throughout the period 1969-1983 also been consistently refusing to report and analyze scrupulously the continually growing evidence of Soviet deception and violations in regard to arms control treaties. There was endemic “with-holding” and suppression of evidence and analysis of Soviet arms control deception and violations, within U.S. Intelligence and especially within CIA.

There was simply a mindset in U.S. Intelligence throughout the 1970s and up to 1983 that the Soviets were incapable of massive deception on anything important, and that they certainly did not negotiate deceptively or cheat on arms control treaties.

One CIA analyst had written about Soviet deception and cheating in arms control, but he had resigned from CIA in 1978 in a public controversy. Thereafter, CIA suppressed all his writings and evidence, and CIA tried vigorously to disprove his findings and erase his evidence.

Thus after 1978, no CIA or DIA analyst dared to even entertain the hypothesis that the Soviet military was capable of serious deception projects or arms control cheating. But the belated discovery of the Soviet Krasnoyarsk radar in July, 1983, a clearcut violation of the ABM Treaty, together with the drafting of a ground-breaking study of Soviet arms control non-compliance by the President’s General Advisory Committee on Arms Control (the famous “GAC Report”), would slowly begin to affect CIA’s myopia to Soviet deception by the end of 1983. (By January 23, 1984, the CIA was forced to admit that the Soviets had committed major SALT violations over the past 12 years, when the first Presidential Report to Congress on Soviet SALT Violations was delivered.)

**X. U.S. INTELLIGENCE EVIDENCE OF SOVIET COVER-UP AND DECEPTION ON KAL-007 THAT WAS FULLY ANALYZED**

It is important to note that we later learned from highly sensitive special intelligence that as early as several hours after the shoot-down, there was evidence that the Soviet air defense forces in the Far East Military District made secret, “after-action” reports on the incident to Moscow, but they reported the initial detection of KAL-007 25 minutes later than in actuality. This error was later corrected in Marshal Ogarkov’s September 9, 1983 press conference. These initial “after-action” reports cited equipment failures, communications failures, but glossed over the failure to positively identify KAL-007 before shooting it down.
But according to highly sensitive special intelligence, false information and outright lies about the circumstances of the incident immediately began to be suggested in the final after action reports, at the initiative of Moscow, probably by Marshal Ogarkov. The actions of KAL-007 just before it was attacked were described as evasive actions and attempts to escape, indicating that KAL-007 was a “spy plane.”

We also now know from sensitive special intelligence that the Soviet military had a monopoly on all information regarding the incident, which it tightly controlled. All others were prohibited from collecting, discussing, or disseminating any information on the incident.

Moreover, we also know from special sensitive intelligence that Marshal Ogarkov and his deception managers took immediate control of the entire situation. Ogarkov immediately recalled several key generals from the Far East to Moscow, and he sent a deception management team to Sakhalin from Moscow. They tightly controlled what they found out. They probably also engaged in certain “active measures” related to KAL-007’s fuselage, passengers, luggage, and black boxes, as we shall see.

As noted, U.S. Intelligence finally realized from its later access to these secrets Soviet military “after action” reports on KAL-007 that much erroneous data on the incident was first introduced into these reports by Marshal Ogarkov, and was later repeated by Marshal Ogarkov and the General Staff in subsequent erroneous reports to the political leadership. Indeed, there is evidence that the political leadership, especially Foreign Minister Gromyko and General Secretary Andropov, suspected this military falsification, was displeased by it, and was further displeased by what the falsifications indicated about the poor performance of the Soviet air defense forces. But U.S. Intelligence refused to believe that this military falsification may have been part of a much larger deception plot perpetrated against the whole world by Marshal Ogarkov and his General Staff deception department.

Thus there is strong evidence from sensitive special intelligence of a Soviet military cover-up on KAL-007, which was designed to fool not only the whole world, but especially to fool the Soviet political leadership, and that this cover-up of Soviet military malfeasance also became a massive and successful Soviet deception operation. CIA’s own biases and myopia against perceiving Soviet deception caused CIA to fail to understand the significance of their own evidence. Thus CIA was fooled too.

U.S. Intelligence noted at the time several serious falsifications in Marshal Ogarkov’s cover story presented to the world’s press on September 9, 1983. Moreover, as noted, it is now confirmed by Izvestiya that the Soviets placed decoy “pingers” in order to deceive and mislead the September 5–November 6, 1983 U.S.
Navy search efforts near Moneron Island for the true location of the wreckage and the black boxes. And we now know that the Soviets provided false geographic coordinates for the search area in international waters, and even went so far as to move U.S. search area sonar markers on the ocean bottom. Finally, the U.S. Navy after action report states that Soviet naval vessels flew false signal flags and sent false light signals in order to confuse and mislead U.S. search efforts. Thus there was already in 1983 some evidence that Soviet falsification and deception was afoot, and U.S. Intelligence noted some of the individual pieces of this evidence at the time.

A. Ogarkov’s 16 Lies Designed to Demonstrate That KAL-007 Was a “Spy Plane”

The following deliberately false “facts” were originally reported in the secret, initial Soviet military “after action” reports distorted by Marshal Ogarkov and the General Staff deception department, to the Soviet political leadership and Defense Council, according to special intelligence. These same deliberately false “facts” also were used by Marshal Ogarkov publically in his September 9, 1983, international press conference in Moscow. Finally, these same deliberately false “facts” also appear in the Soviet Appendix F to the December, 1983 International Civil Aviation Organization Report:

--1) KAL-007 allegedly approached the U.S. RC-135 off of Kamchatka without signaling, indicating pre-arrangement, and allegedly loitered for ten minutes flying parallel with the U.S. RC-135 Cobra Ball reconnaissance plane outside of Soviet airspace near Kamchatka, allegedly merging with the RC-135 into only one blip on Soviet radar;

--2) KAL-007 allegedly communicated directly with Cobra Ball, during this loitering period, and also made an “all is ready” status report to Cobra Ball just before proceeding into Soviet airspace;

--3) KAL-007 allegedly made encrypted, burst transmission of intelligence data whole over Soviet territory;

--4) KAL-007 allegedly did not have any of its navigation or cabin lights on, and was flying completely blacked out because it was on a secret spy mission;

--5) KAL-007 allegedly coordinated the timing of its intrusion with U.S. intelligence satellites, U.S. naval spy vessels, and other U.S. reconnaissance aircraft, which were all allegedly in the vicinity at the time;

--6) The Soviet SU-15 allegedly fired tracer cannon shells in an effort to wound KAL-007;
--7) The Soviet SU-15 and ground controllers allegedly tried repeatedly to communicate with KAL-007 on the 241 Megahertz international emergency frequency;

--8) The Soviet SU-15 allegedly tried to warn KAL-007 by rocking its wings, and blinking its lights;

--9) The Japanese air controllers and the U.S. allegedly failed to “approach [the USSR] through channels” about the whereabouts of KAL-007 for ten hours;

--10) The Soviets allegedly found no bodies of victims, and the Soviets allegedly did not know where the plane went down;

--11) The Soviet Navy allegedly did not hinder or intimidate the U.S. Navy in its search efforts;

--13) The U.S. Navy allegedly did not need to search in Soviet territorial waters;

--14) KAL-007 allegedly was attacked while it was inside Soviet territorial airspace;

--15) KAL-007’s intrusion allegedly violated the 1944 Chicago Convention and the Standards of the International Civil Aviation Organization;

--16) “No remains of the victims, the instruments or their components or the flight or cockpit voice recorders have so far been discovered.” (Appendix F to ICAO Report.)

Finally, the 1991 Izvestiya series reveals that the Soviets falsified and re-recorded their own audio tape of the communications of their interceptor pilots and their ground controllers during the shoot-down, complete with an electric shaver buzzing in the background to simulate radio static, and also that Pilot Osipovich was ordered to lie in his original 1983 public interviews with the world press, and was even given a false prepared "libretto" script for these interviews.

In fact, Pilot Osipovich in 1991 actually openly criticized Marshal Ogarkov and the Soviet military high command for what he regarded as their lying about the entire incident.

All of these 16 Soviet-alleged “facts” from either the secret military after action reports, or from Marshal Ogarkov’s press conference, or from the ICAO Report Appendix F, or from all three sources, are all designed to prove that KAL-007 was on a spy mission. A study of the Soviet press reports on the KAL-007 incident also shows the deliberate Soviet lies occurred from the time of the very first TASS report on September 1, 1983. This suggests that Marshal Ogarkov was active from the very start in
designing and implementing the massive Soviet deception operation.

But unfortunately for the Soviet “spy plane” cover-story, U.S. Intelligence has hard, conclusive evidence that all of these 16 items of information are completely false, and they all are indicative of a massive Soviet deception operation. The Soviets’ own information and initial after action reports showed clearly that all 16 allegations were deliberate Soviet lies.

U.S. Intelligence thus had strong evidence of Soviet military deception in September, 1983, but failed to understand the significance of the deceptive military cover story.

The fact that U.S. Intelligence collected evidence in September, 1983, indicating a massive Soviet deception operation, but did not understand this evidence in 1983, confirms that active Soviet deception was used in the Soviet military’s cover story. Indeed, the fact that U.S. Intelligence collected the evidence but did not properly evaluate it, proves that U.S. Intelligence was deceived once again by the master deceiver, Marshal Ogarkov.

B. The Timing and Location of Soviet Search and Rescue Efforts Were the Key to Detecting Soviet Deception

The key to understand the scope and purpose of the Soviet KAL-007 deception operation was to inquire into the timing, location, and nature of the Soviet search and rescue operations. But U.S. Intelligence did not do this. The classified U.S. Navy after action report stated:

“Within 6 days of the dawning of KAL-007, the Soviets had deployed 6 ships to the general crash site area...Several areas where intelligence needs to be improved were highlighted during KAL-007 search and salvage operations. Most noticeable among these were the limited information immediately available on-scene concerning Soviet salvage operations, including search operations...there was little analysis of Soviet activity relative to KAL-007 search and salvage operations from shore-based commands...there were several factors...which would have improved the effectiveness of the initial search effort. Principal among these factors were: timely intelligence information with respect to the aircraft flight trajectory and possible crash location...The earliest that the Task Force received the all-source intelligence data in its entirety [on the crash site] was 14 October, almost a month and a half after the shoot-down...Off-board analytic support concerning events of the KAL-007 impact and likely debris areas to be searched was sparse, and on occasion, tome late...Lack of timely availability of required search information precluded early development of an overall detailed plan for the search operation...Soviet objectives appeared to be search and salvage, monitoring and hindrance of U.S. search and salvage efforts, hindering U.S. observation of Soviet efforts, and discouraging
encroachment into claimed territorial waters.”

Thus, as noted, U.S. Intelligence did not prove its own best estimate of the coordinates of the KAL-007 wreckage site until as late as October 14, 1983. And the Task Force 71 after action notes finally that:

“Bottom contour charts requested early on were not provided until two weeks after the commencement of search operations...Large scale charts for the areas being searched were requested but never provided.”

These were incredible operational and analytic failures of U.S. Intelligence.

And as we have seen, the supposedly “conclusive” NSA report of September 3, 1983, made a crucial error on the altitude of KAL-007 4 minutes after it was hit, contradicting the U.S. Secretary of State, and suggesting that it catastrophically crashed.

Moreover, the 1991 Izvestiya series also reveals that active deception (the decoy pingers) was used to disrupt the U.S. search and salvage operations near Moneron. In fact, the Soviets had a Victor III class submarine as part of their search task force, along with an array of at least four types of submirsibles.

In contrast to extensive Soviet use of submarines and submirsibles, the U.S. Navy was reportedly prohibited by the State Department from using its special submarine capabilities to find the KAL-007 wreckage. It is a highly sensitive fact that the U.S. Navy, using these special submarine capabilities, has been able to pick up Soviet missile Re-entry Vehicles off the ocean floor, and also to plant intelligence sensors inside Soviet territorial waters. But we were forbidden to do this, because the State Department was afraid of offending the Soviets.

In sum, special intelligence indicates that Marshal Ogarkov was the Soviet master-mind of strategic “maskirovka.” He had probably planned the Soviet flight test of the illegal SS-25 into the Kamchatka impact area the night of August 31-September 1, 1983, to take full advantage of the camouflage, concealment, encryption of telemetry, and under the cover of darkness, all to safely violate SALT II with minimum risk of detection. Thus it was most likely that Ogarkov gave the order to cancel the flight test upon the unexpected intrusion of KAL-007.

It was tip-off intelligence of this impending SS-25 flight-test that night that caused the U.S. RC-135 Cobra Ball reconnaissance aircraft to be loitering off Kamchatka that night in the first place, and it was probably KAL-007’s unexpected intrusion which caused the cancellation of the SS-25 flight-test.
As noted, we know further that there was an “extraordinary” active Soviet program of using airborne emitters to mask or jam their missile telemetry signals over Kamchatka, and that this program had just begun in August, 1983. The special airborne electronic warfare jamming planes were cancelled as well.

C. The Three Main Elements of Ogarkov’s Deception Operation

In sum, special intelligence and open sources indicate that these were the three main elements of the large-scale Soviet deception operation to conceal what really happened to KAL-007:

--1) the completely false “spy plane” cover-story containing at least 16 serious, deliberate lies, promulgated by Marshal Ogarkov and his special deception commission in the secret military “after action” reports used to cover-up the many operational mistakes of the air defense forces, the resulting “spy plane” cover-story used by Ogarkov to convince the political leadership not to blame the air defense forces for the shoot-down, and the “spy plane” cover-story disseminated by Ogarkov himself in his September 9, 1983 international press conference;

--2) the decoy pingers, false search area coordinates, false flags, false light signals, movement of the U.S. sonar reference markers on the bottom, and fake “search” operations used by the Soviet Navy in international waters off Moneron Island to completely misdirect and hinder the U.S. Navy salvage operations:

--3) the completely false Soviet Appendix F to the International Civil Aviation Organization Report of December, 1983, also containing the “spy plane” cover-story.

There is a fourth major indication of active Soviet deception involving the area surrounding Kamchatka—the special airborne jamming planes, as reported in special intelligence, in addition to the extensive deception activities related to their missile flight testing into Kamchatka.

Finally, the Soviet President and General Secretary at that time was Yuri Andropov, also a master of deception and “active measures” as the former chief of the KGB. Despite Andropov’s reported displeasure over Ogarkov’s efforts to mislead the Soviet political leadership into not blaming the military for the shoot-down, surely the similarly deceitful Andropov would have approved of Ogarkov’s masterful use deception in order to blame the entire incident on the United States in a credulous world.

And Mikhail Gorbachev was Andropov’s protege. In 1983, Gorbachev was a new, junior member of the Politburo being groomed by Andropov for the top leadership post. Thus Gorbachev’s role in the Soviet political leadership in 1983 means that he bears responsibility for the Soviet lies and deception on KAL-007.
XI. IZVESTIYA SERIES PROVES THAT THERE WAS A SOVIET MILITARY COVER-UP OF WHAT HAPPENED TO KAL-007

Thus the public Soviet military explanation of what happened to KAL-007 presented authoritatively since September, 1983 by the Soviet government is that KAL-007 intruded into Soviet airspace on a spy mission for U.S. Intelligence, and that it was justifiably shot down with all passengers killed in the crash. According to this official Soviet explanation, the plane’s wreckage, the bodies of the passengers, and its black boxes were never found.

We now know that KAL-007 was unjustifiably shot down over international airspace. Moreover, the still ongoing series in the official Soviet government newspaper Izvestiya from January-February-May, 1991, on KAL-007 reveals, in summary, the following new information:

1) By about October, 1983, the Soviet military allegedly discovered the black boxes from KAL-007;

2) The Soviet military also discovered the wreckage of KAL-007;

3) The wreckage was found in water about 300 feet deep about 11 miles north of Moneron Island, inside Soviet territorial waters;

4) There were no bodies or luggage discovered, and crabs allegedly ate the bodies;

5) The Soviet Navy dropped decoy “pingers” on the ocean bottom in several places well outside Soviet territorial waters, in order to confuse and mislead the U.S. Navy search and salvage flotilla as to the true location of the wreckage.

6) The Soviet pilot, then-Major, now retired Lieutenant Colonel Osipovich, was ambivalent about what type of airplane he saw that night—he stated in an interview reported in Izvestiya that he did not believe that KAL-007 was a U.S. RC-135 reconnaissance plane, but he still could not identify it. (Osipovich reportedly stated in a later, April 1991, interview with Korean television that he believed KAL-007 to be a passenger airliner when he shot it down.)

Moreover, in Izvestiya, Osipovich accuses Marshal Ogarkov of serious lying in his September 9, 1983 press conference. And the series quotes several Soviet divers and officers involved in the Soviet naval search and salvage operation as saying:

“...Then we had to destroy this material evidence [i.e. the KAL-007 wreckage or aircraft pieces]...they destroyed everything that was turned in...Some [Soviet naval and auxiliary vessels] were searching, some were looking on, and others still--were hiding what
they had found and [were] covering up their tracks...but in fact a concealment operation was going on...This was all a matter of confusing ourselves and others as successfully as possible...”

All of the above new facts from the 1991 Izvestiya series confirm that Marshal Ogarkov and the Soviet military lied to the world about what happened to KAL-007. There was indeed a massive cover-up by the Soviet military to hide their air defense failures, and this cover-up included lying to the Soviet political leadership and to the entire world.

But the Izvestiya series is incomplete, internally inconsistent in some ways, and is seriously misleading in other ways. It surely also contains much continued disinformation. For example, it asserts that the Soviets first “discovered” the wreckage of KAL-007 in October, 1983, when special intelligence shows that it was probably on September 1, 1983, that the Soviets actually found KAL-007. Moreover, the series perpetuates the theory that KAL-007 crashed catastrophically, when the full evidence strongly suggests a successful ditching. Thus the series at best may merely be another cover story, partially unraveling the first lie. Nevertheless, if we now know that Ogarkov lied, then the original mystery deepens—what actually happened to the passengers and to their luggage?

Could there be more to this tragic and mysterious story?

XII. NEW EVIDENCE FROM RECENT RUSSIAN EMIGRES OF WHAT REALLY HAPPENED TO KAL-007

New and extremely provocative, sensitive evidence from recent Russian emigres had provided shocking new information on what may have really happened to KAL-007.

According to this information, as soon as KAL-007 was shot down and successfully ditched, Marshal Ogarkov ordered special maskirovka measures to cover-up evidence of what really happened.

Moreover, Ogarkov immediately ordered a special maskirovka team from the deception department of the Main Operations Directorate and the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff to go to Sakhalin in order to cover-up the evidence of what really happened, and provide the cover story. The Ogarkov deception commission was reportedly headed by then-deputy chief of the GRU, General Varrenikov.

This is consistent with U.S. Intelligence information.

Izvestiya confirms that Soviet air defense Marshal Petr Semenovich Kirsanov, who was then chief of all the air forces in the Far Eastern Theater of Operations, was appointed to head another special military commission sent to Sakhalin even on September 1, 1983. Marshal Kirsanov was known to have been involved in the KAL-007 incident, and he even admitted in the 1991
Izvestiya series that, of course, the Soviets had found the wreckage of the plane, thereby seeming to strengthen the "spy plane" cover story. This air defense commission was probably, however, entirely separate from the General Staff deception commission. And Marshal Kirsanov was probably reprimanded by Ogarkov for the performance of the air defense forces, and relieved of his duties and posted to a lesser job.

Indeed, U.S. Intelligence can confirm that the special General Staff deception commission was sent by Marshal Ogarkov himself, almost immediately, on September 2, 1983, to Sakhalin in order to "investigate" the KAL-007 incident.

There probably were as many as four special military investigative commissions sent to Sakhalin--the first and main one probably from the General Staff deception department and the GRU, the second from the main staff of the Soviet air defense forces, the third from the Far East Theater of Operations, and the fourth from the Far East Military District—all to cover-up the truth by stripping the plane, probably moving it from where it probably ditched in Soviet territorial waters closer to Moneron, sinking it inside Soviet territorial waters North of Moneron, and the blowing it up underwater, and devising the "spy plane" cover-story, and then using the other commissions to promulgate the cover-story. There may even have been a 5th commission, from the defense industry's Ministry of Aviation Industry, to provide some official, civilian cover to the military's multiple deceptions.

The recent emigres provide new information that KAL-007 actually ditched successfully in Soviet territorial waters between Moneron Island and Sakhalin Island, and reportedly that many passengers, including Congressman Larry McDonald, may have survived. The ditched plane was reportedly recovered largely intact by KGB Border Guard boats under the command of KGB General Romanenkov, and it was stripped of all its surviving passengers and their luggage. The emigres also report that a Soviet helicopter pilot saw KAL-007 in one piece on the surface of the ocean. It was then towed to Soviet territorial waters near Moneron, and deliberately sunk in shallow waters inside Soviet territorial limits.

But General Romanenko reportedly did not know what to do with the survivors and their luggage, and he forgot to retrieve the black boxes. He was reportedly disciplined by Ogarkov, relieved, and sent to the Gulag himself, because he made mistakes and knew too much.

So a special team of Soviet divers was reportedly brought in to retrieve the black boxes, and to search the intact hulk in order to discover any spy gear. Finding no spy gear, it was reportedly decided by Ogarkov to blow it up underwater, in order to make it look like it had crashed catastrophically into the sea. Another team of different divers then observed the wreckage, and confirmed
that there were no bodies or luggage.

After reportedly sending all the passengers to special Soviet prison camps for foreigners in the Far Eastern Military District along the coast, on Sakhalin, and also on Wrangel Island, where many such prisons are located, Ogarkov himself reportedly then devised the “spy plane” cover-story, organized the elaborate ruse of the completely fake Soviet “search” and salvage effort, complete with providing the wrong search coordinates to the U.S., and decoy pingers to mislead the U.S. search efforts, and extensive, flagrant Soviet violations of the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement and international law, in order to prevent the U.S. Navy from entering Soviet territorial waters to find the now-destroyed KAL-007 “wreckage.”

The new emigres also state that several Soviet air defense radar sites on the Soviet mainland opposite Sakhalin simultaneously tracked the gradual descent of KAL-007, and that these radars were able to pin point exactly where KAL-007 had successfully ditched at sea near Moneron. The emigres give precise identification of the local air defense commanders, precise locations, and the precise nomenclature of the types of radars involved, all of which seem consistent with existing U.S. Intelligence information. For example, then-lieutenant Valery Vladimirovich Ryzhkov was the duty officer the night KAL-007 went down at Radio Technical Brigade 1845 at the town of Zavet Ilyicha on the mainland coast. He personally tracked KAL-007 in its controlled descent to the water, and he was in communication with at least three other air defense radar sites and several Soviet KGB Border Guard boats which also tracked KAL-007 in its controlled descent. The emigres mention a Soviet air defense radar tracking site at the mainland coastal village of “Nelma,” and such a village is indeed on a map of the mainland coast.

This new emigre information is also consistent with Izvestiya, which states that: “The coordinates of the region where the aircraft was shot down were known by the anti-aircraft defense.” Moreover, the emigres also report that Soviet small boats were immediately on the scene of KAL-007’s ditching, which is also consistent with U.S. Intelligence information.

The recent Russian emigres also report that Marshal Ogarkov himself quickly came to Sakhalin with the extra-special general Staff GRU-deception commission, which as noted, was headed by General Varrennikov of the GRU, the Intelligence directorate of the General Staff. At the direction of General Varrennikov, all the luggage, the black boxes, the navigation and electronic and avionics equipment, were all removed from KAL-007 and sent to Moscow aviation design institutes for analysis. The black boxes were placed inside special containers of sea water for their shipment to Moscow, in order to preserve their environment. These institutes were at Lyubertsy and the Ilyushin Aircraft Design
Bureau, both near Moscow.

U.S. Intelligence can confirm that such institutes are located near Moscow, and would be logical places for the Soviets to send the black boxes. The identities of the people in Moscow who analyzed the black boxes were: Mikhail Alexsandrovich Antipov, Mikhail Yakolovich Shalito, Colonel Uvanaly Tarasenko, and General Alexandr Subbotin.

In Moscow, the analysis of the black boxes reportedly confirmed that KAL-007 had descended under control to “zero” altitude, successfully ditched in shallow water, and that it was definitely not a “spy plane.” In fact, Moscow’s analysis of the black boxes reportedly showed that no “SOS” or “Mayday” emergency signals were sent out as KAL-007 descended, because the pilot was in control, and he saw that they were going to ditch close enough to land to be rescued. The black box analysis did indicate, however, that the tail of KAL-007 had been damaged by one of the Soviet missiles.

The emigres stated that the black boxes contained subsystems marked “Hamilton AIDS.”

After the identity of Congressman Larry McDonald was established, the command came from Moscow to announce that the plane had crashed. General Varrennikov suggested that KAL-007 should be declared to be a “spy plane,” and that it was a drone, sent without any passengers or luggage. Then, as noted, the plane was blown up underwater. The Soviet military planned a major propaganda offensive, to exploit their cover-up “spy plane” version of the incident.

Congressman McDonald reportedly was then taken to Moscow by special plane, and is reportedly imprisoned in the KGB’s Lubyanka prison. The other surviving Americans are reportedly at special prison camps for foreigners along the Trans-Siberian border and on Wrangel Island.

The recent Russian emigres confirm the key role of Marshal Ogarkov in the cover-up and “spy plane” deception. The details of Ogarkov’s role in the deception operation are confirmed by sensitive special intelligence. Also significantly, the emigres stated, as noted, that when Soviet experts in Moscow opened up the black boxes, they found the words “Hamilton AIDS” on the insides. “Hamilton AIDS” has been confirmed by both Boeing and other aviation experts to be marked on subsystems of the black boxes of 747s.

XIII. CONCLUSION: KAL-007 PROBABLY DITCHED SUCCESSFULLY, THERE MAY HAVE BEEN SURVIVORS, THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN LYING MASSIVELY, AND DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS NEED TO BE MADE TO RETURN THE POSSIBLE SURVIVORS
and from special intelligence, altogether strongly suggest that
KAL-007 successfully ditched at sea, that there may have been
survivors, and that the Soviets have been engaged in massive lying
and a major deception on this entire incident from the very start.

As former President Reagan stated on September 2, 1983, just
after the shoot-down of KAL-007:

“What can be said about Soviet credibility when they so
flagrantly lie...? What can be the scope of legitimate mutual
discourse with a state whose values permit such atrocities? And
what are we to think of a regime which establishes one set of
standards for itself and another set for the rest of mankind?”

In conclusion, much work remains to be done in checking and
verifying the new evidence from the new Russian emigres.

Finally, attached is an annex illustrating that the problem of
Soviet deception goes all the way back to the beginning of the
Bolshevik regime in 1921. Also to annex is an official U.S.
Government 1990 statement on the KAL-007 incident.

ANNEX 1: Memorandum by Earl Curzon on the Krassin Negotiations,
February, 1921.

ANNEX 2: Official U.S. Government 1990 Statement on KAL-007 Incident

ANNEX 3: Official U.S. State Department Documents on U.S.
Statements on KAL-007